The reversal of this decree, in 1529, by a simple majority vote, drew forth the ((Protest° from which the °Protestant° party takes its name. Charles V had meanwhile gained the advantage both of the papacy and of France (treaties of Cambray and Barcelona). and his adherents were feeling very aggressive. They wished to force the issue, and they succeeded. The 'Protest° was a technical- one against the right of the diet to reverse the former unani mous edict. Charles himself earnestly- sought to bring the schism to a peaceful end. He vited discussion and summoned conferences, act ing not at- all like the tyrant that many writers have made him out. He staved off war for 17 years, and then entered into it more on political than on religious grounds. Several Protestant princes fought on his side. This war with the Smalkald League, of which Elector John Fred erick of Saxony and Margrave Philip of Hesse were heads, ended in the defeat and capture of those princes and in their long captivity. The electoral dignity in Saxony passed to the other branch of the house, the head of which, Maurice, had helped the emperor. But Maurice in turn, dissatisfied because Charles did not fully keep his promises, and alarmed at the emperor's at tempt to have his son, Philip II of Spain, de dared successor to the throne, headed a revolt which reduced Charles to great straits. A tem porary peace was concluded at Passau (1552), but the final settlement was delayed by the dis unity of the Protestant princes, the Margrave of Culmbach and Maurice of Saxony fighting on opposite sides. Maurice was killed at Sievershausen ( 1553) .
Finally at Augsburg (1555) a general peace was concluded between the Protestant and Catholic princes; but by Ferdinand, not by Charles V— the latter preferring to abdicate rather than to make the needed concessions. The basis of the peace was free choice on the part of each lord of the land of the form of faith to be tolerated. There were, unfortu nately, ambiguous clauses that led to later con flicts.
For the next 20 years Protestantism had the upper hand; but while the Roman Catholic party was strengthening itself by internal reforms, the Protestants, through dogmatic disputes, were becoming greatly weakened. Saxony (Lutheran) and the Palatinate (Calvinist) allowed their private enmities to ruin their cause as a whole. The Jesuits, marvelously trained for such work, made it their chief purpose to combat Prot estantism. They secured the majority of votes in one bishopric after another, and even in the imperial diets and in the law courts.
A revolt of the Bohemians (Protestant) against the house of Hapsburg precipitated a European war. The acceptance of the Bo hemian crown by Frederick V of the Palatinate was a challenge on political as well as on re ligious grounds; for the other German states could never suffer one of their number to hold two of the seven electoral votes. The Pope, the king of Spain, the elector of Bavaria, even the Protestant elector of Saxony rallied to the Hapsburgs. Frederick proved but a winter king and, before a year was over, was decisively de feated on the White Hill near Prague. New
allies came to the fore in time: Bethlen Gabor, prince of Transylvania; Mansfeld, the Savoy condottiere; Christian of Brunswick: the Mar grave of Baden Durlach, and, last but not least (1530), Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. The emperor, Ferdinand II, would have succumbed to Gustavus Adolphus, who won a at victory at Brietenfeld and made a triumphal progress as far as Nuremberg, had he not, by enormous con cessions, succeeded in inducing the mysterious Wallenstein, who was living in forced retire ment, to re-enter his service. Wallenstein, en dowed with dictatorial, almost royal rights, raised a huge army, compelled Gustavus Adol Thus to withdraw from Nuremberg, and, finally, engaged him in a battle at Liitzen, near Leipzig, that cost the Swedish conqueror his life. Later, indeed, doubts arose in many quarters as to Wallenstein's ultimate purpose. As far as we can judge now, it was to dictate a peace to Germany even at the risk of having to intimidate the emperor. Just at what stage his dealings with the Swedes and Saxons became treasonable is hard to establish, but treasonable they were at the last. An order was given for his arrest, living or dead; and some of his own officers joined in a deliberate plot to kill him. His room was invaded, he himself stabbed in the breast (1634).
The war now entered a new phase. It was no longer merely a question of religious inter ests, for Catholic France joined in on the side of the Protestants. The struggle finally became one merely for compensation and costs. For four years it went on simultaneously with peace negotiations (at Osnabruck and Mfinster in Westphalia) which ended in an agreement as to mutual religious toleration and in a readjust ment of the map of Europe. Unfortunately the boundary between Germany and France was es tablished by an ambiguous formula and, later, led again to war (1688-97).
The most important development in the period following on the peace of Westphalia was the rise of the Brandenburg-Prussian monarchy. See PaussIA. After the Great Elector (1640-88) had consolidated his posses sions, his son, Frederick III, was allowed to assume the royal title as compensation for aid furnished the Hapsburg emperor in the Spanish Succession War. The Spanish throne, vacant by the death of the childless Carlos II, was claimed by Emperor Leopold for his son Charles (VI), and by Louis XIV for his grand son, the duc d'Anjou. Against Louis XIV was arrayed thend alliance, consisting of Eng land, and the majority of the German states. With Louis were the electors of Cologne and of Bavaria. The war, which lasted 13 years, showed an almost unbroken series of victories — Blenheim, Turin, Ramilies, Malplaquet and others — for the Grand Al liance. Yet by the Treaty of Baden (1714) the German states gained absolutely nothing, Eng land and Austria having already secured their own advantages by the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt.