Upon the entrance of the United States into the war, a party truce of a somewhat limited character was tacitly agreed to by the two major parties. In the nature of things, how ever, such a truce could be only temporary. As the summer of 1918 approached, President Wil son, in calling upon the members of Congress to attend to legislation rather than to go home to mend their political fences, made use of his well-known, laconic expression, 'Politics is ad journed?' Politics, however, was not adjourned sine die, but was liable to be reconvened in special session at the first opportunity. This opportunity came with the approach of the Con gressional elections of the fall of 1918, which were the only elections of any importance held in the United States during its participation in the war. It is true that even in this election some traces of the party truce remained. In Minnesota the Democrats did not oppose the re-election of •the loyal Republican candidate for United States senator. In New York City an agreement was reached between the leaders of the two major parties, in accordance with which each party endorsed the candidates of the other in three Congressional districts. These instances, however, were exceptional and were probably due in part to the belief that the elec tion of the candidates whom it was proposed not to oppose was, in any event, a foregone conclu sion. Party contests occurred generally in States and districts wherever there was a fair chance for the election of either candidate.
The Congressional campaign of 1918 at tracted on the whole, as was natural, much less public attention than usual. Until a few days before election day, war news crowded political news out of the headlines of the newspapers. Underneath the surface, however, the political pot was simmering. The case of the Demo crats, in the eyes of most of the Congressional leaders of that party, rested larply on the ground that, under their administration of affairs, the war was being conducted success fully. A huge army had been placed in France — an undertaking more gigantic than the coun try had ever before attempted, in comparison with which our efforts in the Spanish-American War were mere child's play — and yet there had been less mismanagement, inefficiency and graft than in former wars. President Wilson's claim for the support of his policies, however, rested on a loftier plane than mere military success or efficient management in the conduct of the war. In March, the President had is sued an appeal to New Jersey Democrats in which he struck the keynote of service to hu manity as the aim which the party should em brace. The days of political and economic reconstruction which are ahead of us,' declared the President, °no man can now definitely as sess, but we know this, that every program must be shot through and through with utter disin terestedness; that no party must try to serve itself, but every party must try to serve human ity. . . . Every program must be tested by this question and this question only. Is it just, is it for the benefit of the average man, without influence or privilege, does it embody in real fact the highest conception of social justice and of right dealing, without respect of person or class or particular interest?" That the politi cians of either party were likely to measure up to such a high standard was doubtful.
In the 14.conditions of peace which the Pres ident laid down in his January address and in other addresses he indicated his tenacious pur pose of using force to the utmost, if necessary, in order to crush the German military autoc racy, but at the same time showed his desire for a peace which would bring about reconciliation and brotherhood among the peoples, even in cluding ultimately the German people if they threw off the yoke of their military masters. The President's holding out of the hope of peace to the German people on this condition was a powerful diplomatic weapon in his hands, as effective in its way as the military weapon of force, and he used it with marked success in the diplomatic notes which he dispatched in reply to the German government's appeal for an armistice. The President's belief, however, in the possibility of making a distinction be tween the autocratic German government and the German people was not shared by some of the more prominent leaders of the Republi can party, and was also viewed with consider able scepticism by many persons who were not politicians. Former President Roosevelt went
so far as to denounce President Wilson's 14 points as thoroughly mischievous and other Republican leaders emphatically disapproved of the President's policy in sending notes to the German government. The Republican leaders indicated their belief that the war was to be won, not through diplomatic appeals to the German people to overthrow their masters, hut through the use solely of military force. This was natural, since any victory through diplo matic weapons would redound to the advantage of the administration, while a victory through military force would he more truly the work of the whole nation. They succeeded, however, in making many people believe that the President's policy meant a peace by negotiation and con ciliation instead of a peace by dictation and force and that the Republicans were in ad vance of the Democrats in demanding the un conditional surrender of Germany.
President Wilson was handicapped, more over, by the fact that there were many promi nent members of his own party who were not wholly in sympathy with his policies, and, through the operation of the rule of seniority, some of these men had become chairmen of im portant Congressional committees. He felt, nevertheless, that the Republican leaders were even more out of sympathy with his policies than the large majority of Democrats and that, by their utterances, the former had already broken the party truce. Shortly before the Congressional elections, therefore, he issued a public appeal to the voters to return a Demo cratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives in order to prevent °division of counsel and leadership) and to avoid the necessity which might otherwise arise of carrying on the government °amid con test and obstruction." The President's appeal was unusual, but was salutary as bringing about a public discussion of the political aspects of the war which had been partly lost sight of in the midst of important military developments. His main reason for issuing the appeal doubtless was that the possible control by opposite parties of the executive and legislative branches, re spectively, would create an anomalous situation, — one liable to lead to difficulties if not dead lock in ordinary times and one especially to be avoided in a period of war and of reconstruc tion after the war when harmony between the executive and the legislative departments be comes even more important and desirable than usual. The election to the legislative body of a majority opposed to the executive would, in parliamentary governments, during ordinary times, lead to the resignation of the executive and to the establishment of an executive of opposite political complexion in harmony with the legislature. Such a mode of procedure on the part of the executive, however, is not fea sible under the American system of government, for the resignation of the President would, of course, merely place the Vice-President in his office with no change of party control over the executive department. Under the circumstan ces, therefore, in case the opposition party gains control of Congress, that party may also at tempt to control the President and harmonious relations between the two branches of govern ment become more difficult to maintain. The President is practically reduced to the alterna tive of refusing to submit to the dictation of Congress, which may produce a deadlock, or of attempting by persuasion and by arousing pub lic opinion through appeals to the country, to compel Congress to carry out his recommenda tions. The vital importance to the President, therefore, of having a Congress in harmony with administration policies was the principal justification for the President's unusual action. His appeal, however, was not sufficiently effi cacious to save his party from defeat in the Congressional elections. The resulting likeli hood that a conflict between the President and Congress would occur was foreshadowed by the passage by the Republican senatorial caucus, shortly after the election, of a resolution declar ing that "Congress should assert and exercise its normal and constitutional functions, includ ing legislation necessary for reconstruction.' Jourt M. MATHEWS, Associate Professor of Political Science, Uni versity of Illinois.