In the 130 years of its existence the court has pronounced 33 acts of Congress, and mare than 225 State statutes, to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution, and therefore invalid, and in each instance there has been complete and peaceful acquiescence in the decision. So that instead of being a disturbing element, the exercise of this power confirms the peaceful relation between the States and the Nation, and beween the States as among themselves, pro tects foreign nations from the breach of treaties, and conserves the rights of property and con tract, and the fundamental rights of personal liberty. The Constitution prcrvides that °no State shall pass any law impairing the obliga tion of contracts,') and the aid of the court has often been invoked for protection against the attempts of States to violate this prohibition. The framers of the Constitution believed, and .the people of the United States, in view of the suc cessful operation of this prohibition for more than a century, believe that the States ought not to be permitted to intervene between the parties to a contract, to destroy or impair the binding force of terms by which they have agreed to be bound, and that such intervention is contrary to the principles of popular govern ment It is true that in the days that tried men's souls before the adoption of the Federal Con stitution many attempts had been made by States to intervene for this purpose, which doubtless led to the adoption of this clause.
Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist classing such laws with bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, which are prohibited by the same clause, says.: " Laws inspaking the obligation of contracts are oontrarY to.the first principles of the social compact, and to every poomple of sound legislation. They are prohibited by the spirit and scope of the State constitutions. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences. against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very prop erly. therefore, have the Convention added tlffs constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private right& And I am much deoeived if they have not, in so doing. as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted mterosts of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enter mama and influential speculators, and snares to the more mdustrious and less informed part of the community. They have seen. too. that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain oiroTetitions, every subsequent interfer ence being naturally uced by the effects of the preceding. TheY very rightly in er, therefore. that some thorough reform s wanting .ich will banish speculations on public measurea, Inspire a genesal prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of Society."
In the celebrated Dartmouth College case the protection of this clause was invoked by the trustees of the college, to recover its property from a person who held it for new trustees under the authority of a law of the State of New Hampshire. In 1769, King George III by royal charter incorporated 12 persons, therein named as 'The Trustees of Dartmouth Col lege,') granting to them and their successors the usual corporate privileges and powers, and authorizing the trustees who were to govern the college to fill up all vacancies which may be created in their own body. The application by the founder, who had already established the college, was for a charter to incorporate a religious and literary institution, and stated that large contributions had been made for the object, which would be conferred upon the corporation as soon as it was created, and on the faith of the charter the property was con veyed to it. After the Revolution (in 1816), the legislature of New Hampshire passed an act incre,asing the number of trustees to 21, giving the appointment of the additional members to the governor of the State, and creating a board of overseers with power to inspect and control the most important acts of the trustees. Admit ting that the provision of the Constitution em braced only contracts which respect property or some object of value, and which confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and did not refer to grants of political power or to acts creating institutions to be employed in the administration of government or of pub lic property, or in which the State as a govern ment was alone interested, the court after most mature consideration reached the conclusion, that the charter was a contract which secured to the trustees the property and control of the college— a contract made upon valuable con sideration— for the security and disposition of property, and on the faith of which real and personal property had been conveyed to the institution, and, therefore, a contract, the obli gation of which could be impaired without a violation of the Constitution of the United States. It held that the statute of New Hamp shire did impair it, and was, therefore, void, and rendered judgment restoring the property and control of the pollege to the trustees who represented the founder. The opinions of Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Story are masterpieces of judicial reasoning, and the principles laid down by them have ever since prevailed. In 56 cases decided by the court, acts of State legislatures have been declared invalid in accordance with these principles, because they impaired the obligation of con tracts, and it is not too much to say that, instead of having a disturbing or disintegrat ing effect upon civil society, these decisions have done more than any other single cause to inculcate a reverence for the law, and for the sanctity of the right of private property, which is one of the chief objects of free government.