RELATION BETWEEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE.
In the matter of the relation between the national executive and the authorities admin istering the various services of local govern ment, England occupies a position intermediate between that of France on the one hand, and the New England or Western States of the United States on the other. The very real autonomy of the English local governing body —greatest in the County Borough, or in such bodies as the Mersey Docks and Harbor Board or the Commissioners of Sewers of Romney Marsh, and least in the Boards of Guardians— marks it off from any analogous authority in continental Europe. The English local author ity for each area is formed without any inter vention of the national executive (except in the cases of the Justices of the Peace and the ordi nary commissioners of sewers, and then mainly in form only), and entirely independently of its volition. It is, for the most part, not subject to the orders of any part of the national execu tive; it has, in nearly every case, real and com plete discretion as to the manner in which its services shall be rendered or the law of the land carried out; it can, for the most part, de termine whether or not a particular service shall be supplied in its locality; in all cases it decides on its own responsibility upon its own budget of expenditure, and (whilst not able to impose a new kind of tax) as to the rate of the taxation — of the kind prescribed by statute — which it will levy upon its constituency; and while in particular instances it is required to obtain the approval of the national executive, either for its projects or to its actual adminis tration, its practical, independence is such that a stubborn local authority usually gets very nearly its own way. To an Englishman it is almost inconceivable that a local authority should be appointed, wholly or in part, by the national executive (unless merely in form)— though the Crown nominates a few members to such bodies as the Port of London Authority and the Mersey Docks and Harbor Board, while the Local Government Board nominates members to, and exercises a real control over, the very anomalous Metropolitan Asylums Board — that it should receive and obey orders from the Minister of the Interior; or that it should have to submit its budget for the ap proval of any superior. On the other hand, no local authority in England — whatever the case may have been in times past — has any original, inherent, or independent powers. With the possible exception of the ancient corporation of the City of London, all the English local au thorities of to-day plainly owe their origin to and derive their governmental powers exclu sively from the statutes which Parliament has enacted concerning them; and they are, with out exception, in all cases, subject to the condi tions and limitations of those and any new statutes. A local governing body has, in Eng land and Wales, no rights, powers, privileges or duties inherent in it merely because it is representative of the people of the particular locality; or secured to it by a constitution or other authority independent of the national legislature for the time being. Nor is there in England anything corresponding to the com plete separation between the state executive and the local authorities and their mutual inde pendence of each other that characterizes so many of the States of America. Every local authority in England is required by law at least to furnish an annual statement of its accounts to the Local Government Board; nearly all of them have to obtain the approval of that branch of the national executive before incurring ex penditure to be met out of borrowed money, and before raising a loan; most of them receive annual grants from the national exchequer in aid of their expenditure on particular local services, and have therefore to comply with the condi tions that may be attached to these grants by the Treasury, the Board of Education, the Home Office, the Board of Agriculture or the Local Government Board; finally, nearly all of them have to submit — but the municipal corporations only in respect of part of their work—to an annual audit of their accounts by auditors ap pointed by and responsible to the Local Govern ment Board. These auditors do not carry out, however, the wishes of the national executive; what they have,to do is to prevent disobedience to the statutes of the national legislature. They have, in fact, to act in a judicial rather than in an executive capacity, having no power to over ride a mere exercise of the discretion of the local authority, but they are authorized, and in deed required, whatever the Local Government Board, or other executive authority might de sire, subject to appeal to the ordinary courts of law, peremptorily to disallow and to cause to be refunded, any expenditure that (whether in respect of its subject matter, or by reason of fraud, embezzlement or mere waste) falls out side the statutory powers conferred upon the local authority. It should, moreover, be added
that any difference of opinion between the Local Government Board (or other branch of the national executive) and a local authority, or between two local authorities, as to their re spective legal powers and obligations, has to be determined (unless by mutual consent) not by the decision of any executive officer or by the national executive itself —not even by any special tribunal which the national executive might influence — but, as in the United States, by the ordinary courts of justice, applying to the dispute the ordinary law of the land, ex actly as if it were a dispute between private individuals. In the same way, when a local authority disobeys or fails to comply with any of the statutes, or acts in excess of its powers, it can be coerced to obedience (apart from such disallowance of unlawful expenditure by the auditor, or such withdrawal of financial assist ance from the national exchequer as has been already mentioned) only by means of actions in the ordinary courts of justice, which have to be initiated either by aggrieved individuals or by the national executive under the ordinary law. But any description of the relation between the national executive and the local governing bodies in England would miss the most im portant feature if it omitted to lay stress on the Grant in Aid. It is the system of grants in aid from the national exchequer upon which the smooth and efficient working of the whole or ganization to a large extent depends. The expressed purposes of these grants in aid are (a) to assist poor localities, and prevent flit local rates rising to an oppressive height, by promoting a partial equalization of burden; and (b) to induce apathetic or backward local au thorities to incur expenditure on local services in which the community as a whole has a strong interest. Even more important to the student of political science is the utility of these na tional subventions to local government, when given in their most efficient form, in securing national efficiency, without destruction of gen-. nine local autonomy. The basis of English local government is the statutory enactment, by the national legislature, of a minimum standard in each public service (notably in sanitation, education and police), the attainment of which is legally obligatory on every local authority, and is legally enforceable by mandamus. Be yond that national minimum in each public service, each local authority has complete dis cretion. It can, at the expense of its ever rising local rates, and subject to the control implied in periodical popular election, do as much or as little as it chooses. But if it chooses to comply with certain specified con ditions imposed by the national executive— conditions designed to secure a constantly rising standard of efficiency in particular services it can (especially in education) obtain national grants in aid of its local expenditure, so cal culated as to share the financial burden of in creased efficiency between the national ex chequer and the• local rates. The position of authoritative criticism and ultimate power to withhold the grant, which this relation gives to the national executive — while leaving the local authority both freedom of decision and a genuine choice among methods, as well as com plete autonomy in the appointment of officers — appears, on the whole, the best possible device for combining administrative efficiency with local popular control.
Bibliography.-- Besides the authorities cited in the text the student should consult 'Eng lish Local Government,' by Dr. Joseph Red lich and F. W. Hirst; or The Parish and the County,) by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1906) ; 'The Manor and the Borough' (1908) ' • The Story of the King's Highway' (1913) and 'Grants in Aid' (1911), forming an analytic and historical account of English local gov ernment. Brief descriptions of the actual or ganization of to-day are 'Local Government,' by Percy Ashley (1905) ; and 'Local Govern ment,' by Dr. Blake Odgers (1902).