Ethical Views.— There is nothing very in dividual in the ethics of Leibnitz (which may be generally described as a doctrine of rational istic utilitarianism of a type common enough in the 17th and early 18th centuries), except his treatment of the problem of moral freedom. As we have seen, the original source of all change is appetition in the monad. Conscious appetition is desire, and desire is always di rected toward the apparent best. There is thus no such things as unmotived willing; a volition only seems unmotived when the motive im pulse is ((below the threshold.' Leibnitz is consequently a consistent determinist in his analysis of choice and volition, yet he regards it as one of the merits of his system that it vindicates the reality of freedom against the Spinozistic doctrine of universal necessity. In what sense, then, arc we free? Leibnitz replies by distinguishing two kinds of necessity, meta physical and moral. That is metaphysically necessary of which the contradictory is im possible. In this sense no volition is necessary. (This, however, is, of course, inconsistent with the theory that all true propositions are ana lytical, since the contradictory of an analytical proposition must be false). A thing is morally necessary when it is an indispensable means to the obtaining of the apparent best. In this sense all volitions are necessary— though for reasons which merely incline, hut do not com pel the will. Spinoza, according to Leibnitz, erred by confusing the two senses of necessity. Moral freedom, then, consists in spontaneity plus intelligence. We are free in proportion as we have intelligence to discern the real best, a doctrine which is only nominally distinct from Spinoza's. Leibnitz further agrees with Spi noza in his general conception of the moral good. Pleasure is assumed to accompany in crease of activity, i.e., clear perception, and good and evil correspond to acts motived re spectively by clear and by confused perception. Hence Leibnitz ought to have regarded vice as equivalent to honest and unavoidable error. He tries to escape by his distinction between meta physical and moral evil. The former is simply the element of passivity or confused percep tion in the monads, and is not inconsistent with God's goodness, since a world which includes this element may contain a greater number of and so be on the whole better, than one which does not. Moral evil, or vice, and physical evil, or suffering, are inconsist ently regarded at once as being logical conse quences of this metaphysical evil, and yet as contingent and non-necessary. The ethical sys
tem based on such ideas is naturally in the main one of enlighted egoism in which intelligence is exalted at the cost of ignorant good inten tions. But since, in virtue of the harmony between monads, my own good and that of others are inextricably bound up together, Leib nitz holds that doing good to others naturally gives us pleasure, and hence he agrees with Shaftesbury in recognizing the existence of dis interested affection. To make the coincidence of my own good with the good of others com plete he has further to assume, as we have seen that he does, immortality and the final proportionment of happiness to desert.
Other works by Leibnitz are 'Nouveau sys teme de la nature) (1695) ; 'Essais de the °dice& (1710) ; 'Principes de la nature et de la grace) (1714); 'Nouveaux essais sur l'en tendement humain) (1765). His philosophical works in French and Latin have appeared in several editions. The principal are those of Erdmann (Berlin 1840), of Jaret (Paris 1866; 1900); and of Gerhardt (Berlin 1875-90). Pertz undertook the publication of a complete edition — four volumes of history (Hanover 1843-47), seven volumes of mathematics (Ber lin and Halle 1849-63) and one volume of philosophy have appeared. Some of the im portant philosophical works have been trans lated by G. M. Duncan (New Haven 1890); the 'Nouveaux essais' by A. G. Langley (Lon don 1894); 'The Monadology' by R. Latta (Oxford 1898).
Bibliography.— Cassirer, Ernst, 'Lcibnizs System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grund lagen' (Marburg 1902) ; Couturat, Louis, 'La logique de Leibniz' (Paris 1901) ; Dewey, John, 'Leibnitz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding) (Chicago 1888) ; Dill mann, Eduard, 'Eine neue Darstellung der leihnizschen Monadenlehre' (Leipzig 1891); Feuerbach, E. A., (Darstellung, Entwickelung and Kritilc der leihnizschen Philosophic (Anspach 1837) ; Guhrauer, G. E., 'Gottfried Wilhelm 'Freiherr von Leibniz' (1842; Eng lish version abbreviated. Boston 1845) ; Har nack, Adolf, 'Leibniz Bedeutung in der Ge schichte der Mathematik' (Stade 1887) ; Heim soeth, Helhz, Mcthode der Erkcnntniss hei Descartes •und Leibniz) (2 vols., Giessen 1914); Kirchner, F., 'G. W. Leibniz' (Ciithen 1876); Merz, J. T.,
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