The attitude of the Japanese government toward this state of affairs is best expressed by the following quotations from Baron Komura's dispatch to the late Japanese Minister in Saint Petersburg. He says: CThe unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. The prin ciple of equal opportunity would thereby be an nulled and the territorial integrity of China im paired. There is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire, or at least make Russia the dominant power in Ko rea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defense, and Japan consequently consid ers her independence absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other powers. These interests and influences, having regard to her own security, Japan cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another power?) The Japanese government, however, was eager for peace and made overtures to the Russian government in July 1903 to come to a friendly agreement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian and Korean problems. Having obtained the consent of the Russian govern ment, a memorandum was drafted which would form the basis of agreement.
The main points in the memorandum were (1) that Russia and Japan should both respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and maintain the principle of equal opportunity toward all nations; (2) that the two nations should reciprocally recognize Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and that each had right to take such measures as was necessary for the protection of their respective interests; (3) that each nation was free to send troops to protect the interests mentioned above; (4) that Russia should recognize the exclusive right of Japan to advise and assist Korea in the interest of civil and military reform. Against this memo randum Russia sent on 3 October a counter proposal demanding that Japan recognize Man churia to be outside her sphere of interest and forego her exclusive right to assist Korea in making military reform, and that Japan and Russia should mutually engage not to use Korea for strategical_purposes, as well as to consider that part of Korea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone.
Besides, Russia quietly suppressed in this counter note the important clause providing for equal opportunity for the commerce and indus try of all nations. On the receipt of this counter note the Japanese government, after several conferences with Baron Rosen, the then Russian Minister in Tokio, proposed a fresh memorandum containing the "irreducible mini mum," which was accordingly communicated to the Russian on the last day of October. In this new memorandum Japan made
several important concessions: (1) Japan would engage not to undertake on the coast of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Korean Straits; (2) she would agree to the proposal of Russia to create a neutral zone, but that said zone to be created at the Korean-Manchurian fron tier and to extend 50 kilometers on each side; (3) that Russia and Japan should mutually de clare that Korea was beyond the sphere of the "special* interest of Russia and Manchuria of Japan.
To this note Russia replied only on 11 De cember. In this new counter note Russia was entirely silent on the subject of Manchuria, and regarding Korea repeated the restrictions pro posed in September, including the restriction of Japan's giving advice and assistance on mili tary matters. On 21 December Japan made her last attempt to come to terms with Russia, and M. Kurino, the then Japanese Minister to Saint Petersburg, was instructed to present a note verbale to the Russian Foreign Minister. In this note verbale the Russian government was requested to reconsider her contention that Japan had no right to have a voice in the affairs of Manchuria and that Japanese assistance to Korea be limited to civil affairs only; besides Japan finally requested Russia to give up the idea of creating a neutral zone out of the Korean territory north of the 39th parallel. To this Russia gave reply which reached Tokio on 6 Jan. 1904, again insisting that Japan should recognize Manchuria as beyond her sphere of influence; that Japan should agree to the Russian proposal of creating a neutral zone in North Korea; that Japan should be accorded full right to the privileges according to the existing treaties, but no right to estab lish settlements; and no mention was made of China's territorial integrity in Manchuria.
Against this the Japanese government made another proposal on 13 January making fur ther concessions, such as giving up the claim to special interest in Manchuria, provided Rus sia agreed to grant full privilege for the enjoy ment of treaty rights acquired from the Chi nese government besides giving up her claim to special interests in Korea. But to this last proposal Russia kept postponing reply, while reports of Russian military preparation on the Yalu side of Manchuria kept coming.
On 1 February the governor of Vladivostock warned the Japanese commercial agent there to prepare for withdrawing his compatriots. Under these circumstances it seemed doubtful to Japan whether the Russian government was really sincere and wished an amicable agree ment. The Japanese government felt that it had made all possible concessions in the interest of peace, and on 5 Feb. 1904 sent a note inform ing the Russian government of the severance of friendly relations between the two countries. On 10 February Minister Kurino withdrew from Saint Petersburg, while Baron Rosen, the then Russian Minister at Tokio, left the Japanese capital on the following day.