All through those trying months and espe cially up to the time of the Lusitania sinking in May 1915 there was effort among the people at large to he neutral' or inoffensive in their expression of sympathy for the Allied cause. Doubtless a portion of this inoffensiveness was lethargy; but even those hoping strongly for the defeat of Germany refrained generally, though not universally, from public denuncia tion of Germany's conduct in beginning the war and of her method of carrying it on. Defenders of Germany, on the other hand, often quite open in their pronouncements, had every opportunity of free statement. Opponents of Germany, it is true, were by no means all silent; books were written and editorials in the news papers were printed which discussed the Ai dence of Germany's guilt, but in the opinion of the writer of the present article, the out standing fact is the hesitation of the people generally, even those feeling strongly in sym pathy with the Allied cause, to indulge in heated declamation or to embarrass the government which had issued a proclamation of neutrality and was seeking to play the part of a neutral honestly and not merely ostensibly. Of course as the months went by expressions of opinion were stronger and more openly made. It is naturally impossible to say how much of the growing opposition to Germany was due to developing appreciation of her guilt in be ginning the war and carrying it on with a ferocity which astounded the world, and how much was due to interference with American rights on the seas and to the rising apprecia tion of a German menace to our own peace and safety; but mere fear of German ambition probably played no very large part, it may be not so large a part as it should have done, in arousing American antagonism.
Before taking up other aspects of the case it is well to remind the reader that there were various things occupying the minds of the American people besides the war in Europe. Prominent among them was the trouble with Mexico. It was not at all sure that we should not be driven into a conflict with that country and it must also be remembered that the danger continued down almost to the time of our taking up arms against Germany. An entirely wrong perspective is gained if these various distractions are overlooked ; without some ap preciation of the reality of internal problems and of the Mexican and Caribbean difficulties and responsibilities, one might gather the opin ion that our minds were wholly taken up with purely humdrum domestic toil or with watch ing the conflict in Europe as more or less in terested spectators. It is also well to remind ourselves that, during a good portion of the time we are discussing, i.e., the two years and a half between the outbreak of the war and the breaking off diplomatic relations with Ger many (August 1914 to February 1917), our State Department was in part employed in dis cussing with the British Foreign Office various troublesome questions arising from Britain's sea policy. It is impossible to do more here than hint at these discussions, for the whole matter is complicated and inextricably connected with the whole diplomacy of the war. We may say in a word that the discussion practically began over Britain's control, especially in the North Sea, where it was said Germany had scattered contact mines. As the months went by, argu ments turned on the right asserted by the British government of seizing contraband destined ultimately to Germany though bound first to a neutral European country, and on taking American ships into British harbors for examination instead of making the search for contraband at sea. The British replies to our various protests were able and in the hest of temper and there was little, if there was any, evidence of a desire to banish international law altogether under the plea of necessity, a plea which the German government was quite ready to indulge in.
In January 1915 the German government took control of the corn, wheat and flour in Germany and it was henceforward difficult for neutrals to maintain that provisions evidently intended for Germany were not absolute con traband and liable to seizure. No one reading the documents with a fair mind will fail to see the inherent perplexities of the problem and that the United States, with no apparent intent of doing aught but preserve rights of neutrals on the seas, stated the case against Great Britain with at least sufficient directness and plainness. The subject is one that may still
vex the brains of international lawyers; but the unlearned in the law will not detect a readi ness on the part of the American government to wink at British transgressions and denounce German wrongdoing, and he will not detect that British conduct is in the same category with German frightfulness and disregard of ordinary principles of law and the claims of humanity for consideration.
Though such subjects as those just men tioned continued to be subjects of diplomatic discussions for many months, they sank into comparative unimportance upon the inaugura tion by Germany of a plan of terrorizing on the high seas. As early as December 1914 Ad miral von Tirpitz was quoted as intimating that a war of submarines on British merchantmen was impending. On 4 February the German proclaimed the waters around ritain a "zone of war" and announced the in tention of destroying ships found there "even if it may not be possible always to- save their crews and passengers." That was the beginning of Germany's piratical policy which finally made nearly the whole of the civilized world her enemies; no wonder it had that effect, for she defied the world. The American government answered the war zone proclamation by solemnly warning the German government that it would be held to strict accountability. It is not the purpose of this article to outline the diplomatic controversy with Germany, but we must point out that the President exhibited great patience, seemingly intent upon saving in ternational law and defending if he could Amer ican and general neutral right to safety on the sea. There were many, though probably by no means the majority of the people, that thought he should stop writing notes and should prepare for war. The great crisis came with the sinking of the Lusitania (7 May 1915) when over eleven hundred persons were drowned, including 1Z4 American men, women and children. That was bringing German practice of frightfulness near home and a wave of indignation swept over the country. Germany could not plead that the sinking was an accident, and, though she ex pressed "deepest sympathy," put the blame on Great Britain. The American people will not forget in this generation the brutality of a de liberately planned attack on a passenger ship. The sinking of the ship brought a sharp note from our government in which the German government was informed that we should not omit any word or act necessary to the sacred duty of maintaining the rights of our citizens. Other disasters and lawless attacks followed and other notes were issued in the course of that year; but still it is not within the power of the present writer to say that the bulk of the American people were ready to go to war. As the months went by, there were doubt less gradual education and gradual apprecia tion of the deeper significance of German as sault upon international law and upon the ordinary claims of humanity, and there was a growing conviction of the menace to civiliza tion in a power which stopped at nothing to win. We may, therefore, pass over the suc ceeding months in which Germany gave new proofs of the character of her government and her military leaders and aroused in the Ameri can mind the confirmed belief that if the world was to be a decent place to live in the mili tary clique of Germany must be beaten and beaten badly at their own chosen game of war. Though there were many other causes for anxiety or for actual war, we may now mention only one — the sinking of the Sussex in the spring of 1916, in which Americans lost their lives. The promise wrung by President Wilson from the German government to observe at least some measure of respect for human life in her barbarous submarine policy was openly cast aside in January 1917 and diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off. War seemed inevitable and though we tried arming our mer chantmen and still hesitated to take the plunge, the President finally went to Congress with a war message on 2 April 1917.