Determined to carry his arms into the east, he sent twelve legions to Brundusium. In the beginning of the year he arrived with five legions and 600 horse, in Chaonia in Epirus, and sent back two ships to bring over the rest of his army. Pompey was equally ac tive in marshalling his forces; and had received rein forcements of extraordinary magnitude both from Europe and from Asia. He had obtained one legion from Sicily, one from Crete, and two from Syria. The princes in alliance with Rome raised three thou sand archers, six cohorts of stingers, and seven thou sand horse. The free Asiatic cities joined him with their best troops; and he is said to have received suc cours from Arabia and Ethiopia, and even from the Indus and the Ganges. His own army comprehended almost all the Roman knights, and the flower of the young nobility; and his soldiers were principally vete rans, accustomed to all the dangers and privations of war. His fleet consisted of about 500 ships, and his army was accompanied by the two consuls of the last year, and about 200 Roman senators. The cause of Pompey was therefore everywhere considered as the cause of the Roman commonwealth. Those who had hitherto remained neutral flocked to his standard; and all who were distinguished by their patriotism and their virtues had taken refuge in his camp. When Cxsar had landed in Epirus, he took Oricum and Cephalonia; and he was on the eve of marching to Dyrrachium, which contained Pompey's maga zines, when he heard that thirty of the ships which he had sent back to Brundusium had been taken by Bibulus, one of Pompey's admirals, and that his troops at Brundusium were likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, who possessed all the harbours between Salonium and Oricum. Under these circum stances, Cxsar offered to make peace with Pompey, on the conditions that the armies of both should be disbanded in three days; that their former friendship should be solemnly renewed, and that they should re turn together into Italy. These terms were twice sent to Pompey, who refused to enter into any accommo dation. Caesar therefore advanced towards Dyrrha chium; but Pompey having entrenched himself in its immediate neighbourhood, he was disappointed in his expectations of taking it by surprise. The two hostile armies were unwilling to engage; and Cxsar, who was sensible of his great inferiority in numbers, sent the most urgent despatches to Mark Antony to hasten to his assistance. Having received no reply to these demands, he disguised himself in the habit of a slave, and resolved, in the frail bark of a fisherman, to cross over to Brundusium, through the enemy's fleet; but the boat being driven back by contrary winds, he despatched Posthumius with the most ur gent orders to Mark Antony to bring over the troops at every hazard. These succours at last arrived under Mark Antony and Calenus, who landed them safely at Nyphccum. Pompey attempted in vain to prevent their junction with the main army, and no sooner had Cfesar collected his forces than he offered Pompey battle, and drew up his army in his sight. Pompey, however, declined the engagement, and encamping on a hill called Petra, which commanded the sea, he expected to be supplied lvith pruNisiuns from tireeLe and Asia, while his rival would be reduced to the ne cessity of procuring them from Epirus by a danger ous and expensive route.
Csar, who saw his design, conceived the bold plan of besieging Pompey in his camp. He drew round it a line of circumvallation, and hemmed in Pompey so completely, that his horses died for want of forage, though his troops were liberally provided for by sea. Cxsar's army suffered great distress for want of corn, but those of' his men who had been in Sardinia made bread from an herb called c/xra, which they steeped in milk. The diseases which broke out
in Pompey's camp, and the want of forage, forced him to break through the line of the enemy. Em barking his archers, slingers, and light infantry, he marched at the head of' sixty cohorts to attack the part of Cxsar's lines next the sea that were incom plete. The seventh legion who defended them gave wai•; and notwithstanding the succours that were sent by ;)larcellinus, Pompey was successful till a power ful body of troops under Mark Antony compelled him to retire. Cxsar now attempted to seize a post occu pied by a legion of Pompey's troops. He accordingly attacked it with thirty-three cohorts, and in spite of the most powerful resistance, penetrated to the second entrenchment. Cxsar's right wing, however, mis took the entrance into the camp, and having separated from the left wing, were thrown into great disorder, which Pompey no sooner perceived, than he attacked them with his cavalry and completed the defeat. Csar attempted in vain to rally his routed soldiers, who left thirty-two Roman eagles in the hands of' the enemy.
Mortified, but not disheartened by this severe de feat, Cesar addressed his army with the most sooth ing eloquence, and retired to Appollonia. He thence marched to Macedon, with the view either of drawing Pompey into a general engagement, or of cutting off Scipio MeteIlus, Pompey's father-in-law. The news of his late defeat threw immense obstructions in his way; but having marched into Thessaly, the principal towns opened their gates to him.
The dilatory conduct of Pompey, though no doubt founded on true wisdom, and on a thorough know ledge of the talents and situation of Cxsar, began to give umbrage to his own officers; and under the influ ence of these feelings, which had extended themselves even to the common soldiers, he resolved upon risk ing a general battle. With that view, he occupied the wide plain of Pharsalia between Pharsalus and Philippi, where he was joined by his father-in-law MeteIlus.
Pompey pitched his camp on the declivity of a mountain which was entirely inaccessible; but he was deeply impressed with the propriety of destroying his enemy by the slow weapons of fatigue and hunger, rather than staking his whole fortune on the issue of an engagement with a brave and almost desperate army. He therefore himself of various pre tences to evade an action, till he was compelled to it by the unanimous decision of a council of war, which his officers had almost forced him to assemble. Hav ing determined to offer Pompey battle, Cxsar led out his army; but Pompey still kept his advantageous position under the cover of his trenches at the foot of the hill. Unwilling to attack his enemy in such a position, Caesar resolved to decamp next day, and had just strut,: his tents when he learned that Pom pey had quitted his entrenchments and advanced into the plain. He immediately halted his army, and drew them up in order of battle. The army of Caesar did not exceed 22,000 foot and 5000 horse, while that of Pompey was above 45,000 foot and 7000 horse. In order to make up for this inequality in his cavalry, Caesar had selected the strongest and the most active of his foot soldiers, and taught them to fight between the ranks of his cavalry. Pompey placed his veteran troops in the centre and two flanks of his army, and he distributed his new levies over the main body of the army. Scipio commanded the Syrian legions in the centre, Domitius Ahenobarbus led the Spaniards on the right wing, which was covered by the river Cnipus, while Pompey placed himself at the head of two legions on the left, where he had assembled all his horse, slingers, and archers, with the view of making the most vigorous attack from that quarter.