The British attack on the South was re newed in 1778 by the capture of Savannah and the reduction of the greater part of Georgia. The British seem to have counted on the large number of slaves in the Southern States as an element of weakness in the defensive capacities Of the region and to have planned to roll up the South from Georgia to Virginia by combin ing use of sea-power with the threat at the altars and fires of the interior by an overrun ning force. An attempt in the summer of 1779 at a recapture of Savannah by the combina tion of the French fleet and American and French land force under Lincoln was repulsed. The capture of Charleston in 1780 by the Brit• ish fleet and army made the soil of the Caro linas for the two following campaigns the scene of an interesting conflict between two efficient armies, each under competent leadership, and, at first, on something like even terms, as far as aid from local partisans is concerned. The crushing defeat of Gates .by Cornwallis in Aug gust 1780, at Camden, S. C. seemed to promise Cornwallis the control of the whole State and a position toward North Carolina, but the American victory.at King's Mountain in October 1780 served to keep him close to ter ritory controlled from the sea. Greene now succeeded Gates in command of the American army and after King's Mountain and the battle of the Cowpens had largely deprived Cornwal lis of his light troops, succeeded in drawing him away from the coast and northeastward across North Carolina almost to the Virginia line. Here, at Guilford Court House, in March 1781, in an action which was tactically a de feat for the Americans, Cornwallis was so weak ened that more thorough invasion of the Caro linas became impossible. He retired first to Wilmington on the coast and then, as it be came evident that Greene was returning south westward again, crowding the British back to the coast at Charleston and Savannah, himself turned away and joined Arnold in Virginia in May.
The French Alliance now supplied, for the first time in an effectual manner, that indis pensable element in the American defense, lack of which had prevented development of its more aggressive possibilities — viz., control of access by the sea. The threat upon New York by the French fleet and the forward movement by the American force drew off strength from Cornwallis in Virginia and kept Clinton close in New York till the strength of Washington's and Rochambeau's force was far on its way to Virginia. In the meantime, De Grasse's seizure
of the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and the five days' action with the relieving British fleet off the entrance isolated Cornwallis, now in trenched on the peninsula between the York and the James rivers, for a long enough period to allow of the complete investment of his posi French fleet in his rear. Having exhausted the resources of such a position before the Eng lish fleet could appear again, Cornwallis sur rendered 19 Oct. 1781. It is worthy of note tion by superior numbers in front and the that this was the first failure of the British sea power on the coast during the war and the thoroughness with which this first opportunity was exploited for purposes of aggressive de fense indicates the grasp of the situation as a whole and the cautious daring which character ized Washington's strategy. The British were now in possession only of the ports of New York, Charleston and Savannah, and by reason of the moral effect of the capture of Cornwallis the war was practically at an end.
The decisive battles may be selected as fol lows: Bunker Hill, 17 June 1776, which in spired the British commanders with a firm notion of the inexpediency of a front attack on American forces behind breastworks; Long Island, 27 Aug. 1776, which gave the British the control of the mouth of the Hudson; Saratoga, 17 Oct. 1777, which frustrated the attempt to break the confederacy in two and which brought the French Alliance; King's Moun tain, October 1780, and the Cowpens, 17 Jan. 1781, which deprived Cornwallis of his light troops in his overrunning of the Carolinas, and the naval action at the entrance of Chesa peake Bay, in the early part of September 1781, which made the siege of Yorktown possible.
Bancroft, G., 'History of the United States) (Vols. IV and V, last ed., New York 1891) ; Doyle, J. A., 'History of the United States) (London 1875) ; id., 'Cambridge Modern (Chap. 7, Vol. VI, New York 1903) ; Fiske, J. 'The American Revolution' (2 vols., Cambricfge 1896-97); Lecky, W. E. H., 'History of England in the Eighteenth Cen tug) (Vols. III and IV) ; Trevelyan, Sir G. O., American Revolution) (6 vols.; New York 1899-1914) ; Wiley, E., and Rines, I. E., 'The United States) (New York 1916) ; Winsor, J., 'Narrative and Critical History of America' (Vol. VI, 1884-89).