The moment was now dramatic for the two navies. For years officers and men had looked forWard to the day when the strength of one should be measured against the strength of the other, and here side by side off the shores of Jutland were the majority of the capital ships of each nation hard at work, one against the other. More than two hours of daylight vras to be expected in this latitude, and no British sailor present thought that many of the Ger mans vvould be afloat when it ended. But here came one of those unexpected turns of the weather which so often favored the Germans on land and sea. The mists thickened and fell down on the surface so that distant objects were no longer visible. Frequently it became so thick that German ships were lost altogether. lts effects were heightened by German smoke screens. Under these conditions a squadron of British cruisers rati between the German and British battleships, which were actively engaged, and only got out with severe losses. In the third stage of the battle the main purpose of the Germans was to escape, but the British had worked around them and stood between them and Heligoland. The closing down of the mists broke up formations and the action resolved itself into a series of small engagements, the Germans using every opportunity to slip away in the obscurity. Nor was it possible to see how much damage was done to them. In the half-light a ship would be seen to be hit or on fire and she would drop out of line, but it was impossible to determine how seriously she was damaged. Darkness came about 9 P.M., and throughout the first hall of die night intermit tent outbursts of firing broke the stillness. During this period the British had reason to beware of submarines, but the destroyers were deplcored successfully, all the time the fleets steaming southward. At dawn on 1 June the British fleet vras 100 miles north of .Heligoland, but the Germans had disappe-ared. Jellicoe and Beatty lay in position until 11 a.m. awaiting the appearance of the foe, and• when he did not come they slowly returned to British ports. They had met the enemy and fought him ia hard battle in which he had escaped severe losses only by reason of the mists and the ar rival of darlmess.
When the world received its first news of this battle it received it by way of Germany, and it was represented as a German victory. "The gigantic fleet of Albion, ruler of the seas," said the kaiser, "which, since Trafalgar, for a hundred years has imposed on the whole world a bond of sea tyranny, and has sur rounded itself with a nimbus of invincibleness, came into the field. That gigantic Armada ap proached, and our fleet engaged it The British fleet was beaten.' The Germans announced their own losses as one old-type battleship, the Pammern, three small cruisers, Wiesbaden, El blag and Fraitenlob, and five destroyers. Later they admitted the loss of a battle cruiser, the Lutsow, and a light cruiser, the Rostock, con cealed at first "for political reasons." Against these aclmowledged losses were the undisputed British losses of three battle cruisers, the Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invincibk, three armored cruisers, Defence, Black Prince and Warrior, and eight destroyers, which in ton nage was nearly double the tonnage of the ships mentioned by Germany. Admiral Jelli coe reported that there was every reason. to be lieve the enemy had lost three batdeships, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, six destroy ers and one submarine. He based his opinion on testimony talcen from 'his officers and care fully corimared. But in his memoirs, published in 1919, he did not repeat this statement In fact, his general testimony of the low visibility during•the action, due to the mists and smoke screens, goes far toward discrediting reports of losses his own officers thought they observed in the moment of battle. In his later account he
contented himself v.ith pointing out that the Seydlitz, a battle cruiser, xvas injured so badly that she had to be beached, that at least four German battleships were torpedoed, but with what result he did not say, and that all their other capital ships were severely damaged Other statements by Admiral Jellicoe seem to be important in this connection. He declared that the British battle cruisers were not as well protected by armor as those of the Germans and he said that in several respects their mechanism was not so good as that of the Ger man ships, insomuch so that he ordered im provements made after the battle. It was gen erally admitted that the German aim was ex cellent early in the battle. All these things considered, the results can be accounted for by supposing that many German ships, though se verely damaged, escaped to their home ports and were thus not placed among the lost. That the German naval power was severely damaged in the battle is unquestionable. Captain Per sius, in the Berliner Tageblatt, 18 Nov. 1918, said the °Fleet's losses were severe' in this engagement and that the authorities ad znitted that the °battle must and would be the last? In fact the German fleet did not again leave the protection of the Heligoland region, except for a short cruise in August 1916, until it made its tragic journey to Scapa Flow 21 Nov. 1918. Whatever we say about actual losses, the battle of Jutland marks the change of the naval policy of Germany from a series of attempts to lure the British into battle when divided to a quiet stay-at-home policy.
Naval Operations in the While the North Sea was the most important field of operations f,,r the 11,i. al forces of the Entente Allies, the Mediterranean Sea was not without significance. Here the Austrian fleet had its base, and it was necessary to keep it bottled up in its Adriatic harbor; for if it came out it would have menaced French and Italian communication with Africa and Brit ish communication with Egypt, East Africa and India. To keep these fleets in har bor the Allies had the French fleet arid such ships as Great Britain could spare from serv ice in the North Sea and from the work of chasing down the few German cruisers that raided their conunerce in the beginning of the war. After Italy came into the war against Austria-Hungary, 23 May 1915, her navy gave assistance in this service. The blocicade was effective from the beginning. At no time did the Austrians, in whose navy were severul mod ern battleships, dare risk battle in the open sea. As for the Turks, with the German battle cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau added to their originally tnvial fleet, they did not dare risk battle on the Mediterranean but were content to make raids against Russian ports on the Black Sea. Even in this service they were not successful; for the Goeben re ceived serious damage in a fight with Russian warships off the Anatolian Coast, 18 Nov. 1914. By this time German officers were in control of the Turkish navy and the Goeben was repaired and sent out to raid the oil port of Batum, 10 December, but the Russian squadron drove her bacic to Constantinople forthviith. By reason of the strength of this squadron the control of the Black Sea was in Russian hands throughout the- war. Thus shut up in their harbors the allies of Germany were forced to confine their naval efforts to submarine warfare, of which more anon.