It is not an easy matter, then, to define the limits of reason in religion. \Vhat it can do we can only conjecture; having no certainty that there is one article of the religious creeds which have been cur rent among men, that can be set down as the result of unassisted reason. Were we inclined to pre serve the distinction between natural and revealed religion, we would not limit the former by attempt ing to draw a strict line of demarcation between it and the doctrines of revelation; but we would con sider as within its province all those doctrines which, whether they have been the result of reason or not, are at least cognizable by it, and capable of being established by its deductions, though they may not have been discovered by its researches. This is extending the boundaries of natural reli gion, without encroaching on revelation: it is only giving reason the advantage of all the light which revelation has imparted, and considering as within its legitimate province those matured results which correspond with its dictates, though they may have originated in revelation. Of this kind are the doc trines respecting God, providence, a future state, &c. which have been set in the clearest light by re velation; yet our improved knowledge on these subjects is so perfectly conformable to the dictates of natural reason, that we can scarcely persuade ourselves hut that reason, by its own efforts, might have reached them.
The doctrines peculiar to revelation are of a dif ferent description, and easily distinguishable from those mentioned above. The trinity, incarnation, atonement by Christ, resurrection of the body, &c. are doctrines not discoverable by reason. But we are not on this account to suppose that they are not proper subjects of reasoning. They may be established by argument, by ascertaining the genu ineness and authenticity of the records in which they are contained, and the value of the testimony on which they rest; and by considering, at the same time, the reflex light which they cast on the gov ernment of God, and on the character and condi tion of men. \Ve are farther to consider, that though the doctrines peculiar to revelation could not be discovered by human reason, nor, even after they arc known, can they be comprehended by the human faculties, yet in no instance do they contra dict the dictates of enlightened reason: they are above it, but not contrary to it. It would be abso lutely impossible to believe a revelation which con tradicts any ascertained principle of pure reason. This may be considered as an axiom in theology; for a revelation must come from the same being who has formed the mind of man and the constitu tion of nature; and we cannot conceive that the word of God can ever contradict his works, or that he should command us to believe any doctrine which the reason he has given us compels us to reject. But in admitting this axiom we must be extremely careful to free reason from the influence of the pas sions, and from the power of those prejudices which tend to bias its decisions, otherwise we will measure doctrines and facts, not by the standard of reason, but by the strength of our inclinations and feelings.
Revelation has certainly nothing to fear from the strictest scrutiny, provided it be fairly conducted; but it has no chance before a prejudiced judge, against perjured witnesses, and a corrupted jury.
But from the influence which we have ascribed to revelation and tradition, in forming the religious creed of mankind, a greater uniformity of opinion may perhaps be expected; and it may probably be thought that some traces of all the doctrines of re vealed religion ought to be found even amidst the mythology and fables of the heathens. Many con tend that this is actually the case; but we think they carry their arguments too far. We hold that no traces of many of the important doctrines of revelation are to be found in the religious creed of the heathen; and for this reason, that these doc trines were withheld from the world, except in the obscure imitations of figure and prophecy, till the period of the Christian revelation; and therefore they could only be known where that revelation was announced and received. It has been said, for exam ple,that the doctrine of atonement for sin was no new doctrine, since it has a place in the creed of all na tions, inasmuch as they have all trusted in expiatory sacrifices. This, in a certain sense, is true: the prac tice of sacrificing has been almost universal, and its object has always been the remission of or the procuring of blessings. It is difficult to account for this practice, as the offspring of reason: it is not difficult to trace it to the Scripture history; for we read that Cain and Abel, the first-born of the human race, offered sacrifices to God. It is not said, however, on what authority they did so. We are inclined to ascribe it to a divine injunction which is not recorded; the more particularly, as God after wards saw it expedient solemnly to enjoin the prac tice to the Jews. If it is the offspring of reason, Cain must have the honour of the invention, as he is mentioned as the first who sacrificed to God.
But whether the general practice of sacrificing arose from this primeval source, or whether it is an invention within the ordinary reach of human reason, this at least is certain, that the Scripture doctrine of atonement through Christ was alto gether a new doctrine, except in so far as it was announced in the predictions of the prophets. It is altogether beyond the reach of human reason; and appeared so strange, that, with all the aid of pre vious education, it was a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, both to the Jews and Gentiles. We need not be surprised then, that the doctrine in this shape should have no place in the creed of the an cient heathen, since it was concealed even from the people of God, till the fatness of lime, when every thing in the plans of providence was ripe for its dis closure.