0 P Austin

flag, war, enemy, law, american, enemys, purpose, neutral, british and german

Page: 1 2 3 4 5

The German military authorities attempted to justify the act as a measure of military necessity; the territory in question was to be a military zone and it was, therefore, necessary to destroy trees, houses, vineyards, etc., to prevent the enemy from using thetn for pur poses of concealment As stated above, all authorities on war law are agreed that a bel ligerent may destroy objects likely to be of mili tary value to the enemy into whose hands they may fall and he may level houses and trees for the purpose of bombardment to prevent the enemy from concealing hirnself behind them. He may even destroy mills, granaries and growing crops for the purpose of depriving the enemy of the means of subsistence which they afford. It was on this theory that Sheridan's devastation of the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War has been defended by some writers on international law. But it is clear that the German devastation of the Somme region went much further than this, including as it did the cutting down of orchards and vineyards which lay not within a probable zone of attack but in a region from which the Ger mans were retreating. In any case, the whole sale pillage of private houses, desecration of the churches, deportation of the inhabitants. etc., could have subserved no immediate mili tary end. Much of it appears to have been done in the spirit of wantormess and revenge and was entirely unjustified. ((The measure of permissible devastation,* say the American (Rules of Land Warfare,' *is found in the strict necessities of war. As an end in itself, as a separate measure of war, devastation is not sanctioned by the law of war. There must be some reasonably close connection between the destruction and the overcoming of the enemy's army.* (Art 334). The British and French .manuals lay down essentially the same rule and this is die view of the great majority of the text writers on international law.

Numerous charges and counter-charges have been made by each belligerent against the other of misusing the white flag, and as in other cases the Germans appear to have been the most frequent offenders. The abuse consisted in hoisting the flag as the tolcen of a desire to surrender and of firing upon the enemy when he advanced to take them as prisoners or to confer with the commander. In some cases the white flag was raised by the enemy for the purpose of enabling him to bring up his reserves. The Germans were many times charged with this offense. The employment of the white flag and the flag of truce for such purposes has long been forbidden by custom and it is expressly condemned by The Hague Convention respecting • the laws and customs of war on land. (Arts. 23j and 32-34). The use of either flag for the purposes mentioned above is not regarded as a legitimate ruse of war but an act of gross perfidy and treachery. A ruse of war to be legitimate must be one which does not involve perfidy or breach of faith, such, for example, as the allowing of bogus dispatches to fall into the hands of the enemy, deceiving the enemy by means of false signals, sham works, dummy artillery and the like.

In several instances charges and counter charges were made by belligerents on one side against the enemy for attacking in his adver sary's tutiform. International law does not for bid the use of the enemy's uniform or his military insignia as a ruse of war, but The Hague Convention prohibits their improper use without indicating what is and what is not a proper use. Many writers on international law hold that it is legitimate to wear the enemy's uniform for the purpose of approach, but that before attacking he must put on his own uni form and reveal his true identity.. Other au thorities, however, take the position that it is not allowable for any purpose, not even for the purpose of approach, on the theory that the distinctton behveen the use of the enemy's in signia prior to beginning the attack and after beginning it is arbitrary. Most military manu als now condemn the use of the enemy's uni form for purposes of deceit, but allow it in case of necessity, as, for exatnple, where on account of lack of a sufficient supply of cloth ing the soldiers are dependent upon uniforms captured from the enemy. In that case if the uniforms are altered or distinctly marked so as to disclose the true character of the wearers there is no treachery and the practice is un objectionable..

A. somewhat similar question was many times raised during the late wax by the action of merchant vessela or warships in flying the enemy's flag or the flag of a neutral power. The action of the master of the ilWated Lusi Ionia and other British merchantmen in hoisting the American flag in order to deceive German submarines evoked a protest from the American government. As is well known, the German cruiser Emden flew the japanese flag on the high seas for many weeks, and even entered neutral ports and obtained supplies under false colors. The use by a warship of the enemy's flag for the purpose of deception has generally been regarded as a legitimate ruse, subject to the condition that before beginning the attack the ship must display its true colors. That is to say, a warship may sail and chase under false cc4ors but it cannot tnake an attack until its own flag has been raised. The prize regula tions of many countries lay down this rule, but as in the case of. the ttse of the enemy's uni form, the distinction between approaclung and attacking is more or less arbitrary, and writers are not lacking who condemn the use of the enemy's flag for any and all purposes. The Institute of International Law in 1913 adopted a rule forbidding the use of false flags, uni forms or insignia of whatever character.

As regards the use of neutral flags by war ships, opinion is still more divided, although the practice has often been resorted to, e.g., by the commanders of the Alabama and the Florida during the Civil War. It has also been stated that the American warship Charleston was fly ing the Japanese flag at the titne it captured Guam during the Spanish-American War. As to the use of neutral flags by merchant vessels of belligerent nationality for the purpose of deceiving the enemy and escaping attack there appears to have been no instance prior to the present war of such use, doubtless because mer chant vessels have not heretofore been re garded as liable to attack and destruction and hence the necessity of resorting to ruses of this kind rarely mdsted. In the course of the controversy between the Atnerican and British governments on account of the action of the Lasifaxia in hoisting the American flag to escape destruction by a German submarine, the British Foreign Office contended that the use of neutral flags as a ruse of war was a well established practice and it pointed out that British law allowed British merchantmen to use neutral flags for the purpose of escaping capture. The American government contended that there was a distinction between the oc casional use of a neutral or enemy flag under the stress of immediate pursuit or with a view to deceiving an approaching enemy, on the one hand, and a general authonzation of a belliger ent of its merchant vessels to fly the flag of a neutral power within certain positions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented by hostile warships. In short, it did not deny the right of a British merchant vessel to use the Amencan flag in particular instances to escape destruction but it did contest the right of the British government to authorize its merchant vessels generally to fly the Am,erican flag since such general use would expose American ves sels and their passengers to danger.

Such are some of the methods and practices of war which are either forbidden by interna tional law or concerning the legitimacy of which there is doubt or difference of opinion among the authorities. The list is by no means exhaustive. Many others were resorted to dur ing the late war, especially by German military and naval commanders, but the limits of this article do not permit a consideration of them.

Bibliography.— Hershey,

James W. GARNER, Professor of Political Science, University of

Page: 1 2 3 4 5