What caused the matter to be more difficult of settlement was the fact that there was no final authority, no judge between the two par ties. An infraction of the general Constitution, that is, a violation of the contract between the Union on the one side and the States on the other, was a matter that could not be satisfac torily determined since there was no outside tri bunal whose judgment could he accepted as dis interested. Jefferson thought on the whole that -.the States should be the final judges; Madison inclined with the exception of a few years of his life to the opposite view, while both Wash ington and Hamilton had held that the national government was to be its own judge in such cases.
In 1832 South Carolina formally annulled the . tariff laws of the Union and the State of Geor gia had steadily refused to recognize the au thority of the United States courts within her boundaries during a period of several years be ginning with 1825. After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and especially after the Dred Scott decision of 1857, many Northern States refused to obey the national authority and in various instances passed laws to prevent enforcement of the laws of the Union.
Further still actual secession was not un familiar to Americans. The counties of west ern North Carolina (new Tennessee), just prior to the formation of the national gov ernment, had formally declared their inde pendence and then proceeded to establish a separate and independent government. This new sovereignty, called the State of Franklin, was successfully maintained for four years, 1784-.88. Western Pennsylvania and north western Virginia made a similar attempt to se cede both from their mother States and from the Federal Union in 1794; in 1805 to 1807 there was danger that Kentucky, Tennessee and parts of the Louisiana cession would withdraw their allegiance from a government which was thought not to be sufficiently jealous of Western interests. The principle of local autonomy and local sufficiency was so universally accepted in the various sections of the United States that such threats and outbreaks were not surpris ing; they were not thought to be positively un lawful. Yet public opinion supported the Exec utive in putting down the whisky "insurrec tion" as it was called and President Jefferson did not sacrifice his popularity by taking vigor ous measures to prevent what appeared to be a dangerous movement led by Aaron Burr in 1806. In 1814 the strongest organs of public opinion in Virginia recommended the use of force against New England in case of secession and the terms of "traitor" and "treason" were frequently applied to leading opponents of the war with Great Britain. The vigorous and prompt proclamation against the proposed plan of South Carolina by President Jackson was a prominent cause of that leader's lasting popu larity South as well as North. However, it was not quite decided then that a State could not withdraw from the Union, in which case, of course, no national law would have force within its jurisdiction. Calhoun, the author of nullifi
cation, did not at that time advocate secession. He relied on the Jeffersonian teaching of 1798, that the State was the proper judge of the va lidity of a national law in so far as that State was concerned. The debate between Webster and Hayne brought to light the fact that a genuine national spirit had arisen in the North and that the conservative particularism of the earlier years had entrenched itself in the South ern States. Meanwhile economic forces had begun to crystallize in such a way that disunion seemed to offer advantages to the South.
When the fierce struggle over Missouri was waging certain strong and far-seeing Southern leaders who regarded negro slavery as essential to the Southern economic and social structure •decilared that the James River and the Ken tiRky-Tennessee boundary was a natural line •4. cleavage between two civilizations which were growing up within the bounds of the United States. John Randolph and Nathaniel Macon held this view and there were a few others who agreed with them. The Missouri Compromise was considered by them a great blunder, notwithstanding its Southern origin. They declared it a violation of the national compact. From this time forward the develop ment of the cotton plantation as the typical Southern institution of everyday life caused negro slavery in the lower South to appear to be an absolute necessity. Climate, soil and social habit combined to raise the institution from the position of a necessary evil to that of a benevo lent system working alike for the uphuilding of the slave and his master. The price of cotton regulated the price of the negro; and the de mands of the world's commerce grew faster than the supply of cotton. The economic life of this section was centred in this industry, and the profits were so great that with a small cap ital the younger sons of the older families of the south Atlantic seaboard could become inde pendent planters in a few years and in a decade or two they became masters of vast estates with hundreds of slaves. Three factors entered into the makeup of these fortunes: cheap lands, negro slaves and a demand for cotton. The supply of cheap lands seemed inexhaustible, the demand for cotton as already noted continued to increase, negroes alone were limited in sup ply and they died very rapidly in the cotton belt. Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas began early to send their surplus slaves south; as the price mounted from $300 in 1820 to $1,000 in 1850 the stimulus to raising negroes increased and the immorality of the business appeared, less evident. This is the development which brought unity of economic interest to all the Southern States from Virginia, at least, to Louisiana.