Mill's published works are the following: 'System of Logic) (1843) ;
As Logican, Mill's greatest contribution was his treatment of induction. The four "meth ods" of agreement, difference, residues and concomitant variation had been mentioned by J. Herschel, but were by Mill first brought out clearly. In the part of his
which deals with the nature and conditions of knowl edge he attempts, with only partial success, to give logic a more vital relation to truth and fact than it had borne since Hobbes and Locke. He insists that propositions concern °things° not °ideas)); that there are (real kinds,)) not merely class names; that cause is not to be defined with Hume as °invariable antecedent° but as °unconditional antecedents or "sum of conditions.° But he does not see that this really implies a reconstructed view of nature, in which a conception of an interrelated system or whole should replace the conception of a mere sum of individuals or particulars. He remains true to his older presuppositions in holding that reasoning is from particular to particular, and that axioms owe their force to association. Matter, he holds, following Ber keley, is only permanent possibilities of sen sation. In his view of the self, on the one hand, he considers that we can know only states of consciousness, that the law of association is the °governing principle,° and that the concep tions by which knowledge is organized are impressed upon the mind from without°; on the other hand he recognizes "the paradox, that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a
He therefore admits that °the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them.° While, then, he holds to the doctrine of °circumstances° as deter mining character, he is careful to insist that this is not °necessity° in the ordinary sense; "our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances.° As Economist, Mill attempted to follow the general plan of Adam Smith and give the sci ence a more concrete form than it had received at the hands of Ricardo; to treat it not merely as an abstract science of the °economic man,° but as °branch of social philosophy, so inter linked with all the other branches that its con clusions are only true conditionally.° The cur rent economist had aroused the antagonism of the working classes. Mathusianism held out a grim prospect of increasing stress with increase of population. Ricardo's presentation of the laws of wages seemed to condemn as absolutely futile all effort to raise wages, whether by vol untary association or by political action. The repeal of the corn laws would, it was feared, ultimately benefit the employers instead of the employed. Mill retained the Mathusian doc trine as one of his cornerstones. He sees hope for the laboring classes only if they will restrict their offspring and thus diminish the supply of labor. He retains also the doctrine that labor is supported by capital, and in his
only of getting rid of primogeniture and en tails, and of promoting restraint of population by general education. He later came to look for a great advance in co-operation, and in the character which this implies. In 1869 he definitely retracted the "wage-fund doctrine, recognizing that there is a considerable range in the wage which economic conditions allow and hence that trades-unions may raise wages to a certain extent." In his last years he was es pecially impressed with the injustice of the places which the landowners occupy at "Mal thus's feast." "Land alone has the privilege of steadily rising in value from natural causes." The "unearned increment" should be not for the private owner but for the nation. He dif fered from more complete Socialists in retain ing competition in his scheme, and insisting that the associations for co-operation must be voluntary. He regarded the problem of the future to be "how to unite the greatest individ ual liberty of action, with a common owner ship in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor." His moral and political theories are set forth in his 'Utilitarianism,'
and
of Women.) He always remained a Utilitarian in the sense that he believed "those actions right which promote the greatest happi ness of the greatest number"; further, he at tempted to prove this by the individualistic doctrine that since each one desires his own happiness, the general happiness must be a good, not noticing the possible conflict between such happiness-seeking in individuals, which would make a "sum" impossible. But else where he breaks away decisively from Ben tham's doctrine that happiness means only pleasure of varying intensity, length, certainty, etc., regardless of what objects produce it. "Higher pleasure," a "sense of dignity," will not be exchanged for any amount of the "lower" by the expert judge. It is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." This is evidently abandoning pleasure pure and simple as standard, and setting up instead a "standard for pleasure," namely, the character of the man who judges. In the 'Liberty' he states that the utility which is the ultimate ap peal "must he utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." The motives on which he relies are not the external "sanctions" of Ben tham; nor yet the association of private with public happiness which James Mill had regarded as the structure of conscience. These sud denly appeared to him artificial. Partly under the influence of Comte he came to hold, rather, that conscientious regard for others is sup ported by natural social instincts. His
erty,' the most carefully written of his works, contains a fresh and vigorous argument for the principle that only self-protection — to pre vent harm to others — justifies society in inter fering with the individual's liberty of action. "His own good is not a sufficient warrant." The positive reason for this is the great value of individuality in human welfare. The prin ciple requires not only liberty from tega. re straint, but from the coercion of public opin ion. It comprises, first, liberty of thought and discussion, in order that truth may be reached; secondly, liberty of tastes and pursuits; thirdly, freedom to unite for any purpose, not involving harm to others. In the 'Subjection of Women' he argues for the complete legal equality of men and women, not only to remove injustice but because "the only school of genu ine moral sentiment is society between equals.' "We have had the morality of submission, and the morality of chivalry and generosity; the time is now come for the morality of justice." Moreover, a position of equality with its ac companying effects of enlarged interests, wider responsibility, greater dignity and the possi bility of individual development and satisfac tions would add immeasurably to the well being of all other members of the family.
Mill's religious views are found chiefly in the 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton' and in the three essays published after his death. He found no warrant for making na ture a standard of morals or for inferring from it perfect benevolence or justice. Indeed only by sacrificing the attribute of omnipotence can we reconcile nature with the existence of a moral deity. In all this he is considering the older deistic conceptions, nature, man and God, as three separate beings. But there is much in his thought which is incompatible with such mechanical separation of nature and spirit, and of human and divine, notably in the fa mous passage from the 'Examination.' In re ply to Dean Mansel's mode of reconciling sup posed divine action with human conceptions of justice by the doctrine that God is Incon ceivable, and therefore what is wrong by hu man standards may be right by divine standards, Mill replies, "I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." See MILL, JOHN STUART, AUTO BIOGRAPHY: ON LIBERTY.