The night of the 9th, Negley's division, forming the Union advance from Stevens' Gap along the road leading through Dug Gap to Lafayette, encountered the enemy in the gap, and later in the night it was ascertained that a strong force was concentrating there.
General Bragg, in developing his plan, had advanced Hindman's division from the Lafayette side of the mountain, and ordered General Hill to send Cleburne to co-operate. Late at night Hill sent word that Cleburne was sick, the gaps blocked with felled trees and that the move ment was, therefore, impracticable.
Early the next morning General Buckner from the extreme right was ordered to advance into the cove to support Hindman. This tion was not effected until the afternoon of the 10th. Meantime, Negley had withdrawn his division from Dug Gap and was maneuvering in defense. Hindman, instead of attacking as ordered, sent a staff-officer to Bragg at Lafay ette to suggest a change of plan. This officer reached Bragg at midnight and was at once directed to return and notify Hindman to carry out the orders he had received. Cleburne was then in Dug Gap, and had promptly cleared away obstructions. Walker's reserve corps was ordered forward to join Cleburne in the at tack, and all impatiently waited for Hindman's guns. Bragg had ordered seven divisions to co-operate in this movement against Thomas' three which composed the Union centre. Hind man did not attack until afternoon. At that time Baird's division had arrived from Stevens' Gap to support Negley, and by brilliant move ments in retreat, with some sham fighting by T. R. Stanley's and Starkweather's brigades, the two divisions with their trains were with drawn in perfect order to Bailey's crossroads, a strong strategic position in front of Stevens' Gap, where Brannan's division, which had com pleted the crossing of Lookout, was within easy supporting distance. Thus Bragg's attempt to crush the Union centre failed. For this failure he held Hill and Hindman responsible.
Bragg then withdrew the forces operating against the Union centre to Lafayette, and at once dispatched Polk's and Walker's corps with orders to attack Crittenden's corps in the vi cinity of Lee and Gordon's Mill. This corps at
the time was known to Bragg to be divided, with one of its three divisions near Ringgold. Polk was urged to attack with the greatest promptness. He, however, was led to believe that a general attack on his column was about to be delivered. Instead of carrying out Bragg's orders, he therefore awaited attack and sent for the whole of Buckner's corps as reinforce ments. This delay enabled Crittenden to unite his forces, cross the Chickamauga, and take a strong position on the bluffs overlooking that stream at Lee and Gordon's. Thus Bragg's attempt to crush the Union left failed, as his movement on the centre had miscarried_ For this Polk was held responsible.
Meantime the Union right was withdrawing under orders to join the centre at Stevens' Gap. Rosecrans had early discovered that Bragg, in stead of retreating, was concentrated for battle, and that Johnston from Mississippi and Long street from Virginia were about to join him. General Rosecrans in his report says: "It then became a matter of life and death to effect the concentration of the army.' The flanks of the army were 40 miles apart by the nearest practi cable roads, and the centre was obliged to .e main near Stevens' Gap until the right corps arrived.
General Bragg's third plan, for which orders were promptly given, was to move his army down the valley of the Chickamauga, cross at the bridges and fords below Lee and Gordon's Mill, sweep up the valley, attack Crittenden, the left of Rosecrans' army drive it back on the centre, and thus, interposing between the Union army and Chattanooga, push it back into the mountains and regain that most important city. Rosecrans, however, by an undiscovered night march moved his centre and right from the cove to the left of Crittenden, and at sunrise of 19 September had interposed between Bragg and Chattanooga on the field of Chickamauga.
These movements of the opposing armies brought on the battle of Chickamauga (q.v.).