The most serious situation which developed any time during the war in connection with the food supply doubtless was during the winter of 1917-18 when the ravages of the submarine and other causes had depleted the available stocks of the allies to a very low point. How near this came to being a real calamity to the cause of the Allies was not generally known until a considerable time after danger was past. Thanks to the conservation which the Ameri can people had been practising during the year or so preceding this period and to extraordi nary efforts which were made to ship large quantities of food to Europe in a hurry, the critical situation was overcome. Throughout the whole North American hemisphere the crops of 1917 were in general bad. In addi tion to inevitable reduction of crop areas at tributable directly to the war, the harvests pro duced were not as large as they should have been. And yet out of a scant crop in 1917 more was sent to the Allies than had been sent out of the abundant crops of the preceding years. This was due to the wonderful savings made by the conservation measures in effect in the United States. The voluntary reductions in wheat alone during the first year of the Food Administration's operation in the United States saved 125,000,000 bushels out of the normal consumption. Taking into account the fact that generally speaking the 1917 crops were far below normal and that in spite of that fact $1,400,000,000 worth of food was shipped to Europe, the accomplishments of the United States in helping to feed the Allies looms large. There was an increase of 844,600,000 pounds in the exports of meats and fats. In 1916-17 there was sent from the United States to the Allies a total of 2,166,500,000 pounds of meats and fats, which includes all sorts of meat and meat products, canned and powdered milk, but ter, cheese, vegetable oils, lard, etc. In 1917 18 there was sent 3,011,100,000 pounds. That increase was the result of saving.
The full effect of the American Food Ad ministration's work began to bear its best results in the last half of the fiscal year, 1917 18. There was a gain of 80,900,000 bushels of cereals over the amount which had been shipped in the previous fiscal year. In a letter which Mr. Hoover addressed to President Wil son giving some of the results of this year's saving, he said: "It is interesting to note that since the urgent request of the Allied Food Con trollers early in the year for a further ship ment of 75,000,000 bushels from our 1917 wheat than originally planned we shall have shipped to Europe or have en route, nearly 85,000,000 bushels. At the time of this request our sur plus was more than exhausted. This accom plishment of our people in this matter stands out even more clearly if we bear in mind that we had available in the fiscal year 1916-17 from net carry-over and as surplus over our normal consumption about 200,000,000 bushels of wheat which we were able to export that year without trenching on our home loaf. This last year, however, owing to the large failure of the 1917 wheat crop, we had available from net carry-over and production and imports, only just about our normal consumption. Therefore our wheat shipments to Allied desti nations represent approximately savings from our own wheat bread.
"These figures, however," added Mr. Hoover, "do not fully convey the volume of the effort and sacrifice made during the past year by the whole American people. Despite the magnificant effort of our agricultural popu lation in planting a much increased acreage in 1917, not only was there a very large failure in wheat but also the corn failed to mature properly and our corn is our dominant crop. We calculate that the total nutritional produc tion of the country for the fiscal year just closed was between 7 per cent and 9 per cent below the average of the three previou• years, our nutritional surplus for export in those years being about the same amount as the shrinkage last year. Therefore the consump tion and waste in food have been greatly re duced in every direction during the year." With the allied nations in Europe dependent for 70 per cent of their deficiency in essential foodstuffs on North America, it is readily seen what an important factor the conservation sys tems adopted by the United States and Canada were in furnishing this deficit. The great dan ger which but few realized that the allied nations in Europe would be forced to make peace by food shortage was happily averted by the resolution and self-sacrifice of the people of the United States and Canada. Italy's sup plies were dangerously low in December 1917, and again in March 1918, but the crisis was passed. Three meatless days a week became necessary in Italy. • The weekly ration of bread for sedentary people was three pounds eight ounces of war bread, with an additional allowance for heavy workers, while macaroni, rice and maize flour were also rationed. The weekly ration of sugar was placed at two and a quarter ounces.
The world food situation as it stood in the latter part of 1918 was summed up in a resolu tion adopted at a conference in London of the food controllers of Great Britain, France and Italy and the food administrator of the United States. The resolution read: "Resolved, that while the increased produc tion of the United States and Canada renders it possible to relax some of the restrictions, which have borne with peculiar hardship upon all our peoples, yet it is absolutely necessary that rigid economy and elimination of waste in the con sumption and handling of all foodstuffs, as well as increased production, should be maintained throughout the European Allied countries and in North America. It is only by such economy and elimination of waste that the transportation of the necessary men and supplies, from North America to the European front, can be accom plished, and that stocks of foodstuffs can be built up in North America as an insurance against the ever-present danger of harvest failure, and the possible necessity for large and emergency drafts to Europe. We cannot ad
minister the food problem on the basis of one year's war. We must prepare for its long continuance if we are to ensure absolute victory." Following his return from this European conference, Mr. Hoover made a statement in which he showed something of the great con tinning demands of the Allies for food, and that too in spite of the fact, as he said, that "the harvests of France, England and Italy are better than one could expect in the tremendous drain of man-power to the front." This showed that for the year beginning 1 Sept. 1918, the Allies would have to import 500,000,000 bushels of cereals for human consumption, 4,000,000,000 pounds of fats, pork products and vegetable oils; 900,000,000 pounds of beef products for civilian consumption; 1,500,000 tons of sugar, in addition to which beef must be imported for army needs and oats for army horses. If this program was fulfilled he de clared there would be no need for the drastic rationing of food among the Allies except in beef and sugar, such as had been necessary during the previous year. The world shortage in beef and sugar made it impossible to satisfy the whole need. But the program would pro vide an ample supply of bread and fats without the rationing of either and with their own pro duction would give the Allies sufficient sup plies, so that bread of a better quality could be allowed. Mr. Hoover said it was the "largest call for food exports we have ever under taken;" and then added: °We can do it if we simply have the will to live with every economy and to waste nothing, and it will put us to no hardship. Our complete fulfillment of last year's promises in food and our assurances to furnish even larger supplies this next year have removed from them the last fear of hunger." A food conservation program, effective in the United States, 21 Oct. 1918, for all places where cooked food was sold to be eaten on the premises, affected every hotel, restaurant, café, club and dining car service in the country. It carried into effect the announcement of the Food Administration issued a short time prior which stated that in fulfilling the American promise to the Allies to send them 17,500,000 tons of food during the year, the public eating places would be called on to undertake in many particulars a more strict program than last year." There were 12 "General Orders" in the plan which set forth the specific measures by which it was proposed to carry out a direct reduction in the consumption of all foods, particularly staples, rather than a series of emergency regulations such as meatless and wheatless days and meals, and the substitution of one food for another. The proprietors were told that it had not been deemed advisable or necessary at the time to license their operation but that °in cases where the patriotic co-opera tion of such public eating places cannot be secured by other means, the United States Food Administration will not hesitate to secure com pliance with its orders through its control of the distribution of sugar, flour and other food supplies." The prohibition against serving any bread that did not contain at least 20 per cent of wheat flour substitutes was announced; and of this Victory Bread" no more than two ounces could be served to a patron at one meal. No bread could be served until the first course was on the table. Four ounces of other bread, such as corn bread, muffins or Boston brown, could be served instead of the Victory bread. Only one kind of meat could be served at a meal. Bacon could not be served as a garni ture. One-half ounce of butter only was al lowed to a person at a meal. The same ap plied to Cheddar (American) cheese or butter. No sugar bowl was allowed on the table or lunch counter; and one teaspoonful was all that could be served one person at a meal. All waste food had to be saved to feed animals or reduced to obtain fats. Double cream or cream containing more than 20 per cent butter fat was prohibited.
On one memorable occasion Lloyd George said: *I fear the disciplined people behind the Germany army, the rationed family and the determination of wife and sister and daughter and mother to stand and starve so that their fighting man may be fed. I fear it more than the Imperial army itself.° In spite of numerous reports from Germany at various times during the war pointing out the shortage of food and declaring that the people were almost on the verge of famine it was shown by statistics be lieved to be reliable that whatever hopes were entertained at one time that Germany could be starved into submission all hope on that score would have to he abandoned. It was necessary for the Allied countries to depend on the maintenance and the conservation of their own crops for their ultimate victory rather than to count on a failure of the enemy's own supplies which were more completely controlled and regulated than were those in the nations who were fighting against them.
The food problems with which the Allies had to struggle were enormous. They kept changing from time to time and new provisions had to be adopted during the progress of the conflict. The difficulties which had to be met and overcome were tremendous. They required the most consummate handling, the employment of the best brains of the countries involved and a vast amount of administrative work in addi tion to the education of whole peoples to the needs of the time. The exertion of strenuous efforts to bring about increased production, accompanied by enforced or voluntary systems of conservation on all the various articles of food, were the main factors in the successful solution and carrying out of these vital prob lems.