International Relations Since 1880. Eu rope in Africa and Asia.— International rela tions since 1880 require brief statement. France, longing to recover her lost provinces from Germany in a war of revenge, drew close to Russia. Bismarck offended Russia by sup porting Austria in the Balkans. Italy, was angered by the French seizure of Tunis in 1881. Thus new combinations of the powers appeared. In 1882, Germany, Austria and Italy (all old enemies) leagued in the Triple Alli ance; while a little later, France and Russia formally adopted a dual alliance. The Con tinent was thrown into two hostile camps and rested for the next 30 years under a crush ingly burdensome armed peace. England, un willing to join the Triple Alliance, as Bismarck wished, was left in a position her statesmen characterized as one of "splendid isolation." Soon, however, England began to see in Ger many a rival in Africa and Asia (below) more to be dreaded than France. Germany's grow ing commercial activity, too, threatened Eng land's supremacy in trade. Above all, German militarism was intensely repugnant to English democracy. On the other hand, England and France grew to a better understanding of each other, and in 1903 a standing arbitration treaty between them went far to prevent future jealousies. From that time England was prop erly regarded as allied with the old Dual Al liance — which now became the Triple Entente.
To this alliance the small states of Europe gave their sympathies. On the other hand, Turkey fell away more and more from Eng lish influence into a practical dependency of Germany. And while the Dual Alliance grew into the Triple Entente, the old Triple Al liance was partly disrupted. Italy's acquisition of Tripoli (1911) canceled her old grievance against France; and then her ancient bitter ness against Austria, because of Austria's re tention of the Italian Trentino, began to drive her away from the central European powers.
In the 90's all these European arrange ments were threatened by the active appear ance, in the field of international politics, of two non-European powers. The Chinese War of 1894 revealed Japan as a modern and pow erful state; and the Spanish-American War (1898) made it apparent that the United States had abandoned its exclusively American policy. Moreover, since about 1880, European politics had been merging more completely than ever before in world politics. Rhenish and Danu bian questions for a time were dwarfed by mighty African and Asiatic problems. The earlier part of the 19th century, indeed, had been an age of expansion of civilization. The United States had quietly filled its borders from ocean to ocean with a homogeneous population. Russia had spread across northern Asia to the Pacific, and was reaching down in the Trans Caspian region toward the Persian Gulf. And England had continued annexation of the keys to empire in waste spaces of the earth. These three were the world-powers. Far behind came France, with some important possessions in North Africa and some ancient claims in south east Asia. Until 1884 Germany had no thought of colonial empire.
But about 1880 a new, conscious greed for colonial territory seized Europe. Africa, some Pacific islands and the helpless Asiatic em pires of Persia, Turkey, Siam and China were the only unappropriated lands. There followed
a swift, peaceful division of Africa. In 1880, only patches here and there on the coast were European; in 1891, except for the native states of Abyssinia, Liberia and Morocco, the conti nent was mapped out between European claim ants. The three important African powers had come to be England, France and Germany, though Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy were also represented. England was far in the lead. Her ambition had been to unite her two main possessions, in the Nile Valley and in South Africa, by acquiring intermediate territory; but the Kongo Free State and German East Africa were thrust between too soon. France came second in extent of territory; but, except for Algeria and Madagascar, her dis tricts were less valuable than those of England or Germany. France would have liked to join her holdings on the east and west of the con tinent; but she found English territory thrust in between. German ambition was frustrated in similar manner. Until the World War be gan the three powers had mutually stale-mated one another's attempts to dominate Africa.
The occupation of Asia by European states has proceeded more slowly, but has moved with increasing rapidity in recent years. England, Russia, japan and France have been the chief powers concerned, though Germany has shown an active disposition to take a hand in any partition.
In 1894, Japan and China engaged in war over the control of Korea. With amazing rapidity, Japan overcame her bulky antagonist; but Russia, backed by France and Germany, stepped in to rob her of the fruits of her vier tory. Japan, owning not even one modern ship of war, was forced to yield — to spend all energies for the next 10 years in preparing for further conflict. Russia secured from China the right to extend her Siberian railroad through Manchuria, and in 1898 she also ob tained the powerful fortress of Port Arthur. Germany and England then compelled China to grant than important districts, which, like the Russian acquisitions, seemed to command the heart of China and to doom that power to partition. In 1900 the Chinese resentment against °western barbarians') culminated in the Boxer massacres. The powers sent armies to rescue their beleaguered embassies at Peking; but, largely through the policy of the United States, no territorial indemnities were de manded. During the campaign, however, Rus sia occupied Manchuria, and, despite repeated solemn promises, it soon became plain that she meant to keep it. The powers apparently ac quiesced; but when Russia in 1903 encroached also upon Korea, Japan foresaw danger to her own independence, and, in 1904, she began war. The struggle was tremendous, beyond all comparison with former wars; but Japanese victory was swift and overwhelming. That victory not only checked Russian aggression in the Orient, it also made plain that an Asiatic power had arisen able and disposed to enforce a Monroe Doctrine for Asia against the West ern world. It was only one step more in the same direction when, at the opening of the World War in 1914, Japan captured the Ger man holdings in China, under pledge of re storing them conditionally to China.