"The founders of the Triple Alliance inten tionally created a guarantee of peace. They have not been disappointed in their hopes, for the steadfastness of the Triple Alliance has more than once in the course of the last thirty years warded off the rising danger of war." He concludes with the observation that "The Triple Alliance as a guarantee of peace has proved its worth for thirty years and this justi fies our hopes." This defense of the Alliance was written shortly before the outbreak of the Great Euro pean War since which time Italy has ceased to be a member of it. Italy's position as a member of the Alliance was from the first peculiar, if not unnatural, and it is well known that she joined it with more or less misgiving if not reluctance, largely in consequence, it is said, of pique at the acquisition of Tunis by France. That she should have entered into an alliance with Austria which execised dominion over nearly a million Italians occupying considerable territories to which Italy had never ceased to lay claitn and which she still hoped eventually to recover can only he explained by the Ital ian suspicion of the designs of Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean region. The alliance by its very nature, therefore, con tained the seeds of its own dissolution. The national aspiration for "Italia Irredenta? con tinued to be a source of irritation between Austria and her neighboring ally, and as time passed the ties which bound them began to snap. The first shock came in 1908 on ac count of the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an act which greatly irritated the Italians who regarded with regret if not fear the extension of Austrian power and influence in the Balkans. The weakness of the bond had already been revealed to the world in 1906 at the Algeciras Conference, when Italy broke away from her allies and acted with Great Britain and France against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, Italy's war against Turkey in 1911 and 1912 and her subsequent annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica was regarded by Germany, Turkey's protector, with regret, for Turkey in effect was now to all intents and purposes a member of the alliance. Germany had been compelled to stand by and see her Ottoman protege stripped of her possessions by an ally which refused to consult Germany or consider her sug gestions. This action of Italy still further re vealed bow loosely she was bound to her allies and particularly her independence of Germany in the conduct of her foreign policy. The al liance was again weakened by the outcome of the Balkan wars: Although Austria and Italy had acted together in thwarting Serbia's aspira tions for an outlet on the Adriatic, in creating Albania an independent state under international supervision, the seeds of future discord between Austria and Italy were sown, since it marked the beginning of a diplomatic struggle between the two powers for control of the newly-es tablished state.
On 8 Dec. 1912 it was announced from Vienna that the Triple Alliance had been re newed "without any change? The announce ment created a mild surprise in other countries; in Austria itself it caused a panic on the Bourse and a run on the savings banks in Galicia. The last time the treaty had been renewed was in 1902 for 12 years, and would consequently not have expired till May or June 1914. Conflicting reports stated that the renewal was for 12 years or two terms of six years; also seven years. The Austrian press dwelt on the pacific character of the alliance and declared the re newal as "a clear hint to all whom it may con cern? It was recalled that Bismarck had pub lished the terms of the treaty in 1888 at a moment when Austro-Russian relations were strained. Italy, it was known, had two treaties, one with each of the other two contracting par ties. In 1912, also, an attitude of growing op position was manifesting itself in Italy against Austro-Hungarian action with regard to Serbia. German naval circles efforts were made to give the alliance a definite significance for naval as well as for military defense, in the sense of binding Germany's partners to pro vide naval "compensations* for the increased military expenditure of Germany in order that the naval power of the Triple Entente (q.v.) might have to be strengthened in the Mediter ranean and so, perhaps, be weakened in the North Sea. A more drastic attitude was adopted by a general officer writing in the Zeit, a Ger man diplomatic organ (8 Dec. 1912). He argued that Russian boldness had its root in the "in famous alliance)) with France, and the situa tion could only be saved if the Powers of the Triple Alliance adopted the formula that Russia must not be allowed to mobilize, and that the Alliance must fall immediately upon France and crush her before Russia could intervene.
One victory on French soil, he stated, would cure Russia of her fondness for the French alliance. The paper editorially declared that these ideas prevailed in a great part of the Austro-Hungarian corps of officers. In any case, it was evident that the renewal of the alliance "without change' left the de facto situa tion in Europe unaltered. Already in 1902 M. Deleas* then French Minister of Foreign Af fairs, informed the Chamber of Deputies that the Italian government had given the assurance to France that "the policy of Italy as result ing from her alliances was neither directly nor indirectly directed against France' and that "in no case and in no form can Italy become either the instrument or the auxiliary of aggression against this country') (3 July). This inspired prophecy was destined to be verified 12 years later in the European War, when Italy refused to join her allies against France and, in 1915, threw her weight on the side of the Entente Powers. Italy now saw an opportunity to realize her irredentist aspirations by joining in the war against Austria.
Under the terms of the treaty of 1882 be tween Italy and Austria-Hungary, by which treaty Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance, Italy bound herself in certain cir cumstances to come to the aid of her allies in case they should find themselves in war with another power or powers. Article III of this treaty reads as follows: "If one or two of the High Contracting Parties should be at tacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war with two or several great powers not signatory to this treaty, the Casus fcederis shall apply simultaneously to all the High Contracting Parties? Article IV de clares that: "In the event that a Great Power not signa tory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the States of one of the High Contracting Parties, and that the menaced Party should be forced to make war on the Power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her ally.D During the negotiations preceding Italy's entrance into the war in 1915 the Italian govern ment contended that these stipulations bound Italy to come to the aid of her allies only in the case of a defensive war. Regarding her allies as the aggressors in the war of 1914 she did not consider, therefore, that a cams fcedcris existed. Moreover the Italian government com plained that the Austro-Hungarian government had violated article VII of the treaty of 1882 by failing to communicate to the Italian govern ment the terms of the Austro-Hungarian de mands of 23 July 1914, upon Serbia, which preceded the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. The answer of the Austro Hungarian government that the note to Serbia had not been communicated to the German gov ernment, that Germany had not been consulted regarding Austria's relations with Serbia and that the Italian government had been assured that Austria-Hungary had no designs of con quest in Serbia, was not regarded as satisfac tory. After protracted negotiations between Italy and Austria-Hungary, in which the Italian government demanded the cession of certain Austrian territories to Italy which Austria at first refused, but afterward partially agreed to but not to take effect till after the war, the Italian Parliament in May 1915 declared that the Triple Alliance had been dissolved by the failure of the Austro-Hungarian government to acquaint the Italian government with the terms of the ultimatum to Serbia. In a note handed by the Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the former referred to the Triple Alli ance as having been entered into as a guarantee of peace and defense, the observance of which would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and effective action. eAustria-Hun gary," the note went on to declare, ein ignoring the obligations existing under the treaty, pro foundly disturbed the status quo in the Balkans and created a situation from which she alone was destined to profit to the disadvantage of interests of the greatest importance, which her ally had many times affirmed and proclaimed. So flagrant a violation of the letter and the spirit of the treaty,— not only justified the re fusal of Italy to place herself on the side of her allies in a war provoked without her knowl edge, but at the same time deprived the alli ance of its essential meaning and of its reason for existing." See ITALY AND THE WAR; Aus