The year 1844 witnessed another event which revealed the widening difference between the two sections. After an exciting contest over slavery the Methodist Episcopal Church split into a Northern and Southern branch. This di vision made it easier for both parties to obtain both religious sanction and religious condemna tion for their work. This situation added greatly to the bitterness of the strife. The feel ing between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery elements became so pronounced in the next few years that both Whigs and Democrats in the Presidential campaign of 1848 refused to make any definite statement on the -slavery question. The anti-slavery Whigs resented this non-committal position of their party end many' of them joined in the formation of the Free Soil party, which pledged itself to oppose the extension of slavery to the. Territories. At the same time the new party declared that Con gress was powerless over slavery in the States where it existed. The election of 1848 revealed a further tendency toward sectionalization among the voters of the two old parties. Be cause General Taylor, the Whig candidate, was a Southern slaveholder he received a much larger vote in the South, where the great strength of the Democrats usually lay; while Cass, the Northern Democrat, received some what similar support in the North, though not so striking on account of the Van Buren de fection. For the next two years the gulf of sectionalization greatly widened.
The specific cause of contention was the question of slavery or no slavery in the territory obtained by the war with Mexico. The South felt that slavery must go into the new lands, not only because that section needed the new region to add to her weight in the councils of the nation, but, also, because the region was acquired largely through her own efforts. The North was becoming more and more outspoken in opposition to the extension of slavery into the new region obtained from Mexico. Nearly every Northern legislature resolved in favor of the power and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories. The legislature of Virginia resolved that if this principle be carried out the people of Virginia must either'submit to °aggression and outrageD or resist at all haz ards and to the last extremity)) Public meet ings in several Southern cities approved the strong words of Virginia. Although the num ber in favor of dissolving the Union rapidly in creased in the South and grew bolder in as serting their views, the great mass of people were yet true to the Union.
When, therefore, Henry Clay, by the unani mous vote of the legislature of Kentucky, was called from retirement and sent back to the Senate to restore harmony and to strengthen the weakening bonds of union his efforts met with sympathy and support on the part of the masses of the two sections. By the compro mise of 1850, the admission of California as a free State and the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia were bal anced by the payment of $10,000,000 to Texas and by a new Fugitive Slave Law. meetings were held in various places to bring public opinion into hearty accord with the com promise. Nevertheless there were men in both sections who had little or no faith in the meas ure as a means of allaying the hostile sec tional feeling. The greatest argument of the South in support of the compromise was the greatest argument of the North against the compromise—the Fugitive Slave Law (q.v.).
The drastic provisions of this law and the new zeal for its enforcement caused a wider development of the °Underground Railroad)) (q.v.). But to hinder further the return of the fugitive to his master, some of the Northern States began to pass Personal Liberty Laws. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill (q.v.) and the con sequent contest for Kansas, led the majority of Northern States to nullify, as far as possible, the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law by means of some such legislation as the Personal Liberty Laws. This legislation was cited by more than one seceding State, in 1860 and 1861, in justification of secession. Immediately, how ever, the South became more and more irri tated because, on account of the opposition of Northern men, so few fugitives were returned, while the North became more and more irri tated because, by the aid of Northern men, so many fugitives were returned. It is instruc tive to note that the people of the extreme Southern States, who lost few or no slaves, and the people of the extreme Northern States, who knew least about slavery, were the loudest in talk and most radical in action.
The growth of political association and inter est which bound parties together had done much to strengthen the Union. But the excitement aroused by the passage of the Kansas-Ne braska Bill and the bitter conflict for the pos session of Kansas destroyed the Whig party, and dealt the Democratic party a severe blow.
Southern Whigs went over to the Demgcrats, while Northern Whigs joined with anti-slavery Democrats and Free Soil men in forming a new anti-slavery party, the Republican, a purely sectional party. The break-up of the Whig party left an inheritance of suspicion and ill will that boded nothing but evil.
The election of 1856 resulted in a victory for the Democrats, but the Republicans carried all the Northern States but four. The falling off in the Northern Democratic vote was as ominous as the disappearance of the Whig party. Would, therefore, the oldest party in our history also break in two along sectional lines, and former political friends be turned into enemies? Such an event, many believed, would indeed hasten the disintegration of the Union: It was probably clear to the great leaders of the Democratic party that if the struggle in Kansas should go on much longer, nothing could prevent the Northern and Southern wings from taking opposite sides. Hence, the decision in the Dred Scott Case (q.v.) was hailed as the means of settling the dispute over Kansas by taking the question out of politics entirely. Chief Justice Taney, in rendering this decision, declared that, according to the Constitution, neither Congress nor the legislature of a Ter ritory could exclude slavery from the Terri tory. The decision, in effect, placed the doc trine of Popular Sovereignty and the Republi can party under the ban of being opposed to the Constitution. The question was not taken out of politics, for while the South applauded, the North denounced, the decision. Even Northern Democrats wavered in its support ; for of what use was Popular Sovereignty, the doctrine of their favorite, Senator Douglas? The clearer this question became, the more un certain became the question : Can the Demo cratic party be held together in support of the slaveholders' view? The Lincoln-Douglas joint debates, in 1858, settled that question in the negative. Lincoln forced Douglas to admit that he believed that a Territory could exclude slavery from its limits in spite of the Dred Scott decision. Douglas took this stand in order to keep faith with the Democrats of Illinois and of the North. But Southern lead ers watched the debate with deep interest, and were mortally offended at this position of Douglas. They immediately began to take steps to "read him out of the party?) But Douglas went into the National Democratic Convention at Charleston in 1860 with a ma jority of delegates in his favor. They stood faithfully by him and voted down the plat form of the Southern wing of the party. Southern delegations, one after another, with drew from the convention, and the party of Jefferson and Jackson was broken in two. Later, in convention at Baltimore, no compro mise could be reached and both factions nomi nated Presidential candidates. With the Repub lican party, there were thus three sectional parties in the field. How completely the people were imbued with sectional feelings may be seen from .the fact that the one party— the Constitutional Union—which professed to be a national party and urged the putting away of sectional questions received only 80,000 votes in the North. Douglas obtained about 1,300,000 votes, but only 163,000 from the slave States. Lincoln received but 26,000 of his 1,800,000 votes from the South. The strong ties of po litical association were breaking under the strain of sectional hostility, and it seemed that the only thing wanting was some overt and formal act to certify to the division in senti ment which already existed. When, however, South Carolina took the leap, after Lincoln's election, and six other States followed her ex ample, and when it became apparent that seces sion meant a conflict of arms, then those deeper and more fundamental interests than party politics began to assert themselves. The con servative forces born of the history of the past and of the hopes of the future began to call out for concession and compromise. Dur ing the winter of 1860-61 Congress, under pres sure of the conservative interests and patriotic feelings, made vigorous efforts to allay the de mon of sectionalism. The Peace Convention (q.v.) which met in Washington in February 1861, also endeavored to aid in restoring har mony. But the movement of events was too rapid. Lincoln was in the Presidency but a few weeks before Sumter fell, and the two sec tions were at war. It is of little consequence which of the parties struck the first blow, for there seemed nowhere any power or influence strong enough to long prevent sectional ani mosity from bursting into flame.