RELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY.
Conflicts often arise in the relations of the executive and judiciary, due chiefly to the adop tion of the doctrine of separation of powers and the fact that unconstitutional actions and laws are referred to the courts for determina tion. This conflict of relations is most noted as regards the State executives and the Fed eral courts. Amendment XI of the Constitu tion provides that athe judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or sub jccts of any foreign State."' Nevertheless the courts have decided that this amendment does not apply to an injunction or mandamus suit brought against a State officer under a Federal statute or constitutional 'provision (Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123). On the other hand suits against Federal officers in the State courts have been rare and never successful (see, for instance, Ableman vs. Booth, 21 Howard 506; Tarble's Case, 13 Wallace 397). Conversely, in 1793 Congress passed an act prohibiting Federal courts to issue writs of injunction in order to stay proceedings in State courts, save in matters of bankruptcy ((Rev. Stat.' 720). Broadly speaking, the executive is not subject to judicial control in cases of discretion nor in any political matter, save that any executive order which is unconstitutional is null and void, even though it be issued by the President him self ; and any officer or other person executing such unconstitutional order is liable in dam ages (Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170). In
the case of Marbury vs. Madison (consult also Cranch 137) Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the doctrine that although the court could not interfere with the prerogatives of the execu tive it could and would command a head of a department to perform a duty not dependent on executive discretion; but the question of such executive coercion has not been extended to the President. Furthermore, so far as the President and Secretary of War are concerned, the court has decided, that purely political ac tions by an executive are not subject to judicial review or injunction (4 Wall. 475; 6 Wall. 50). But while unauthorized and unconstitutional executive orders are null and void and private parties have the right to sue for damages those executing such the mere allegation of is not sufficient ground for the courts to enjoin the enforcement of a stat ute by the executive. In Wilson vs. Shaw (204 U. S. 24) Justice Brewer expressed the opinion, since Congress had ratified the executive action, that the courts °have no supervising control over the political branch of the government in its action within the limits of the Constitution.) Indirectly through the appointing power the ex ecutive has considerable influence over the judi ciary. See UNITED STATES- JUDICIARY OF THE; SUPREME COURT; COURT.