MAXIMALISTS, or BOLSHEVIKI, the name applied to the adherents of the extreme Socialist party which, headed by Lenine and Trotzky, overthrew the provisional government and the Soviet leaders in Russia on 7 Nov. 1917. The words "Bolshevik° (sing.), "Bol shevik? (plural) and "Bolshevism* are not explanatory terms and have nothing to do with the policy or aims of the party. Their origin dates from the second conference of the Rus sian Social-Democratic party in 1903, at which the methods to be adopted in regard to revolu tionary activity were under discussion. A sharp line of cleavage made itself evident; and when voting on the resolutions took place there was naturally a majority (bolshinstv6) and a minority (menshinstv6). From that moment the groups were called Bolsheki and Menshiviki (maximalists and minimalists). The majority represented the extremists, the "whole-hoggers" of Socialism (bOlshe— more), or those who go for the biggest things; while the minority represented the °moderates" or "thin-end-of wedge" theorists (menshi — less, smaller),. or those whose aims are of smaller intent. There appears to be no evidence that the terms ex isted or were current before 1903, though the Russian Social-Democratic party was founded by Plekhanov and others in Switzerland in 1884. The abortive revolutionary movement of 1905– 06, which opened with the Putilov ironworks strike and the Father Gapon episode, served to widen the breach between the two factions to the extent that in 1907 the party was def initely split into two independent groups Bolsheviki and Menshiviki. The former, fol lowing in part the teachings of Karl Marx, were led by Lenine. The Marxian revolution was essentially a class revolution, to the real ization of which nationalism was regarded as an obstacle. The European War and the after math of the Revolution of March 1917 revealed the wide divergence existing between the aims and methods of the two groups. The Bolshe viki contracted the class distinction to nar rower dimensions and looked upon the edu cated classes, the bourgeoisie, and even the peasants as enemies. Their aim was radical Internationalism; they sought not the re-crea tion of Russia, but the triumph of one class throughout the world — the proletariat ; in other words, mob-rule. For the most part they were bitter and arid doctrinaires, reeling off strings of long, high-sounding words and phrases which few understood, and clinging to a vague and abstract creed with fanatical de votion. Every problem was met by a reference to the letter of their law and interpreted ac cordingly. But whatever political, social or economic creed the Bolsheviki professed on paper, their activity — and by that alone can they be judged— consisted merely of a wild orgy of crime, plunder and treason. No trace of practical ability was revealed by any of their leaders, but they had the driving force which even the shallowest fanaticism can give They were opposed to the war, which they de clared to be °imperialistic° and °bourgeoise' They were opposed (on principle) as much ic a German peace as to a peace dictated by tlx Allies: °No indemnity, no reparation and no annexation' became their ideal. The Menshi viki were of a saner type; while claiming for the working classes the importance due to their numbers, they did not ignore other classes. Holding in view definite practical reforms, they were willing to utilize the existing machinery of the state for their purpose. They accepted the war and its vigorous prosecution as a part of their program and realized that nation alism must precede internationalism. They recognized that the cause of the Allies was also their cause, and in this belief they were undoubtedly supported by the more intelligent Russian Social-Democrats. To the Bolsheviki
the fate of their country mattered nothing. provided only that their own crude ideas of social reconstruction survived the ordeal. They were eager for peace on any terms in order that they might proceed with their own pro gram, that class war which recognized no polit ical frontiers nor national After the fall of Kcrenskv the Bolsheviki began their career as rulers by the wilful and systematic destruction of the Russian army and navy. Their leaders posed before the world as the elect champions of a new idealism which was to redeem mankind. They proposed to teach other democracies the true and saving doctrine of the real revolutionary creed. Of exercising government, as that term is under stood among civilized peoples, they proved themselves utterly incapable; government, in fact, holds no place in their system, of which the sole principle is civil war or, as they term it, "class war." Though it owes its genesis to Socialism (from which it is really far re moved), Bolshevism may be described as a coin pound of anarchism, syndicalism, hatred and blind fanaticism. Needless to say, ingredients of this type cannot fail to attract all the purely criminal elements which, in normal times, are held in check by the forces of law and order. With the removal or breakdown of that salutary check and the absence of an efficient substitute, a free rein is given to •unbridled passions by which a political movement is converted into a mere carnival of terrorism. This was what happened in Russia in 1917. The Bolsheviki had nothing whatever to do with bringing about the revolution which swept away the autoc racy in March of that year. That revolution was neither engineered nor organized; it sprang not from the burning inspiration of a new faith, but succeeded almost automatically from sheer weariness: tired in mind and body, Rus sia had lost nerve and heart. The provisional government that was formed on 16 March con sisted of honest, patriotic and intelligent men Prince Lvov, Guchkov, Milyukov, Terestehenko, Nekrasov, Shingarev and Kerensky, who was the only Socialist in the group. Of all these, Kerensky proved to be the only "man of des tiny" with sufficient magnetism to compel a following. Their first energies were devoted to maintaining discipline in the army and to carry the war to a successful conclusion. But already in September 1915 Lenine had issued the Zimmerwald manifesto, signed by himself and the Swiss Socialist, Robert Grimm, call ing, for "peace without annexations or indem nities.* German agents had sedulously spread this doctrine among the Russian rank and file. with the result that the idea of a peace so easily to be gained soon won a large number of converts. It was easy for German propa gandists to convert the working classes to this view. The people were told what they wanted to hear — that it was folly to fight longer and that their Western Allies were the true foes of Russia, since they sought to force her to re main in the war. Not only did demoralization of the army set in, but there also grew up a spirit of hostility against the Allies, espe cially Great Britain. Thus, while the provi sional government and later Kerensky alone struggled to maintain order and national unity, Bolsheviki and German agents were undermin ing the structure with glowing promises and sedition. On 16 July 1917 the Bolsheviki in Petrograd, led by Lenine and Trotzky, at tempted to seize the reins of government and failed. Lenine disappeared when warrants were issued for the arrest of the Bolshevist leaders. At the last moment Kerensky weakened; re garding the Bolsheviki as "political opponents' he countermanded the order for their arrest.