The heavy purchases of horses made by the European belligerents show clearly that experi ence in the field caused a renewed recognition of the important place of the horse in the work of war. The best estimates indicate that there were purchased in the United States alone, for use in the European War, about 1,000,000 horses at an average initial price of about $170, increased by a further cost' for transportation, etc., of from $115 to $130. This makes the average cost of the horse, landed in Europe, from $300 to $315. If the millions expended for horses as above did not show sufficiently their recognized importance in the face of all competition from motor vehicles, further proof of their essential place in war is found in the greatly improved arrangements, visible in all the belligerent armies, for the care and preser vation of the animals and for the prompt treat ment when wounded.
Railroad Transportation.—In time of war, the railroads give life to armies, provide food, clothing, materials and munitions rapidly. They give freedom and vigor in the movement of large bodies of troops, remove sick and wounded rapidly, deliver reinforcements promptly. In fact, the railroad is indispensable in utilizing a nation's forces to their greatest capacity and with the maximum effect Germany has a highly developed and bril liantly organized military railroad service. They had on hand in 1914 at the outbreak of hostilities all material and rolling stock neces sary for the transportation and concentration of men, animals and materials. Tables for the dispatch and conduct of trains were all ready. The system for handling sick,• wounded and prisoners was carefully worked out. The principal reason for the superiority of the Ger mans over their adversaries was that their rail road systems were perfectly organized, allowing them to mobilize much more rapidly and giving them greater mobility in operations. It might almost be said that their plans of war consisted of the judicious and intensive development of their railway systems. There are nine railroad lines, each absolutely independent of the others, operating in the province of Lorraine. Seven days was the maximum required to put all the first line troops on the frontier, and on the 10th they invaded France. On the west front, the great bases are Dusseldorf, Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence, Mannheiin, Strassburg and Leo polsche. The bases on the east front are Dan zig, Thorn, Posen, Ostrowa, Breslau, Myslo witz and Cracow. These great bases are linked in all their enormous extension by 800 kilo metres of line separate from the nine great lines connecting the two fronts.
France had her railroad service well organ ized and almost all the materials and rolling stock required was on hand. The railroad service was divided into two divisions of sub services (1) Transports over the interior sys tem; (2) transports over the army systems.
The interior system receives orders from the Minister of War and the army system receives its orders from the commander-in-chief of the army only. To insure normal functioning of these services, °regulating stations° were estab lished in regions of notable importance and in favorable situations. An officer of the general staff had charge of each of these stations. Hav ing helped in the preparation of the general plans of mobilization, he had a perfect knowl edge of the conditions to be met. Rapid trans portation of artillery and its prompt entrance in great masses into the conflict is possible only if railway facilities exist and are used. When Paris was threatened, the French brought an entire army from the south in a few days.
Wagon Wagon trains are slow moving, excessively wasteful of road space and very vulnerable. The train guard must fight to save its convoy if attacked and its excessive length requires a large force to ensure its safety. A few mules dropped and the road is effectively blocked. Consider an auto train carrying the same quantity of stores. It will be about one-sixth the length of the wagon train. Its comparatively small cavalry escort, scouting well to the front and flanks, will notify it of danger in time to permit a counter-march and a retreat which will soon easily outdistance pursuit by even cavalry. A hundred shots might hit the truck without damaging the engines and a bullet-proof shield could easily be provided to protect the chauffeur. The empty wagons returning to the base are sup posed to carry sick and wounded, to assist in the prompt evacuation of the field hospitals.
A brigade wagon train in service in the field will vary from 70 to 100 wagons and teams, ac cording to the strength of the brigade, the dis tance from the depots or base of supplies, the character of the roads, nature of the climate or season of the year. Such a brigade train on the march, allowed to go at will, as the roads average, will take up a mile of road. For con venience of handling it, the brigade train should be divided into three parts of from 20 to 25 wagons each. These lesser divisions of the train should march slightly separated from each other. Should they have to leave the road, or halt on the march, each separate train should pull out at the same time into a field or open space, and be parked with the mules facing the road. In such position, all the trains can simul taneously pull into the road and occupy their proper space and distances without consuming time in waiting for each other. If parked with wagon tongues toward the road, the train is ready to march in either direction which neces sity shall require. If the teams are parked three or four deep, that number can start si multaneously at the word.