The apostolic palaces (Vatican and Lateran) the Villa of Castel Gandolfo and their depend encies according to Italian public law should have been declared part of the government do main; instead of that, this declaration, on ac count of political exigencies, was omitted, and by Art. 5 of the law the enjoyment of them was given to the Holy See in perpetuity, hut at the same time the archaeological collections and the libraries adjoining are declared inalienable, which means that the Pope and the Holy See have no proprietary rights to them (as the clerics pretend) which would comprise the right to alienate, by sale, exchange or donation.
The Pope has besides, as an adjunct to his sovereignty, the right to an active and passive embassy, that is, the Italian government recog nizes in all his functions the Ambassador of the Holy See (just as the King of Italy recognizes any other ambassador), and similar privileges throughout the kingdom.
As the papacy is an elective monarchy, and during an interregnum the sovereign power is vested in the College of Cardinals, which elects the Pope in conclave, the Italian government is obliged to protect the conclave from all mo lestation and is hindered from placing any ob stacle to the personal liberty of the cardinals. Hence the ecumenical councils throughout his tory are regarded as sovereign assemblies of the Church and receive the same consideration as do their individual members. But now, since the proclamation of the dogma of infallibility, it is very difficult for them to continue as coun cils, as the Pope may ex cathedra define and proclaim the religious truths obligatory upon the faithful (dogma).
Such is the law which, since 1871, has gov erned the relations between the Pope and the government. It was never fully accepted in the Holy See, but nevertheless the latter enjoys all the privileges of a practical nature, which the government always observed and caused to be ob served. Undoubtedly there never before was a time when the spiritual sovereignty of the Pope could he declared as openly as at present, as was proved by the two conclaves held siticc 1870. In spite of all this, and with all the con ditions essential to this freedom, and the en joyment of the privileges and protection of the law, the papacy has never recognized the state regime of affairs established in Rome in 1870. When the Pope and the king came to an ex plicit understanding it was natural to believe, in the Catholic world, that either the Pope would subordinate his spiritual acts to the in terests and political advantage of Italy, or that the Italian government would subordinate its policy to the exigencies of the Pope and the Church. Official animosity, by reason of the Law of Guaranty, enabled the Pope to enjoy that independence which, for centuries, could not be maintained unless by retaining the tem poral power; moreover it permits the Italian government to maintain, in fact as well as in theory, a perfectly independent position in re gard to a power as morally great as the papacy.
Thus, the official enmity serves both parties: it suits both that the. Pope should consider •the government as a usurper.
This official enmity was associated with a personal enmity, which has never prevented se cret agreements with the papal authorities re sponsible for the safety of the Vatican and the Pope, and the political authority of the king dom, during the pontificate of Pius IX. and at longer intervals during that of Leo XIII; who sought to isolate Italy politically, and thus to weaken, if not destroy the monarchical insti tution; under Pius X this enmity was only of ficial. That Pope was never a cardinal of the Curia, but during the time he was priest, pw tor and bishop he had always held a simple cure of souls, at a distance from Rome, and he saw in his youth foreigners ruling over his na tive country (Venice), and he exulted when he saw the Italian tricolor flag substituted for the yellow and black standard. As a patriarch of Venice he frequently had dealings with the sov ereigns of Italy (for 'Venice was acquired through an international treaty and legiti mately conquered by the House of Savoy) and he assisted in putting a stop to the socialist prop aganda, which at the same time attacked mo narchial institutions and religion, and he opposed it at Venice, inducing the faithful in the Church to vote in accord with the liberal monarchists. When he became Pope he could not forswear his former attitude; hence, while abstaining from every action which gave assent or ap proval to the established conditions of 20 Sept. 1870, when the king's soldiers entered Rome, he did not continue the unyielding anti-Italian policy of Leo XIII and evidences were soon perceived of this new line of conduct of the Holy See. Pius X was a religious Pope, and as religion and the Church were not being per secuted, he permitted frequent infractions of the law non expedif; that is to say: the formal prohibition of Catholics from taking part in political elections, which was promulgate& by Pius IX and confirmed by Leo XIII. But just because he would not recognize Rome, even tacitly, as the capital of the kingdom, he al ways opposed the formation of any Catholic party in Parliament. The Catholics should vote for a monarchical candidate in preference to a Republican or a Socialist. Catholics loyal to the Holy See may enter Parliament and swear fealty: to the king and the constitution, but none has the right to call himself a representa tive of the ideas and principles approved by the Pope. And this was stipulated, because other wise it would appear as if the Pope acknowl edged the right to the possession of Rome, and the electors and parliamentary deputies faith ful to the Pope, and the interpreters of his views, would be unable to deny the funda mental principle of this acknowledgment, namely, the unity of Italy with Rome as its capital. Hence it is not possible in Italy to form a party similar to the Catholic Centre in the German Reichstag.