PRAGMATISM. The term pragmatism, as employed in philosophy at the present time, denotes the general tendency to subordinate log ical thinking to the ends of practical life and to find the test of the truth of ideas in their practical consequences. There are thus two somewhat distinct sides to the doctrine, which we find differently emphasized by different writers. On the one hand, this view points out that thought owes its origin to the needs and de mands of the practical life. Thought is thus a tool or instrument that is always invoked to meet a particular crisis or problem resulting from a concrete situation. Thought, therefore, does not aim at truth in general. ItS business is to discover, in;toncrete circumstances, the best means to the realization of some practical end that life demands.
This side of the doctrine has been chiefly elaborated by Prof. John Dewey and those as sociated with him at the University of Chicago as colleagues or students. These writers have connected their theory with the doctrine of evo lution and support it mainly by arguments and analogies drawn from this source. On the other hand, to decide regarding the truth or falsity of any theory or conception, we must also appeal to the practical consequences that result from it. A theory is demonstrated in the only possible way when it is shown that it will °work*: that is, that the results that we wish to obtain in a given situation follow from it. It is only in the light of these results that a conception has meaning. Apart from its prac tical consequences, a conception is an abstrac tion without meaning or significance and conse quently without truth or falsehood4 This practical test of the truth of a theory through an appeal to its consequences is the element in pragmatism that has been mainly emphasized by C. S. Peirce and Prof. William James. Peirce first employed the term and out lined the doctrine in an article in The Popular Science Monthly (January 1878), though, he put it forward merely as a practical method of avoiding abstractions by making clear to one self the consequences in terms of action of general logical conceptions. The present cur rency of the position in America and England is, however, largely due to Professor James, who has elaborated and enforced it in his psychology and in a number of popular works and articles.
The names of Peirce and James are so closely connected with pragmatism that we quote here the formal definitions of the term which they have written for Baldwin's 'Dictionary of Phi Peirce describes the doctrine as fol lows: *The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the fol lowing maxim for attaining clearness of appre hension: (Consider what effects, that might con ceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our con ception of these effects is the whole of our con ception of the object.' )) James defines pragma tism: *The doctrine that the whole of a conception expresses itself in practical con sequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of ex perience to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue, and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is expressed. If a second concep tion should not appear to have other conse quences, then it must really be only the first con ception under a different name. In methodol ogy it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions.* Caldwell, (Mind, October 1900) ; Dewey, J., 'Studies in Logical Theory' (Chicago 1903) ; James, W., 'Principles of (New York 1890) ; 'The Will to Believe) (New York 1896) ; (Pragmatism) New York 1907) ; 'The Mean ing of (New York 1909) ; Perry, R. B., 'Present Philosophical Tendencies) (New York 1912); Royce, J., 'The Eternal and the Practical' (Philosophtcal Review, March 1904) ; Schiller, F. C. S., (London 1903) ; 'Studies in (London 1907) ; (Rid dles of the Sphinx) (2d ed., London 1910) ; Seth, J., 'The Utilitarian Estimate of Knowl edge' (Philosophical Review, July 1901) ; Sturt, H. C., and others, 'Personal (London 1902) ; Dewey, j., and others, 'Crea tive Intelligences' (New York 1917) ; Adams, G. P., 'Idealism in the Modern Age' (New Haven 1919).