With the increase in the importance of American foreign trade of the 19th century, the American government took steps toward drawing the American states into closer rela tions in conformity with the idea of a com munity of interest emphasized so long before by the undefined political bond of union estab lished by the Monroe Doctrine. A compre hensive Pan-American international conference for closer co-operation, such as had been con templated at Panama in 1824.-26 and in later proposals, already partially realized by confer ences at Lima in 1847-48, in 1864 and in 1877 78, and at -Montevideo in 1888-89, planned by Blaine in 1881, was finally realized at Wash ington in 1889, resulting in a better understand ing and in later conferences which further em phasized the idea of a community of American interests. It established at Washington the International Bureau of American Republics (renamed the Pan-American Union by the Fourth Pan-American conference in 1910) which rendered valuable service by its prac tical activities. The second Pan-American congress which met in Mexico on 22 Oct. 1901, largely through the quiet suggestion of Presi dent McKinley, who tactfully planned to counteract the unfortunate distrust of the United States among Latin Americans, was attended by representatives of all the American republics. Its chief topics of discussion were arbitration and collection of pecuniary claims of citizens of one country against the govern ment of another county. It approved a project for a treaty under which pecuniary claims should be submitted to the International tri bunal of arbitration which had been provided at The Hague. It extended the activities of the International Bureau of American Repub lics, which was also invested with authority to arrange for -subsequent congresses. A third Pan-American congress, which met at Rio Janiero, 21 July 1906, was attended by dele gates from all American republics except Haiti and Venezuela. It recommended that the next Hague congress should seek to secure a gen eral arbitration treaty and take steps toward the abolition of the use of force in the collec tion of international debts. The fourth Pan American congress, which met at Buenos Aires in July-August 1910, discussed compulsory arbi tration of pecuniary claims, sanitation, exten sion of steamer service, patents, trademarks, copyrights and interchange of university pro fessors.
In 1891 a serious difficulty arose between the American government and Chile, with which relations had become somewhat less friendly after 1880 as a result of Secretary Blaine's apparent sympathy with Peru in the War of the Pacific. The decidedly unfriendly feeling created by the American Minister (Patrick Eagan) among the Chilean leaders of the vic torious party in the Chilean revolution of 1891, and increased by the American strict interpre tation of neutral duties in the seizure of the Bata, later culminated in an assault upon sailors of the American cruiser Baltimore while ashore at Valparaiso in October 1891, resulting in the suspension of diplomatic relations and an American ultimatum (from Secretary Blaine) to which Chile grudgingly yielded by an apology and the payment of $50,000 damages for the families of persons killed and for the wounded.
In 1895 the American government in apply ing the principles of the Monroe Doctrine against Great Britain in the Venezuela-Guiana boundary dispute showed a friendly disposition toward Venezuela which was appreciated else where in South America, in spite of Secretary Olney's extreme interpretation, including the provoking assertion that the American fiat was law on the American continent. Later friendly American acts appeared in striking contrast to the bad conduct of the Venezuelan government. Although the American government did not accept the Venezuelan appeal to intervene in 1902 against the debt-collecting activities of Germany and Great Britain (in which it had been invited to participate but which it did not approve), President Roosevelt firmly resisted the later plans of Germany and was successful in terminating the blockade of Venezuela by securing arbitration of the controversy at The Hague under a protocol signed at Washington on 13 Feb. 1903. This friendly action, to
gether with the example of American policy in Cuba contributed much to remove Latin Amer ican suspicions arising from the Spanish-Amer ican War, American negotiations preliminary to the construction of the Panama Canal and various extensions of the Monroe Doctrine which aroused apprehensions. Unfortunately American relations with Venezuela became strained in 1907, under the presidency of Cipriano Castro, by a serious controversy aris ing from certain American asphalt concessions and by the arbitrary expulsion of an American editor of a Venezuelan newspaper. The Ameri can government, seeking adjustment of all asphalt claims, proposed arbitration, which was refused by Castro. It then agreed to a plan of arbitration by separating the claims, as Castro proposed, but to which he later objected (in March 1908), absolutely refusing to arbitrate any of the cases. In June 1908 the American government withdrew its Minister and sus pended diplomatic relations, and two months later offered no objection to the contemplated forcible action of the Netherlands against Castro in return for his conduct against the Dutch islands near the Venezuelan coast. But, when Castro took flight from his troubles, leav ing executive affairs in charge of a more rea sonable official, J. V. Gomez, who sought a restoration of friendly relations, the American government sent to Venezuela a special com missioner, William I. Buchanan, who on 13 Feb. 1909 signed a protocol under which all disputes were satisfactorily settled — two immediately, two within five months and a last remaining one by later adjudication of The Hague. - American relations with Colombia, which before 1860 were largely concerned with prob lems of a transit route across Panama, since the American Civil War, were largely influ enced by revived American interest in the ques tion of the Panama Canal. In 1868, in accord with the wish of Colombia for certain changes in the treaty of 1846, the American govern ment authorized special negotiations at Bogota, which resulted in a draft treaty embodying the Monroe Doctrine and securing to the United States absolute control of any canal across the isthmus. This new treaty, although approved by Secretary Seward, was rejected by the Senate of Colombia and changed by amend ments and alterations which (in February 1869) failed to receive the approval of the American Senate. The attitude of Colombia turned American attention toward the less desirable Nicaragua route and later resulted in an un fortunate period of American-Colombian es trangement and the abolition of the American legation at Bogota for several years before 1878, during which (in 1876) Colombia turned to the French for leadership in the canal enterprise. American interest in the problem was revived in 1879 by De Lesseps' suggestion of a joint international guarantee of neutrality for the canal, resulting (in 1880) in an executive declaration of American policy requiring American control of the canal. In 1881 Secretary Blaine initiated diplomatic measures to defeat the French enterprise by premature denouncement of plans for a Euro pean guarantee over the canal, efforts to es tablish closer relations with Latin America and fruitless negotiations with Great Britain for abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850.