These negative conclusions are not; how ever, the goal of Kant's inquiry. As he him'. self said, he sought only to remove the false pretense of knowledge in order to prepare the way for rational faith. Knowledge, as we have seen, deals only with phenomena; regarding the nature of ultimate realty cognitive experi ence is silent. In the 'Critique of Practical season> Kant shows that our experience as practical and moral beings, which recognizes an absolute obligation to obey the moral law has implied in it certain presuppositions regard ing our own nature and the nature of ultimate reality. In the first place, our recognition of the absolute authority of the moral law and our obligation to obey it presupposes that we have the power to do so. Moral obligation would have no meaning for a being whose will was not free. In the same way, Kant shows that moral experience implies a belief in God as the moral governor of the universe, and in immortality as affording an opportunity for the demands of the moral law to be progressively realized. Thus these problems which cannot be demonstrated on theoretical grounds find their solution from the point of view of prac tical experience. God, Freedom and Immor tality are never matters of knowledge or sci ence, but moral certainties or matters of faith. One constantly finds in Kant's writings a tend ency to make sharp divisions, to separate expe rience into different spheres. He contrasts and opposes to each other a °phenomenal° and an °intelligible° world, and again, 'cicnowledgep and °faith° without any effort to bring these divisions again into relation. It is true that in the 'Critique of Judgment) (where he discusses the nature of esthetic experience, and the question whether we can apply the conception of purpose to the interpretation of the organic world), Kant does at least suggest a synthesis of the two opposing points of view. The spirit of his philosophy really transcends the opposition between phenomena that can only be /mown through mechanical categories, and an unknowable ultimate reality where we may believe that freedom and the realization of ideals are possible. But, even in the third
his formal treatment is unsatisfac tory, and at least the letter of his treatment appears to maintain the opposition to the end.
In addition to the three Critiques, Kant's most important works are the His tory of Nature and Theory of the (1755), in which Laplace's mechanical account of the evolution of the planetary systems is anticipated (translation by W. Hastie with an introduction under the title of Cos mogony,.> 1900) ; the of 1770, which inaugurates the critical movement; and the published in 1783, as a poplar exposition and defense of the first See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, There are also works by him on physical geography, neural pathology, ethnography, anthropology, aesthetics, criticism, meteorology, logic, politics and pedagogy. His complete works were edited by K. Rosenkranz and F, W. Schubert (12 vols„ Leipzig 1842), by G. }far tenstein (8 vols., ib. 1869), by Kirclunann (8 vols, Berlin 1873), the Royal Prussian Acad emy (Berlin 1900—). The most noteworthy English translations of Kant are 'Critique of Pure Reason,' translated by J. M. D. Meikle john (London 1854), and by Max Muller. (2d ed., ib. 1896); and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,' translated by Ernest Belford Bax (ib. 1909); 'Philosophy of Law) (Edinburgh 1887) and 'Principles of (ib. 1891), both by W. Hastie; of Judgment,' translated by J. H. Bernard (ib. 1892) ; 'The Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his own Writ ings,' translated by Watson (New York 1908) ; of Practical Reason, and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics,) by T. Abbott (6th ed., London 1909) ; 'Cosmogony,' by W. Hastie (ib. 1900) ; of a Spirit by E F. Goerwitz (ib. 1900) ; Theory of Kant,' by E. F. Buchner (Philadel phia 1904) • of 2Esthetic Judgment,' by, J. C Meredith (Oxford 1911) ; Peace,' translated by W. Hastie (Boston 1914).