1. The sovereign has a right to forbid all foreigners to pass through, or enter his dominions, whether by land or sea, without express permission first obtained, even if such passage or entry should not be prejudicial to the state. Now-a-days, however, no power in Europe refuses, in time of peace, to grant such permission to the subjects of an other power ; nor is it even necessary for such subjects to ask permission to enter a state and bring their property into it. Thus then the liberty of entry and passage may be con sidered as generally established between the post ers of Eu rope ; and it is particularly so among the states of the German empire. But as this liberty ought not to become prejudicial to the state, every power has reserved to itself the right, first, To be informed of the name and quality of every foreigner that arrives ; and to this end, passports taken at the place from whence a foreigner conies ought to be regarded as authentic, provided they hat e been granted by persons having authority to grant them, such as sovereigns, magistrates, or foreign ministers; second, Each state has a right to keep at a distance all suspicious persons; third, Each state has a right to forbid the entry of foreigners, or foreign merchandises of a certain descrip tion, for a time or for ever, as circumstance may require ; fourth, The liberty of entry and passage extends to indi viduals only. A number of armed men, before they enter the territory of a foreign state, must have an express per mission from the sovereign. This takes place also with respect to vessels of war entering a port to take shelter under the cannon of a fortress, unless this permission has already been granted by treaty.
2. The expenses of government ought to be defrayed by all those who enjoy the protection of the state. When the revenue of the domains is not sufficient for the pur pose, imposts must he raised. A foreigner, enjoying the protection of the state, cannot, while he remains in it, ex pect to be entirely exempted from imposts. Besides, it may be made a condition of his admission. He may even be loaded more heavily than the native subjects of the state, if no treaty between this state and his own specifies the contrary. Yet, as far as concerns personal imposts, it is customary not to exact them from foreigners till they have for some time been inhabitants of the state. Imposts on real estates, on the contrary, and duties on the entry and consumption of merchandises, ought to be paid indis criminately by foreigners as well as subjects, unless they can prove an exemption. Consequently, the tolls that are imposed for the maintenance of institutions of public utility, such as turn-pike roads, canals, Scc. are col lected indiscriminately from those who profit from such in stitutions.
3. One of the most essential rights in the hands of the sovereign, is the judiciary power. It extends
nately to all who are in the territory, and the sovereign only is the source of it. But it must be remembered, first, That there are persons whose exterritoriality exempts them from this jurisdiction, such as foreign princes and their minis ters, with their retinues ; second, That the sovereign some times grants to foreigners the privilege of being tried by their own judges, under the name of consuls, or some other title.
The tribunals of a state being intended to supersede all acts of violence between individuals, foreigners, even though they should not live in the territory, are obliged to address themselves to these tribunals to obtain justice against the subjects of the state ; and if those against whom they proceed should be only temporary subjects, they must nevertheless plead at the same tribunals. But, on the other hand, the sovereign is, to all intents and pur poses, obliged to administer justice to them as promptly and as impartially as if they were his own subjects.
Foreigners have never a right to demand a preference in judicial proceedings, nor have they a right to demand judgment by a special court. And if (in cases where the competence of the judge is indisputable) the cause has been determined according to form, and the judge is not suspected of having acted contrary to his duty, the sen tence that he has pronounced in the last resort cannot be called in question by any foreign power, whose subjects may be dissatisfied with the decision. This principle is justified by the reciprocal advantage of nations.
But a formal refusal of justice, or an unusual delay, is a violation of the law of nations. And if a foreign suhject has reason to complain of it, his sovereign may not only re taliate, but may make use of all the means employed by na tions when their rights are invaded by others. He may make reprisals, and even declare war, to oblige the state, which has thus failed in its duty, to make a proportionate satisfaction.
4. In determining the effect that a sentence pronounced in one state may have in other states, it is necessary to dis tinguish two points: its execution and its validity. With respect to the first, no sovereign is positively obliged to execute in his territory a sentence that has been pronounced out of it. Nevertheless, first, The particular connection subsisting between several states, and in virtue of which they form a compound state, may oblige them to execute reciprocally every sentence pronounced by a competent judge. Second, Sometimes states enter into reciprocal en gagements by treaty, for the purpose of executing sen tences. Third, Friendship and utility often induce a state not to refuse the execution of a sentence pronounced by a competent judge, when the usual request has been made, with an offer of rendering the like service.