From dread of the maritime strength of the new republic the British government made war on the American merchant marine as soon as the Revolution itself had ended. An Order in Council barred American ships from the British West Indies, and forbade the importation into the United Kingdom of all but a few products if conveyed in American vessels—it being in sisted further that these American vessels should bring only the products of the particular States in which they belonged. British ship owners were forbidden to purchase American built vessels, which in 1775 were supposed to constitute one-third of the British mercantile marine. "The ministry,* it was declared, "suppose they have now put a finishing stroke to the building and increase of American ves sels.* Lord Sheffield argued that the Barbary pirates of North Africa, preying on defenseless' American merchant craft, were really a blessing to Great Britain, and London merchants told Franklin that "if there were no Algiers it would be worth England's while to build one." Until the new Federal government was es tablished in 1789, British shipowners dominated American ocean commerce. Our merchant shipping registered for foreign voyages amounted to only 123,893 tons in this year 1789, and 76 per cent of our own imports were con veyed beneath foreign colors.
Striking Early Growth of American Ton Washington and his colleagues felt that this condition was perilous and intolerable, and Adams, Jefferson and Madison prevailed upon the first Congress under the new Constitution to embody in its very first act, passed on 4 July 1789, "for the support of the government, the discharge of the debts of the United States and the encouragement and protection of manu factures," an important clause allowing a dis count of 10 per cent of the tariff duties on all goods imported in ships built and owned by American citizens. Further and heavier re bates were allowed on teas imported direct from the East Indies in American vessels— for the purpose of encouraging an American East India fleet— and, moreover, a sharp pref erence in tonnage duties was granted to all American vessels, which practically barred foreign vessels from the coastwise carrying trade.
Five years later, in 1794, the discount of 10 per cent of the tariff duties on goods imported in American vessels was changed to an addition of 10 per cent to the duties on goods imported in foreign vessels. For many years thereafter this powerful government preference for Amer ican shipping remained the distinctive national policy of the United States. This was justified not only by commercial considerations but by patriotic regard for the national defense. Jef ferson, as Secretary of State, wrote in 1794: 'To force shipbuilding is to establish ship yards; is to form magazines; to multiply use ful hands; to produce artists and workmen of every kind who may be found at once for the peaceful speculations of commerce and for the terrible wants of war' What followed this vigorous maritime pro tectionism of the fathers of the republic was a growth of American shipping well described by a historian of the period as 'without parallel in the history of the commercial world."
American merchant tonnage registered for overseas voyages rapidly advanced from 123, 893 in 1789 to 411,438 in 1792, and to 667,107 in 1800, while the proportion of American im ports and exports conveyed in American vessels rose from 23.6 per cent in 1789 to 76.4 per cent in 1792 and to 89 per cent in 1800.
The Napoleonic wars had a double effect upon American shipping. In the first place, these wars gave a great opportunity to Amer ica, the chief of neutral carriers. But, on the other hand, and offsetting this advantage, both the British and the French governments began an unscrupulous war of seizure and spoliation on American ships wherever bound, while Great Britain ruthlessly impressed American seamen, native and naturalized, into her naval service. Yet American shipping, in spite of all difficulty and danger, grew and prospered until in 1810 the fleet registered for foreign com merce amounted to 981,019 tons, conveying 91.5 per cent of our imports and exports. New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Salem were sending ships to the East Indies. In 1789-90 the Columbia made her famous voyage to the Northwest coast and the Orient — the first American merchantman to circumnavigate the globe.
When, tardily, in 1812 the American govern ment declared war on Great Britain, principally to revenge the wrongs of our sailor-citizens, the merchant ships and seamen proved again a tremendously effective weapon, as they had in the first war for independence. The United States navy in the War of 1812 comprised CM the ocean only 23 vessels of all classes, mount ing 556 guns. These 23 men-of-war captured 254 naval and merchant craft of the But American merchantmen armed and con verted into privateers in 1812-15 numbered 517, mounting 2,893 guns. These privateers, with their merchant crews, took 1,300 prizes, valued with their freights at nearly $40,000,000, or five times the number of the prizes of our regular ships-of-war. Again Yankee shipowners and sailors carried the conflict right to the coasts of the United Kingdom, and attacked rich con voys wherever they could be found. The mer chants of Glasgow in September 1814 pro tested to the Admiralty that as horde of Ameri can cruisers should be allowed, unresisted and unmolested, to take, burn or sink our own ves sels in our own inlets and almost in sight of our own harbors." It was the exploits of the privateers chiefly, and not the loss of a dozen frigates and sloops in single-ship duels, that quickly made the British mercantile community thoroughly weary of this second war with the Americans.