The British, however, were heavy and sol vent buyers of American products; they are not chargeable with the sacrifice of a single life of an American citizen (non-combatant) as against 320 destroyed by German submarines. In addi tion the British government paid for seized cargoes and in some cases for vessels or dam ages for detention, thus relieving the pressure of owners for action by the United States gov ernment. Even when from February 1916 to February 1917 the Germans restrained their sub marines from sinlcing vessels without notice, they were sinking great quantities of Allied shipping. Occasionally, as in the Sussex case, they failed to give due warning. Their treat ment of non-cotnbatants, in Belgium, France, Poland, Serbia, Rumania, and their responsibil ity for the massacres of Armenians by the Turks created a rising animosity against them in the United States. The pressure was to some degree relieved by the efforts of the American government to facilitate peace, particularly the proposals of 8 Dec. 1916, formulated by Presi dent Wilson. This was followed (22 Jan. 1917) by President Wilson's address on 'Peace with out Victory.' The Germans, however, had de cided to return to submarine warfare in its most merciless form. On 31 Jan. 1917, the Ger man government gave notice at Washington that any ships found in a "zone' which included the seas adjacent to Britain, France and Italy, °will *hi stopped with every available weapon, and without further notice.' By an added presump tion, lanes were described upon the Atlantic, over which one American steamer would be per mitted to pass every week.
) It has sometimes been charged that this re newal of warfare was a violation of a promise made by the Germans in 1915. Reference to the . discussion on this point above will shove that the pledge was conditioned on the withdrawal of the embargo by Great Britahi, which was never secured. Renewal of extreme submarine warfare was not, therefore, a breach of faith, but it was a dear breach of humanity and a denial of the accrued rights of neutral com merce. The arpment that it was a retaliation for illegal British behavior had no force as against the United States. Retaliation by one belligerent against another cannot be invoked to destroy a third and neutral power. The ground of the United States was that the free dom of the seas was not granted by or depend ent upon the will of particular nations either in peace or war, and could not be denied upon any "law of necessity.' The revival of a form of warfare which to ?the American govenunent, and most of the American people, seemed murderous, was destined to lead to war. A suggestion had been , made earlier that the difficulty might be avoided I by forbidding Atnericans to accept employment or talce passage on a belligerent ship liable to destruction by a submarine. In February 1916
McLemore, a member of the House of Repre sentatives from Texas, introduced a resolution to the effect that Americans ought not to travel on any armed merchant ship. This resolution was laid on the table by a vote of 276 to 142. When, in February 1917, the difficulty returned in a startling form, the President came forward with a plan for turning the tables by arming American merchantmen. A bill was proposed by the President (26 Feb. 1917) "to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms . . . and to employ any other measures or instru mentalities that may be necessary or adequate to protect our ships and people in their legiti mate and peaceful pursuits on the sea." The bill was defeated by a filibuster in the Senate; but on 12 March the State Department gave notice that 'The Govenunent of the United States has determined to place upon all Ameri can merchant vessels sailing through barred areas an armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board.' This armed neutrality was powerless to stop the progress of the was, and in any case could only have resuhed in a sea fight which would be the prelude to war. The German government made a frantic attempt (Febniary 1917) to in duce Ambassador Gerard to agree to a 'proto col" for enlarging the guarantees of the treaty of 1828, which could operate only if there were war between the countries. On 3 Feb. 1917 the President informed Congress that he had broken off diplomatic relations and dismissed the Ger man ambassador, a broad intimation to the Ger mans that the United States was not too pacific to accept its challenge.
The President's second inaugural address (5 March 1917) indirectly suggested war. The next step was to call Congress in extra session (9 March 1917). The Germans were already beginning to sink vessels on which Americans were passengers or members of the crew. On 2 Apnl the President officially advised Congress to declare war; and on 6 April 1917 Congress passed a joint resolution to the effect that °the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared.' The President thereupon issued a proclamation of war, and the long period of neutrality tertninated. On 7 Dec. 1917, a formal act of war was passed against Austria-Hungary, but no such action was ever authorized against Bulgaria or Turkey, the Allies of the two Central Powers.