For the convenience of the march, it is requisite, 1. To prepare as many good roads as can be got ready or the army, and to avoid defiles as much as possible. The artillery, indeed, must have the firmest and most convenient road ; but the cavalry also must avoid mo rasses, woods, steep hills, ravines, and such like, and rather take a circuitous route. With infantry, on the other hand, regard is principally had to the shortness of a road, and to the facility with which the soldiers can march upon it. 2. Care must be taken in passing defiles, that the troops pass speedily, and in regular order ; and the head, when out of the defile, should not be allowed to run on, but should shorten their pace. For nothing fatigues troops more than the con stant change from halting to running, which is una voidable in the irregular passage even of the most trifling defile. 3. The marches ought not to be too long, nor too rapid ; and all unnecessary circuits should be avoided. 4. All the columns, so far as is possible, should march out of the old encampment, and into the new one, at once ; and no part of the army should have a perceptibly longer or shorter route than the rest. 5. For the convenience of the army, the four niers and sharp-shooters are sent on with the advanced guard, in order to mark out the camp, that the troops may march into it without delay.
On every march, an order is issued, containing an exact description of the number of the columns, and the troops of which they consist ; of the strength and composition of the advanced or rear-guard, or the flank covering parties and patroles ; of the precise route of each column, and all else that is to be observed during the march.
An army does not always carry all the necessary supplies along with it ; nor is it always in a situation to receive these supplies from a distance, without the apprehension of their being cut off by the enemy. When supplies, therefore, are to be brought by a road to which the enemy has access, the convoy must be covered by a party of troops. This is one of the most difficult operations in war; because even a small con voy—suppose one hundred waggons—will occupy a line too considerable to be easily covered by a small body of troops. The strength of the covering party, however, must be regulated chiefly by the probable operations of the enemy. It consists generally of ca valry, infantry, and light troops ; but the description of troops must depend much upon the nature of the ground.
An advanced guard precedes the convoy, %which bears a certain proportion to the whole covering party. The infantry occupy all the villages, bridges, woods, &c. through which either the convoy is to pass, or an attack is to be apprehended from the enemy. The light troops scour the country in front, as far as they can with safety, and examine every place in which the enemy might con ceal themselves. In a flat open country, the cavalry of the advanced guard spread out, to cover the convoy in front, and to support the advanced parties of hussars ; but always in such a manner, that they can easily draw together, and unite to oppose the enemy. A part of the covering party marches in small sections beside the con voy, either on both sides, if both are exposed to an at tack from the enemy, or, as is generally the case, only on one side. While the convoy is passing along, all the
approaches are kept occupied, and the light troops con tinue to examine the country around.
The convoy must also have a rear guard, which fol lows at a proper distance, and has its light troops be hind. The infantry relieves all the posts of the ad vanced guard and the flank-covering party, and occu pies them as long as is necessary. On plains, the cavalry covers the rear of the convoy by its manoeuvres.
A large convoy occupies so much ground, that it is only possible to cover it against an attacking enemy, when the latter approaches by a way which is known in sufficient time to admit of their passage being opposed. Otherwise, it is necessary to make the convoy drive up, in order that it may occupy less space. In this case, the different posts and detached parties must be at such a distance from the convoy, as to give sufficiently early intelligence of the approach of the enemy ; and they must also do every thing in their power, by defensive operations and manoeuvres, to detain him. In passing a defile, the convoy must drive up before entering it. An investigation must then be made, as far as possible, to ascertain whether any attack is meditated by the enemy, and if none is apprehended, the passage commences, after a proper proportion of the covering party has been advantageously posted on the other site of the defile. The waggons, as they effect their passage, drive up again, the remainder of the covering party then passes, and the whole proceed in their march. In all situations where it is intended to rest, the waggons must be driven up, and form a barricado ; the horses placed within, and all the necessary dispositions previously made for the protection of the convoy.
When an attack is to be made by the enemy, the convoy should be formed into a barricado, in an advan tageous position, as, for example, with one or two of its sides leaning on a village, on a large strong building, a river, a wood, a ravine, &c. or upon a height, which the enemy must climb before he can make an attack. In order to form this barricado, the carriages are driven up close to each other, and the troops place themselves behind, and fire. The cavalry are advantageously placed in the Nicinity, in order to molest the enemy during the attack. Shold the enemy, however, attack with cannon, more especially with howitzers, the defence of the convoy in this manner could hardly prove successful. Th.- best plan, in such circumstances, would be, to advance to wards the enemy, to take an advantageous position be tween hint and the convoy, in which he would be com pelled to attack us, and there to fight him. But even upon this plan the convoy must be driven up ; for to cover it on a march by such a manoeuvre could only be practicable in extremely favourable and rare circum stances, in respect to the situation of the ground, when the enemy had only one approach to the convoy, and that one capable of being occupied and defended.