Another wise provision was developed, of not calling for the building of ships of an exact pattern or tonnage, leaving this to be de termined not by the Reichstag which was not technically capable of doing so, but by the naval designers of the department, who' were thus not hampered by inexpert opinions of the legislators. This authorization, however, was utilized in making replacements, to substitute much larger and more powerful ships as time went on and naval needs developed, so that in addition to the replacement of obsolete ves sels, the power of the navy increased vastly with the repeated legislative struggles which would otherwise have been needed to gain the same ends. Von Tirpitz was thus practically given carte blanche to make the German navy what he thought it ought to be.
The principle of national service had long since been applied to the navy, so that person nel for the manning of the ships as fast as they were constructed was always ready, and at vastly less expense than was the case with such powers as depended upon voluntary en listments.
The program adopted in 1898 thus finally placed the German navy on the road of prog ress and invigorated it with the seeds of growth which caused its ultimate remarkable development.
The program of 1898 was projected for seven years, but before it was filially adopted this period was reduced to six years. Hardly, however, was it well started when the Boer War broke out, and the great success which Great Britain obtained in transporting troops and the effectiveness of her navy reacted power on German public opinion, and in 1900 the naval program was more than doubled, a thing von Tirpitz could not have expected in a decade under ordinary circumstances.
Public opinion, was enunciated through the .Navy League, a widespread organization of a large number of members paying a nominal membership fee, and this, together with the increasing influence of the German press, caused the whole German nation to turn its ener gies toward the support of the new naval policy.
In a few years, however, a profound change took place in naval architecture, due to the les •sons of the Russo-Japanese War, to the in vention' of telescope sights for large guns and to the development of the submarine.
Previously all nations had been building battleships with many different sized guns capa ble, of rapid fire, on the theory that an im mense number of projectiles dropped on oppos ing vessels would decide an engagement. The
Russo-Japanese naval engagements proved that vessels with a few very large guns, sighted with the telescopic sight, could stand at a great distance and destroy the vessels carrying the more numerous smaller guns without suffering any injury. British designers having been aboard the Japanese vessels had first at hand the technical details and proceeded to lay down keels for new vessels of the new sort. Ameri can designers also proceeded along the same lines and England launched the first dreadnought, embodying, the new principles, 10 Feb. 1906. '' This, with the gradual improvement of the Submarine in France and America, created an entirely new condition in naval construction, and rendered obsolete for all practical pur Poses the navies of the entire world.
Germany consequently adopted a new naval program in 1906 and 1908 and embarked in the construction of the dreadnought type of vessel as dictated by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. This program contin ued actively in force until 1912 when an addi tional program was laid out.
The growth of the German navy can be appreciated by a comparison of the ca:iital ships provided for by the various programs, which are as follows: Act of 1898 — 17 battleships and 8 large cruisers Act of 1900 — 38 battleships and 14 large cruisers Act of 1906 — 38 battleships and 20 large cruisers Act of 1908 58 dreadnoughts Act of 1912 61 dreadnoughts This program had proceeded to the point of development at the outbreak of the Great War, 1914, of t 20 large battleships (dreadnought type) 20 battleships 8 battle cruisers 33 protected cruisers 8 old armored cruisers 8 old protected cruisers 14 gun boats (for service abroad) 120 torpedo boats over 500 tons 60 small torpedo boats used for mine sweepers and school ships and for Special purposes.
The program also provided for 72 subma rines of which 39 were said to have been built by 1914.
It will thus be seen that the real develop merit of the German navy began only in 1898, and that in its ultra modern aspect it is but the work of a few years since the adoption of the dreadnought type.
A feature that makes it particularly effec tive, in addition, is the fact that in peace times it is manned up to about 80 per cent of its effective power, while the navies of other coun tries are maintained at but half or less than half of their effective strength.