The marvellous, in fine, is carried to its highest extent in religious belief. As almost every religious system, whether pagan or inspired, has for its object things which reason can neither analyze nor conceive, there is an ap parent cause for excluding reason entirely from the con templation of such high subjects. But a careful distinc tion should be drawn between what reason cannot really penetrate, and what is palpably absurd and unfounded, and cannot in truth exist. In not a few of theological systems, belief comprehends not only what, from its very nature, is too high for the human understanding, but what is con trary to it. And priests, who are the authors of this cor ruption, and who find it an inexhaustible source of power and wealth, have too much interest in continuing the delusion, not to resist every examination of their discoveries, and to enforce faith at the expense of reason. This blind submission, which is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of the reformed religion, and to that appeal made to all men to examine their faith, which constitutes reform, seems to have been revived by the reformed churches themselves, so soon as they were established—so soon as they no longer formed an opposition in the bosom of another church, a minority called upon to attack or defend themselves by reason and argument, the only weapons by which men can be effectually and permanently convinced. Wickliffe, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, appealed from faith to reason and examination, from prejudice to judgment ; and the exercise of our faculties which they recommended, has conferred upon us the advantages which we now enjoy. But the candour which characterized the early reformers has in a great degree disappeared ; our doctrine is still that of the reformed church, but our language does not correspond with our doctrines. A certain degree of the wonderful, a certain degree of blind superstitious belief, the submission of reason to faith, constitute a prejudice so essentially interwoven with the nature of the human mind, that no small proportion of the reformed churches have adopted and enforced principles which have rendered re form an empty name, and which are as absurd and as little supported by Scripture as any of the dogmas which reform has superseded. They behold with and displeasure the exercise of reason in investigating the truth of doc trines which they wish to be implicitcly adopted and believ ed, and they regard, as the first of virtues, that disposition which, in prohibiting doubt, renders examination, and afterwards rational conviction, impossible.
The eagerness we have to believe—the thirst we pos sess for the marvellous, is still more decidedly manifested in the successive adoption of opinions which are common to every religious system. The more any particular dogma is repugnant to sense, to reason, and to all the means we have of knowing truth, it is adopted with the greater zeal, and maintained with the keener animosity. Words susceptible of two interpretations, the one according to reason, the other contrary to it, have uniformly been taken in their mysterious sense, because this meaning required a great sacrifice of the understanding. Figurative and poetical expressions have, on this principle, been interpreted in their literal sense, even contrary to the evidence of the text in which they occur. The history of heresies, which presents to us doctrines founded, not on the word of God, but on the fancies and dogmas of men, proves to us that opinionS, which are the most wild and extraordinary, are preferred to those supported by reason, by Scripture, or by nature. The belief in transubstantiation may serve as an example of this tendency in the human mind to select the most absurd and incredible inferences from words suscep tible of a simple and rational explanation ; and upon the same principle, opinions of the most important kind are not unfrequently founded on expressions, which to an un prejudiced mind would convey no such ideas, and which, front the different shades of meaning in which they might be used, would be insufficient to establish the authenticity of a single historical fact.
Testimony,.of whatever kind, is modified in a greater or less degree by our love of the marvellous. A man, whose prejudices are strong, and who wishes to give poignancy and effect to what he relates, does not know, or does not reflect, that he is distorting and qualifying the truth. He thus, without apparently intending it, rejects circumstances which appear to him trivial, but which, not withstanding, to other minds might have been the source of doubt or conviction ; he twists events ; he assigns effects to erroneous causes; and he forms a regular and con nected narrative from detached and isolated facts, incapable of themselves, without prejudice, of any such interpretation. The impression, however, which he thus wishes to make, is that which most flatters his imagination, and which is most closely allied to the marvellous. We ought not therefore to form an unfavourable opinion of the person who relates to us extraordinary facts ; nor to believe that he intends to misrepresent or to deceive; but, before admit ting the truth of his recital, we ought to endeavour to ascertain and analyze the prejudices by which he is influ enced, and the effect which they are calculated to have on his iudgnient and his principles. We ought to remember that these prejudices may have led him to suppose he saw things which did not exist, merely because he had a plea sure in seeing them, and that he has related events which never took place, merely because he derived a gratification in confounding his imagination with his memory. Let us not say of an ocular witness that he could not have been deceived, for probably he took delight in being deceived, and the eyes which so anxiously sought the wonderful, 'experienced no great difficulty in finding it. Such a per son, we ought to reflect, can have no interest in deceiving us ; the only interest he feels is giving way to extraordi nary impressions, and making extraordinary recitals. Let us, therefore, doubt of the facts without condemning the credibility of the witness ; and to the universal prejudice of the vulgar, which adopts, amplifies, and propagates whatever is wonderful, let us oppose the prejudice of the wise, which doubts and distrusts.
III. The Prejudices of Sensibility.
In addition to memory and imagination, sensibility may be mentioned as substituting impressions in the room of reason and judgment; or, in other words, as the source of various prejudices. A state of apathy and indifference is probably the most uninteresting, and the least happy con dition in which we can be placed. Whatever, therefore, has a tendency to develop our faculties and rouse our affections, to make us, as it were, live more and feel more, affords us pleasure and satisfaction. We are anxiously desirous of every thing that can excite joy or sorrow, love or hatred. We are gratified to feel and to know that our heart is filled with emotions, whether these be painful or otherwise. Though these emotions be of the most oppo site and heterogeneous character, they still afford us proof that our sympathy and sensations are strong, and that we are formed for feeling an interest in life—circumstances which are the source of much satisfaction and delight. The necessity and desire, therefore, of having our emotions and sympathy excited, are the principal cause of the pre judices which sensibility rouses and develops.