Unless unanimous consent be obtained, new legislation cannot be introduced in an appro priation bill, nor can a general appropriation bill or any amendment thereto carry an ex penditure not previously authorized by law. But this rule is elastic since oftentimes an ap propriation bill may be passed providing sala ries for new clerks or officials in a department whose positions have not previously been sanctioned by Congress; and sometimes the clerical force of a department is reduced or part of a service already established is elimi nated. Strictly speaking, the reduction as well as the increase would constitute new legisla tion. In practice it would be impossible to consider every item which involved an increase or decrease of administrative force or equip ment and few objections are made to such items. But occasionally party strife becomes bitter and numerous items are objected to and thrown out. Accordingly in 1906 the House adopted a rule virtually depriving members of the right to object and placing the committee in complete power, subject, of course, to ma iority vote under the ordinary procedure.
Department Heads and the Deficiency While Congress is supposed to control expenditures and appropriations, instances have occurred whereby, through loose prac tices, a department head has placed Congress in such an embarrassing position that it was really coerced into making appropriations. As Mr. Tawney, chairman of the committee on appropriations, once said: °Many of the Ex ecutive Departments proceeded on the theory that they, and not Congress, should fix the standard of public expenditure, and if the amount appropriated for the service under their jurisdiction was not in their judgment adequate, they proceeded to extend the appro priation upon the basis of their estimates, and then, at the next session, would submit defi ciency estimates, which, if not allowed, would necessitate the suspension of the service.° Ac cordingly in 1905, in a general appropriation bill, Congress decreed that grants to depart ments should be apportioned by monthly allot ments so as to avoid deficiencies, though this apportionment might be waived by the depart ment head if he stated the reason in writing. But department heads used this privilege so freely that Congress later enacted that the ap portionment might be waived only in case of emergency. Sometimes, if appropriations for a department have been reduced and a certain bureau of that department be affected consid erably by the reduction, the bureau chief en deavors to secure the funds he had requested by drawing upon the general or permanent fund, which often causes a deficiency. Large
amounts are still carried in deficiency bills, in spite of all efforts to harmonize estimates of revenues and expenditures, hut this is largely due to legislation that was not contemplated when the regular appropriations were under consideration. There is also lack of harmony between the executive and legislative depart ments. Sometimes a department head recom mends economical changes for the good of the service or the abolition or consolidation of certain customs districts which have no fiscal justification, whereupon fearing a loss of patronage, the Congressman of the district af fected attempts to defeat the proposed change. Often Congress is prodigal in its appropria tions in spite of executive appeals for economy, in one case the appropriations exceeding by $115,000,000 the estimates submitted by the Sec retary of the Treasury. In another instance the departments asked for an increase of 171 employees, but instead of granting the request the appropriations committee reduced the ex isting number by 61. Hence Congressmen do not know whose recommendations to follow.
Appropriation bills in the Senate receive somewhat different consideration since they do not originate there. Originally the finance committee considered all appropriation bills, but in 1867 all bills except the rivers and har bors bill were taken away and assigned to the new committee on appropriations. But in order to insure harmony, one member of each of the most important committees dealing with gen eral legislation is a member of the committee on appropriations. Through its power of amending House bills the Senate exercises an important influence in determining grants and usually increases appropriations.
The President and The Pres ident may veto an appropriation bill, but is powerless to reduce it; he must consider the bill as a whole and cannot veto separate items. He is loath to hinder the operations of govern ment because of opposition to appropriations of a certain character and, knowing this, vari ous riders are attached by Congress in the hope of passing the Executive, who perhaps will prefer not to quarrel if the bill as a whole be good. The Controller of the Treasury de termines whether Congress has expressly au thorized an appropriation, and the appropria tion is not finally secure until he has passed upon the warrant for its payment from the treasury. This official may raise technical ob jections which would prevent the payment of appropriations presumably sanctioned by the necessary authority.