In order to prevent the enemy from attaining his ob ject by any movement, we may remain obstinately in.
our position, if it be such as gives us an opportunity of inflicting such injury upon him as must necessariis de tain him ; or we may incase ourselves to the place of his destination, or to an opposite quarter, either with the %%home or a part of the army We should march with the whole army towards the pace of the enemy's destination, when we know for certain that he will, or that he must move to that point ; or that we should risk a great deal by suff•ring him to accomplish his object. but would be in no clant.er should he afterwards relinquish it, and even make some other movement. In this case, the army nor-t be prepared for battle, if it should not be thought preferable inereiv to encamp opposite to that of the ene my, with a bet teen. \V should march with a part of the army towards the enemy's point of des•ina tion, either when the enemy himself employs only a part of his force, or when a part of the army is sufficient to frustrate the enemy's design ; for example. when the obj•..ct is to prevent the passage of a defile, which a part of the army can defend against the whole force of the enemy ; or, in case of the investment of a fortress, where the mere reinforcement of the gall ison with one or two thousand men is frequently suffi •ient to frustrate the whole enterprise.
We may move with the whole army in an opposite di rection, 1. When we are certain of being able to inflict upon the enemy a blow, which will be of more conse quence than any m dvantage which he could derive from his movement. 2. When we are equally certain that the apprehension of the blow which we may strike will compel him to abandon his design. We may employ only a part of the army in such a movement, if a part be sufficient to inflict the intended blow; if it he neces sary that we should be prepared, after executing the blow, to move in the direction which the enemy has taken ; if we be uncertain whether the enemy may not abandon his design, from apprehension of the blow which We threaten ; or if, by withdrawing the whole army from the position which it occupies, we should expose our selves to danger.
Feigned marches are such as are made, not for the purpose of accomplishiog our real design, hut in order to induce the enemy to mike some movements, w•lich shall enable us more elT,ctualiy to a•tain our object. These may also be performe I, Lit ler with the .vnole or a part of t.te army. The design with %vhi h we blind the cncm), must be a probable out, .mud such as he may easily take for our true ohjact. The more probable the beat( r ; and best of all, when it may be c inverted into the true one we such a movement is •de with the whole army, we must take care that it do not lead us too fat from our real object, much ess give the enemy an opportunity of rendering it entire ly abortive For this reason, the m•t is frequently performed slowly, the army is extended, and the mdvaileed gonad, esp•eially light troops, spread far out in front. The movement
is gem:tally performed by dispatching a division of the army towards that side on which the feint is ma le, with a number of light tro•ms to conceal its real strength. A . I should the enemy f dlow ibis diviston. we may then move with the rest of the army, or a part of it, towards the true object. In this case, it will be of advant ,gc if it be not necessary for the detached corps to forum a junction with us before we commence our movement ; but that we begin at once, and at the same time, send an cider lot• its retuin. Meanwhile, false repots with re spect to our designs may be circulated, but in such a way as may induce the enemy to believe them to be true. Tie corps which is detached fur the purpose of executing the feigned movement must, of course, be under no apprehensions for its own safe ty.
An arms, weak in numbers, cannot make detach ments while near a superior enemy ; because they may be cut off, and beaten in detail. With a small army. it should he a maxim to act constantly in a body ; for it cannot attempt to form any enterprises but by the ob servance of this rule. The system of covering every poi',t must be abandoned. and our endeavours solely confined to the preservanoa of that object, which event ually must determine the success of the campaign. If, for example, the enemy should detach a corps to riper to a diversion, capture a magazine, or undertake a siege, opportunities may arise of attacking him with a force otherwise far inferior. Should he he defeated, his de tachment must likewise retreat, and his whole project is rendered abortive. A small army is also sometimes enabled to fall upon these detachments bi fore they can retire, or be sustained by the main army.* Every place where is is necessary to march with a very small front, including, or bridges, is call ed a defile. It is necessary to dis'inguisn the entrance, the defile itself, and the outlet, or debouche. N as troops, so long as they are in the defile, are in a defenceless state ; and if one part be on o.me side, and the rest on the other. neither can come speedily to the assistance of the other; the passage of a defile is diffi cult. and easily opposed. D fi,es, therelore, have al ways been of great importance in war.