The Debacle in 1918.--, On 25 Jan. 1918 Count von Hertling Imperial German Chan cellor, and Count dzernin, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, made answer to the state ments of war aims set forth by Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson. Tlae reply of the former was equivocal and most unsatisfac tory while that of the latter went far to meet Mr. Wilson's demands. Czernin, ;towever, re fused to discuss the principle of self-determina tion for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, hold ing that to be a matter of domestic policy for his government.
On 11 Feb. 1918 President Wilson in an ad dress to the Congress laid down four principles the acceptance of which, he believed, would pave the way to a discussion of the terms of peace. These four principles were in substance: (1) Each part of the ffital settlement to be based on the justice of that particular case; (2) pies and provinces not to be bartered as crt- tels from one sovereignty to ar.other; (3) ter ritorial settlements to be made in accord with the aspirations of the populations concerned; (4) national aspirations to be satisfied as far as possible without perpetuating or sowing seeds of discord.
About this time the Lichnowslcy Memoran dum (q.v.) was made public and created a profound impression in Allied and neutral coun tries since it proved from an enemy source England's conciliatory attitude in the summer of 1914 and Germany's encouragement of Austria's attacic on Serbia. In June there followed the revelations of Dr. Wilhelm Million, a director of the Krupp works at Essen. In his book, iThe Devastation of Europe> he wrote: 6Peo ple blame our diplomats for muddling the war. My opinion is that these diplomats have been handicapped by the power, the vacillating char acter, and the continued interference of the kaiser in their work. Only men who would dance to his piping could remain in office.* . . .
On 24 June 1918 the German Foreign Min ister, von Kuhlmann, stated that the war could not be won by arms alone and that peace would come only through negotiation. In the weeks following this statement it became apparent that a fast-growing number of Germans saw the hopelessness of Inctory on the field, and there was an ever-increasing public opinion in favor of a peace by negotiation. On 4 July President Wilson in an address at Mount Vernon re affirmed the war aims of the United States and declared that there could be no compromise. 'What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of manIcind.* Dissension among the Central Powers had now become evident. Bulgaria's aims con flicted with those of Turkey and Hungary be came estranged from Austria. In August the United States after much discussion arrived at an agreement with Japan in regard to joint intervention in Siberia. In September, the Aus trian govertunent sent a note to all other gov ernments proposing a conference to discuss peace terms but not in a binding manner; Ger many proposed to Belgium to restore her eco nomic and political independence on certain con ditions, one of which involved the restoration of the German colonies. The result of these
peace efforts was negligible; in the field the offensive had now passed to the Entente and the will to conquer had seized hold of their peo ples, The prospect of defeat, very apparent in October 1918, accentuated the differences be tween Germany and her Allies. On 30 Septem ber von Hertling resigned the chancellorship and von Hintze, von Kuhlmann's successor, re signed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Prince Max of Baden, a moderate in politics, became chancellor on 2 October and Dr. Solf was made forign secretary. Scheidemann and Bauer, Socialists, and Erzberger and Groeber, Cen trists, became members of the new ministry which set about making radical changes in Ger many's political system. On 5 October Prince Max's message of peace to President Wilson was made public in the United States. The note, which proved the first step which led to the conclusion of hostilities, accepted as a basis for peace the program laid down by the Presi dent in the 614 Points* message of 8 Jan. 1918, and in his address of 27 September at New York, in which the President had restated the purposes of the war. In the American reply dispatched 8 October, the President said: 4The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces every where from invaded territory.
4The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the imperial chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.° Dr. Solf, the German Foreign Secretary, re plied on 12 October, saying the chancellor spoke 4in the name of the German goverrunent and of the Getman people.* To this the United States replied on the 14th to the effect that the con ditions of an armistice must be left to the mili tary authorities, Dr. SoIf replied on 21 October accepting the proposal to evacuate occupied ter ritories and stating that U-boat commanders had been enjoined from torpedoing passenger ships.
On 27 October Germany requested proposa1s for an armistice and was referred to Marshal Foch Meanwhile, Bulgaria had capitulated and Aus tria had initiated separate proposals for an ar mistice. Hostilities ceased ,on the Austrian front on 4 November, and a few days later German delegates arrived at French Great Headquarters to receive the terms of the armistice, which they signed at 5 A.M. (French time) on 11 Nov. 1918.
Ste THE ARMISTICES in this section.