Infantry Attack.— In the operations before Verdun, the German army corps nearly always attacked with their divisions side by side. Only in exceptional cases, as when the extent or im portance of the zone assigned to a single.corps permitted only the employment of a single division, did the other remain behind in sup port of the first.
The front of the zone assigned to a division of three regiments (7,200 rifles) varies between 1,000 and 2,500 meters, according' to the im portance and number of the successive ob jectives assigned to it.
In respect of the disposition for attack of its units, if the zone of action be narrow and the objective varied, the division .places two regiments in the ,first line, side by side, with the third in reserve. But if the zone be wide, with only one objective, then the three regi ments form in one line, separated by intervals varying with the nature of the ground.
Whatever be the disposition taken by the division, the regiments place in general one battalion in the first line and keep two in re serve, echeloned in depth at distances depend ing on the nature of the ground: The more advanced of the two reserve battalions is al ways in readiness to advance, either to sup port the attack against the first objective, or to carry it on beyond. The other reserve battalion is at ease; its duty is,' at the right moment, to relieve the exhausted units of the first line.
The German infantry in general turns out its battalions in two lines. The first is almost invariably composed of two companies side by side; these deploy for the assault either in the most advanced trench or in the last phelter. 'The second line remains in the supporting trenches either in shelters or under some covering obstacle.
The procedure of attack .is always that of successive lines of men, and rests upon the fol lowing general principles: 1. To each line of attack is always assigned limited and well-defined objective, no wider than the front of attack, and never deeper than the distance between two successive lines of trenches.
2. The assaults open only after the artillery has thoroughly swept the trenches and de stroyed the obstacles, in order to compel the defense to 3banclgn all idea of resistance, 3. The assault proper is preceded by thorough reconnaissance of the objective sought, in order to make sure that the artillery has produced the desired effect. These reconnaissances in
reality constitute the first wave of the assault; the succeeding waves are held back until the first shall have made progress.
In respect of details, the various methods of assault are more or less of the following Pat tern: the successive waves are three, separated by some 20 or 30 paces. The first of these makes the reconnaissance mentioned above, it is formed by one or two squads from each platoon, is accompanied by scouts carrying tools, and by grenadiers, and is deployed at wide inter Ira's. The second wave consists of a dense line of 'rifles, and comprises the principal part of each platoon. This line's duty to occupy the trenches. Finally, the third is composed of the remainders of each platoon, and constitutes a new echelon, whose business it is to fill the gaps • that may be produced. With it.a reserve of munitions and materials in order to hold the captured trenches.
Infantry Against Cavalry.—A cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become panic-stricken, run away, or cannot use their rifles. A charge from the•fropt is easily checked by a well-directed and sus! tained fire.
If the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. If this disposi tion is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by a timely change of front. If the cavalry line passes through the firing, line, the latter will be little damaged if the men .retain their presence of mind They should be on the watch for succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to friendly troops in -rear.
In a melee, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is rifle fire. Any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the necessary number of rifles. Ordi narily there will be no time to change or set sights. Fire at will at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. It will usti ally be unwise to open fire at long ranges.