For such a theory of empire, however, the English community on the European side of the Atlantic was very far from ready. By the let ter of the law of the situation as most authori tatively interpreted at the time, colonial affairs were as much in the hands of Parliament as any other interest of the British nation. When, then, the new circumstances of the empire created by the results of the Seven Years' War seemed to call for a policy which should (1) enforce the system of trade regulation more effectively, (2) provide for a standing military force for the control of the newly-ac quired territory and (3) provide a revenue from America which should prevent the addition of the burden of expense thereby entailed to the already huge national debt, it is not surprising that, on the one hand, the ministry should take colonial obedience for granted, and on the other, that the colonists should take fright at the possibilities of oppression involved in the unlimited exercise of Parliamentary power. At all events, acts covering the above purposes were passed in 1764 and 1765. It is only fair to note that experience under the indeterminate relations previous to 1760 had been such as to lead the ministry not unnaturally to believe that unless these objects were secured by action of Parliament they would not be effectually secured at all. It is also to be observed that, whereas the power of Parliament to tax the colonies had actually been used only to regulate commerce and not to raise revenue, it is, in strict logic and in practical administration, impossible to admit the power to tax for one purpose without granting it for the other.
Of this three-fold program, distasteful in all its features to the Americans, the Stamp Act (q.v.) involved the greatest degree of novelty, invading, as it did, what imperial ad ministration had hitherto left untouched control of the legislature of each colony over the granting of supplies to the Crown. Upon this feature American resistance was concen trated and before the time set for the act to go into effect it had been practically nullified by the use of a variety of means, including mob violence as well as the resolutions of legisla tures and of a Congress of delegates from a majority of the colonies. The basis of remon strance was the contention that the granting of supplies from themselves for the use of the Crown by any body in which they were not personally represented was in violation of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. The English reply to this — that the colonies were virtually represented in Parliament as much as many sections and interests in England itself were— was probably quite in accord with the historic meaning of the word repre sentation as it had progressively developed in England. But in America variations from this meaning had developed which made the theory of virtual representation in American eyes in applicable to the case. To Americans the idea of representation adequate for taxing purposes included a franchise regulated by general rules and possessed by practically all free adult white males with a moderate amount of and an apportionment of representatives based on territorial and popular considerations rather than on those of "interest." In all of these points the contrast with English ideas of rep resentation was fundamental and these varia tions in understanding of this term help to ac count for the blindness of each side to the justice of the contention of the other. This theory of representation involved in matters of taxation what has already been referred to in another connection, a theory of federative em pire, while the English theory was that of con solidated empire, directed by Crown and Par liament, with the colonial governments as cor porations, with somewhat extended powers, to be sure, in consequence of their peculiar cir cumstances, but ultimately subject to complete regulation by Parliament. The attempt to en force the revenue feature of the Grenville policy partially revealed the divergence between these two theories. The issue was raised on the specific point of revenue; on this point the colonies successfully resisted and in the repeal of the Stamp Act, in 1766, Parliament on the specific point retreated, at the same time assert ing by the Declaratory Act its power over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." Though the American resistance to the Stamp Act policy was undoubtedly a surprise to the ministry, once the incident was closed, even by such an inconclusive settlement, every effort of the government in matters of colonial policy should have been directed toward the achievement of an arrangement which should provide for de velopment of imperial welfare without raising the issue as between Parliament and the col onies in bare and abstract terms. Instead, the
ministry, now dominated by the king's per sonal influence, chose to raise the issue as plainly as possible by proposing a revenue scheme which technically respected the colonial distinction between external and internal taxa tion but in all other points carried out the es sential aims of the Grenville policy. This was the real significance of the "Townshend Acts,' passed in June and July 1767, and the thorough going character of the American resistance to these acts was serious in a degree correspond ing in ratio to the plainness with which the issue of Parliamentary legislation, in distinc tion from Parliamentary taxation, was thus raised. Again owing to changes in the ministry and to complaints from commercial sources the Townshend legislation was repealed in 1769, except for taxation on the single item of tea, which was retained in set terms for the saving of Parliamentary right. By this time the colon sts had had experience of the consequences of the English theory of empire, under Parlia ment as it then was, and they now formulated their position in the phrase, eNo legislation without representation? The issue between Parliament and the colonies over the funda mental question of the character of the empire federative or consolidated— had now been stripped of most of its disguises. Upon the issue, as thus stated, king and Parliament were in essential agreement, the differences between the various groups in Parliament, and between these groups and the king, being rather con cerned with the question of the most effective use of this unrestrained power. But between 1770 and 1774 irritation was developing in an increasing and dangerous degree between the imperial officials and the colonial populations. Events like the so-called "Massacre" at Boston in 1770, the destruction of the Gaspee in 1772 and the tea riot at Boston in 1773 led the min istry to adopt coercion of the most unqualified kind. By the acts of 1774, aimed at the punish ment of Massachusetts, by the closing of the port of Boston, altering the government of the province and making new and special provision for the quartering of imperial troops, the full possibilities of the theory of the Parliamentary consolidated empire were revealed to the col onies in general. But instead of the isolation of Massachusetts, which the ministry intended, a closer union of all the colonial governments was the result. Throughout the whole course of the agitation the impulse and the machinery of intercolonial discussion and action had been developing, and on the summons of Massachu setts a Congress of delegates from 12 colonies met at Philadelphia in September 1774. This Congress gave expression to the colonial doc trine, and provided for bringing pressure to bear on the commercial interests of Great Britain by organizing a continental scheme for non-importation of British goods. The great result of the Congress was to enlarge the scene of opposition to the ministry from Massachu setts to the colonies as a whole. In the newly elected, Parliament which met in November 1774, measures were taken still further to carry out the policy of coercion and, if possible, to divide the colonies, by providing for a general strengthening of the military force in America and forbidding the privileges of the fisheries and of trade with England to all but New York, Delaware and North Carolina. Schemes of conciliation were proposed but ' received only partisan consideration. Passion was now too highly involved on both sides to allow of suc cess for any moderate or compromising plan. Any_ permanent scheme of governmental rela tions requires mutual confidence to a certain degree and this confidence had been broken down by the circumstances of the agitation of the previous 10 years. Before the news of fur ther action by Parliament in the direction of coercion had reached America, the extra-legal organization of Massachusetts, which the op ponents of ministerial policy had set up there after the alteration in the provincial govern ment, came into armed collision with the mili tary forces of the Crown at Lexington and the military phase of the Revolution had begun.