In the foregoing is shown the method whereby scientific jurisprudence prepares its material by formulating the myriads of juristic facts in a relatively small number of statements, capable of orderly arrangements within the compass of a single volume of moderate size. The nomenclature of the science, though an important element thereof, has not always been adhered to. It could have been adhered to strictly only at the sacrifice of popularity in treatment. Clarity seemed more desirable than profundity. It was possible to deal with only one class of private rights, and antecedent rights in rem, more specifically rights of pos session and ownership, were selected for illus tration because they present the fewest diffi culties. A very much larger class of private rights than the one discussed are the rights in personam. To this class belong all the rights conceded by contract and, though these really partake of the character of antecedent rights, they are never available in rem against the world, but always against specific individuals. Under the general title "rights in persona& are gathered also all other remedial rights, whether they arise from breaches of contract or out of what the Roman jurists call •obliga tions ex delicto," which our lawyers classify as the laws of torts. A further division of law must still be considered. The rules wherein are defined the rights, whether public or private, which the State will support or protect, constitute the °substantive law.° The rules prescribing the modes of aiding or pro tecting either public or private rights are classed as "adjective law° or procedure. Ju dicial intervention may be either preventive, as by injunction, or redressive. Redressive inter vention is by far the more frequent mode, and in respect to private rights the redress usually takes the form of indemnity or damages. In some cases, however, the remedy is more di rect, as when a nuisance is ordered abated, or the specific performance of a contract is de creed, or a mortgagor is put in possession of the property mortgaged by summary process. Rights of action are extinguished by release, waiver or condonation; by bankruptcy of the person liable; by set-off; by merger, as in the case of the substitution of a covenant or a judgment note for a simple contract— the sub stantive right is not extinguished, but the right of action on the less solemn evidence of the debt or obligation would be merged. Estoppel by for the defendant, and by pre scription or limitation, are the remaining modes of extinguishing remedial rights. The death of the person of incidence, i.e., the plaintiff in an action for tort, not merely extinguishes the procedural remedy, but the right itself. To this there is an exception when death caused by negligence or other tortious act is the ground of action. In such case the right and the rem edy pass to the executor or administrator. Remedial rights may be suspended without be ing lost—as, when an action is pending in a court of concurrent jurisdiction, another court will not proceed with a suit to enforce the same right. Finally there is a private, as well as a public, international law. The questions
that arise in this department of the law are mainly jurisdictional. When parties are na tionals of, or are domiciled in, different coun tries a suit may be brought in a court of the country where the plaintiff is domiciled; where the defendant is domiciled; where the object of the controversy is situated; where a mar riage, a will or other agreement, whereby a right was created, was performed or made; in a court of the country where a contract was to produce results or of the country where the plaintiff chooses to bring his action. The courts of the situs of the object of a contro versy (forum rei) have always assumed juris diction in such cases. Jurisdiction is declined by the English courts in suits for divorce if the husband is not domiciled in the country, but there is no uniform rule on this subject in the United States. English and American courts will take jurisdiction in actions on con tracts no matter where they have been made or where they are to be executed, provided the parties are within reach of their process. More complex than the question of the competency of the court is the question as to what country's law should be applicable in any given case. Some states claim exclusive rights to punish persons of their nationality for crimes, no matter where committed. There is such diver sity in the rules that have been applied that a basis for general formula can hardly he said to have been laid in this department of juris prudence. The formulation of the science was plactically completed by the Roman jurists, who invented it, in the domain of private law at least. The 'Institutes) of Gaius, whereof those bearing the name of Justinian and produced four centuries later are merely a recension, are still the point of departure for all scientific studies of the law. Among English writers Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was the first to bring really scientific methods to bear on the subject. He was followed by John Austin, Sir Henry Maine and others. Thomas Erskine Holland in his 'Elements of Jurisprudence,' which first appeared in 1880, and whose ar rangement of the topics and definitions have been followed herein, has set forth the sub ject in an exhaustive yet very compact form.
Bibliography.— Austin, John, 'Jurispru dence or the Philosophy of Positive Law) (5th cd., London 1885; abridgment by Campbell, 9th ed., London 1895); Bentham, Jeremy, 'Princi ples of Morals and Legislation) (Clarendon Press 1879); 'Collected Works) (ed. by Bow ring, 11 vols., London 1843) ; Gaius, 'Insti tutes) (English ed. by E. Poste, Oxford 1890); Holland, Thomas Erskine, 'Elements of Juris prudence) 411th ed., Oxford 1910) ; Lee, Guy Carleton, qHistorical Jurisprudence) (New York 1900) • Maine, Henry Sumner, 'Ancient Law) (wall introduction by Theodore W. Dwight, New York 1888; ed. with notes by F. Pollock, London 1906) • 'Early Law and Cus tom) (London 1883); igarkby, W., 'Elements of (6th ed., Oxford 1905); Pollock, F., 'First Book of Jurisprudence) (2d ed., London 1904); Salmond, J. W., 'Jurisprudence) (5th ed., London 1916).