Leibnitz, who introduced the term apper ception, employed it in a double sense. Its first meaning is the original power of the mind to unify experiences originating in sensation; this is the sense in which Kant uses the term. The second meaning is the mental assimilation that takes place when we use knowledge already acquired to interpret new knowledge. It is nat ural that Herbart should emphasize the latter process, for though he could hardly deny the validity of the first form of apperception, yet so slight is the original equipment of the mind — merely the power of preserving itself against the encroachments of other Reals — that all the significance of its activity must be found in ac quiring experience. This, it may be remarked, is the process most important to teachers, for they can help to supply and order experience, whereas they have no control whatever over the original constitution of the mind. Herbart sees in each new sensation a stimulus to ideas al ready possessed, an attractive force for the sim ilar, a repelling one for the dissimilar. The new idea therefore at first holds the centre of consciousness, gathering about itself similar ideas, and repelling hostile ones already in con sciousness or newly attracted to it by contrast. But this very domination of the new idea is in most cases the cause of its reduction to a sub ordinate place, for by bringing to consciousness a body of more deeply rooted related ideas, it enables the old to control the new by placing the new in its true relation to older and better ordered experience. In other words, the new is apperceived by the old. Herbart's theory, thus briefly stated, has been extended and freed from contradictions, by subsequent writers, no tably Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt (qq.v.).
All knowledge, feeling, desire and will, be ing explained by the various relations into which ideas may come, there is no room in Herbart's system for transcendental will, hence no ethical imperatives antecedent to those de veloped by experience. Ethics consequently be comes a branch of aesthetics, and ethical judg ment is founded upon pleasurable or painful feelings as the case may be. The mind spon taneously approves some will relations and as spontaneously disapproves others. These basal relations refer to five fundamental aspects of conduct, two relating to the self as such, and the remaining three to the relations of the self to others. The first two are Inner Freedom (the feeling that arises from good conscience) and Efficiency of Will (the pleasure that is aroused by efficient action). The three other ideas are first Good Will (subjective attitude toward others), the second Justice (the legal basis of rights), and the third Equity (the de mand that requital shall be adequate to deed).
Upon the basis of his psychology and ethics as above explained, Herbart built his educational structure. Since there is no source of character but experience, it is to experience, i.e., to organized knowledge or groups of ideas, that we must look for the development of char acter, which thus has its roots, not in a single department of knowledge as, e.g., that grounded in sacred writings, but in the whole content of the mind. A man must be ethical all over, not in spots only. For this reason the Herbartians speak fondly and proudly of educative instruc tion, meaning thereby such instruction as shall render all ideas contributory to moral charac ter. But since feeling is the bridge between cognition and volition, this bridge the teacher must induce the pupil to cross if his conduct is to be adequate to his knowledge.
By means of direct interest incited in the pupil for the subject-matter itself, not amuse ment connected with the subject-matter, as some have erroneously thought, the pupil's per manent attitude of mind toward the circle of thought itself and consequently toward the aspects of life involved will be established. This interest falls naturally into two groups, first that pertaining to knowledge itself, and second that pertaining to intercourse with others. The first group embraces em
pirical, speculative (causal), and aesthetic in terests; the second sympathetic, social and re ligious interests. This doctrine of interest, so important in modern educational thought, has been brought into harmony with our more spir itualistic systems of philosophy and psychology by Professor John Dewey as Re lated to Will)). The next important topic arises when we ask how the teacher is to lead the pupil to build his circles of thought ade quately, and then to have the right mental atti tude toward them.
It is a common experience that faulty methods may easily lead to inadequacy of in sight; they may still more easily lead to the wrong attitude of mind, as when the student hates a subject and everything connected with it. The first point to consider is Attention, which is either spontaneous or forced. With the young where forced attention is painful, it is better to induce spontaneous attention, for here the ideas rise freely, producing liveliness and pleasure. Apperception has two marked stages, that of absorption, in which the mind gives itself up to new impressions; and that of reflection, in which the newly acquired elements of knowledge find their appropriate place in the systems of the old. To bring about this two fold process of absorption and reflection most effectively and most agreeably to the mind, we must observe at least four prominent stages of method. The first of these is clearness, by which is meant the adequate apprehension of the single object or element as such. The second is association, which consists in the progress from one absorption to another re lated one. The third is system, or the step in which each part of that which is learned finds its proper place in relation to other parts. Steps two and three may be said to embrace the process of generalization. The fourth stage is what Herbart calls method, by which he under stands the well-ordered activity of the pupil in the solution of problems and tasks.
Making due allowance for those parts of Herbart's system that are now of historical in terest only, it may be seen that many of its elements are still of importance to the world, for they involve the most potent of modern educational processes and aims.
Herbart's chief philosophical works are 'Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophic' (1813) ;
zur Psychologie' (1816); 'Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegriindet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematic' (1824-25) ;
Metaphysik nebst den Anfangen der philosophischen Naturlehre' (1828-29) ;
Encyclopadie der Philoso phic, aus practischen Gesichtespunkten entwor fen' (1831). The complete works of Herbart have been edited in 12 volumes by G. Harten stein (Leipzig 1850-52). Herbart's educational works, including the
Paclagogik) and the 'Umriss Padagogischer Vorlesungen,) were edited by Dr. Otto Willmann in two vol umes (Leipzig 1880). The Psychology is translated and to be found in the International Series, while the (Allgemeine Padagogik) and the
are also found in English, the former under the title of the
of Edu cation,' by H. M. and E. Felkin (Boston 1893), and the latter under that of 'Outlines of Edu cational Doctrine' trans. by Lange and annotated by De Garmo New York 1901). The Her bartian School has produced a literature in metaphysics, psychology and education too voluminous for mention here. Consult Adams, J.
Psychology applied to Educa tion' (Boston 1906) ; De Garmo, C.,
and the Herhartians) (New York 1895) ; Gockler, L., (La Pedagogic de Herbart, Expose et Discussion' (Paris 1905) ; Lang, 0. H.,