Tactics

attack, force, troops, commander, enemy, position, action, movement, commanders and reports

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In addition to the above primary modes of attack, a turning movement may also be con sidered. This might be looked upon as almost a form of flank attack were it not that it differs from it in some essential particulars. The turning movement is more often a menace than an attack for it threatens the enemy's line of retreat so as to force him to change front or shift his position before he enters the com bat The manoeuvre differs also from a flank attack inasmuch as it removes the scene of combat from the position held by the enemy, while the flank attack takes place on one of the flanks of the positkm itself. The turning movement may be made, either with a portion of the force at command, or with its whole strength. In the first case, the conditions should render it improbable if not impossible that the enemy could act offensively in turn upon each fraction of the divided force. Otherwise the separate movement should not be attempted, as it most end in disaster. When the ground permits, or is favorable, cavalry and horse artillery are specially suited to the turning movement. They should, therefore, nearly al waYs form a portion and sometimes the whole of the troops employed in the service, both because they can by rapid advance produce the moral effect of surprise, and because they can more easily avoid destruction by a superior force.

The commander of a small force of the three arms should have no difficulty in prepar ing his plan of attack and issuing his orders, upon receiving reports of the strength and dis positions of the enemy and of the nature of the ground upon which he must act. In ordi nary cases when small, forces are engaged, the cavalry, which reconnoiters in advance, will bring in sufficient information for the purpose; but if the enemy should be covered by ad vanced troops, it may be necessary to make a special reconnaissance, sometimes supported by guns, in order to arrive at a knowledge of his strength and intentions. With large forces this would probably be carried out by the ad vanced guard the artillery of which, re-enforced where necessary from the main body, would take up what may be called a preliminary ar tillery position and open fire at long range to cover the advance of the troops employed in the reconnaissance. The information required being obtained, the commander would issue his orders. In the case of very small operations or of a sudden encounter with the enemy these would be given verbally; under other conditions orders should, if possible, be written. Should the force, as it probably would, consist of de tachments under various commanders, it would be necessary that there should be a general order for all, and also a special order ad dressed to each commander where separate ac tion is required. The general order should be clear, precise and complete, and as short as quick compliance with these requirements will permit. It should contain: 1. The conditions or circumstances of the intended action with what is known of the enemy.

2. The mode of action determined upon, and how to be undertaken; thus for instance, to attack the enemy when he is touched on in direct advance, or, to attack the whole, or a certain part of a position.

3. The strength, composition and general division of the attacking force, with names of commanders; this may be given more in detail in the margin of the order if thought necessary.

4. The preliminary positions to be taken up by each distinct part of the force with their directions of attack.

5. The hours at which these positions are to be assumed, and at which the forward move ment or attack is to be commenced.

6. The position where the commander of the troops will be found during the action, to which all references or reports are to be made or sent.

These clauses would be sufficient for a small force, but in operations of greater magnitude it would be necessary to add: 7. The positions of the ambulance and field hospitals, and the order of march of the trains of the various columns.

It must be understood that the dispositions of the troops thus indicated are only intended for the first phases of the engagement, for, until the enemy's counter-plans are developed, the final movements which depend thereon can not be defined. The special orders addressed to separate commanders should contain nothing that may tie their hands too much in matters of detail. As a rule, they should be told the thing to do, not the manner of doing it, and within safe limits, to be named, they should be allowed free action.

For the purpose of watching the phases of the combat, the position which the commander should assume during the engagement ought, if possible, be on an eminence, from which he can perceive the principal portion of the ground over which the troops are to work. He should not quit this post (duly announced in the ((order") without exceptionally good reasons, and if he is obliged to do so, an officer should be left behind to direct all reports or messengers to the new station of the commander.

The orders which are necessarily transmitted during an action by the commander of the troops are of much importance and should be given with great care. They should, if possible, be in general harmony with the original plan of attack, although certain modifications may become necessary. They should not descend to details which are better left to commanders of corps, nor should the commander of the troops interfere in the execution of his orders, further than to assure himself that they are carried out. He should be satisfied on this point by means of constant reports and com munications which must be kept up without interruption during the action between him and the commanders of separate corps and detach ments. When the reports cannot be sent by an officer, they should be written, and in such case be numbered and dated with the exact hour and minute of dispatch. Above all other matters it is most important that the com mander of the troops should be immediately informed when circumstances render it impos sible for a subordinate commander to carry out the orders or instructions, as the failure to execute these may necessitate modifications and fresh orders to replace the former ones.

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