In spite of these successes the President manifested very little zeal for the prosecution of the war. This was doubtless due in part to jealousy of Hamilton, but it was mainly the result of his intense conservatism. John Adams was not the man to sympathize with the hair brained schemes of Hamilton for the conquest of the Floridas. and he was certainly not the man to continue a war when there was no longer good cause for it, merely because public opinion seemed to favor it. Hearing that the French government would receive a minister from the United States and would treat him with courtesy and respect, he nominated Wil ham Vans Murray to that position. The mem bers of his own party were taken completely by surprise, and the leaders of the war faction made an attempt to defeat Murray's confirma tion in the Senate. Adams checkmated their plans by withdrawing Murray's name and sub stituting three commissioners, Murray, Chief Justice Ellsworth and Patrick Henry (25 Feb. 1799). Henry refused to accept, and William Davie of North Carolina was selected in his stead. Much to the chagrin of Hamilton, the Senate confirmed the nominations. The Ham ilton partisans in the Cabinet now made a final attempt to delay the departure of the commis sioners, but their success was of short duration. The President asserted his authority, and the commissioners set sail in October 1799. The Federalists throughout the country were at first surprised, not to say disgusted, at the peace policy of the chief executive. Hamilton's in trigues to checkmate his plans, moreover, re sulted in a revulsion of feeling, and it may safely be said that the commissioners sailed with the approval of the vast majority of the American people.
The mission was successful. A treaty of peace was concluded with the first consul, 30 Sept. 1800. Provision was made for the resto ration of captured ships and goods which had not yet been condemned. For protection in the future the rule was adopted that "free ships make free goods," except in the case of contra band of war. The terms blockade and contra band were defined, and certain regulations were made in regard to prizes and privateers. The
most serious problem arose from the desire of the United States to be released from the obli gations of the treaties of 1778 and the desire of France to avoid paying indemnities for the American vessels and cdrgoes which had been confiscated. Article II of the new convention provided for the postponement of both ques tions until a future settlement, with the under standing that in the meantime the treaties of 1778 should not be in force. Strong opposition was made in the Senate to this article on the ground that it sacrificed the claims of American merchants. It was finally struck out and a clause was inserted limiting the convention to eight years. In this amended form the treaty was returned to France. Napoleon ratified it with the proviso that each country made the concession which the other demanded. The Senate passed the final vote of ratification with this understanding. It was this bargain which gave rise to some of the French spoliation claims. The obligations of France were, of course, not to the United States government, but to American citizens who were engaged in foreign trade. Consequently when our govern ment released France from those obligations, it tacitly assumed them itself. This treaty of 1800, like the Jay Treaty with England, was really only a temporary settlement. The troubles with both countries continued until the close of the great European conflict on the battlefield of Waterloo. See TREATIES; UNITED STATES - DIPLOMACY.
Adams, J., (Works ' (10 vols., 1850-56); Allan, G. W.,
Naval War With France' (1909);
State Papers, Foreign Relations' ;
of Congress,' Vols. VII-X; Lodge, H. C.,