6 the Eastern Front 1

russian, offensive, germans, discipline, soldiers, july, fighting, war, army and officers

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At the same time the Germans were quick to malce the best of the situation. Instead of beginning an offensive with guns, they began an offensive with propaganda. Pamphlets in favor of international socialism and other forms of pacifism were showered upon the Russian line. Russian outposts were invited to fraternize with their German °brothers.° Hopes of a speedy peace and an end of the horrors of war were held out. The °democrati zation° of the Russian army was having such a demoralizing effect that it was only a matter of weeks before the Germans would find no fighting force worth the name to oppose them at all. Under these alarming conditions the Russian conucanders made most urgent appeals to the provisional government to thke steps to restore discipline. Brussilov, Kornilov, Russky, Gourko and many other most notable and able officers threatened to resign in a hody if something were not done.

At last in May 1917 when Guchkov had been succeeded by Kerensky as Minister of War, some real efforts were made to restore morale and discipline. The death penalty was reimposed and it was decided that one of the best ways of restoring discipline and vigor to the. army would be to undertalce an offensive.

Thereupon Kerensky in his official position as Minister of War made a tour of the front. With impassioned and burning speeches he be sought the soldiers to stand fast against the treadierous Germans and defend their new won freedom. He pointed out that to cease fighting before the Allies had triumphed in the West would be an act of dishonor for Russia and of disaster for democracy 'every where. Russians would soon find that they had merely exchanged a Romanov for a Hohen zollern despot. He spoke with the sincerity of conviction and usually provoked a temporary enthusiasm among his hearers. But in some places the poison of Bolshevism had sunk so deeply that his speeches were received with mockery and derision. At Riga a soldier in the trenches started to enter into a dispute with him; whereupon Kerenslcy screamed at him: ((Hold yonr tongue when the Minister of War is speaking to you." At other points he found it prudent not to attempt to speak at all.

It was finally decided that the offensive which it was hoped would restore discipline and patriotism should begin at 9 a.m. on Sun day, 1 July 1917. It was to start from the front in Galicia which Brussilov had won the year before. Its strategic aim was to capture Lemberg and Stanislay. If this started well a secondary offensive would be undertaken in the north toward Wilna for the recovery of Lithuania and the Baltic provinces. The hours during the fierce bombardment whkh preceded the time set for the infantry to go over the top were nerve-racicing moments for the offi cers. No officer felt sure that his men would obey the command to advance. One of the corps commanders was seen silently praying during the fateful minutes preceding the ap pointed hour. Would his men go over the top or not? He hoped so, but he could not feel sure. When, punctually at 9 A.m., his troops swarmed over and the attacking masses rolled forward, the general devoutly crossed hint self. But all the generals were not equally fortunate. Many mutinies broke out on the

eve of the attack. In many Edaces the Soviets of soldiers, instead of obeying instantly the command to advance, would sit down and debate the wisdom or desirability of the orders given them; and the result of the debate was that too often they concluded not to do what they had been told. This new idea of ((liberty" and the wholesale desertions from the ranks was soon to nullify in less than a fortnight all the preparations and efforts of the govern ment and the officers to make the July offensive a success.

However, the offensive started auspiciously at the outset, considering the circumstances. It showed that there was still a real fighting spirit in a great many of the Russian soldiers. This was further shown by the formation of many oBattalions of Death" and by the enlist ment of battalions of women. During the fight ing of 1 and 2 July Korthlov's men made good progress toward the Stanislav-Lemberg Rail way. Altogether the Russians on the Galician front took 20,000 prisoners and over 100 guns in the first two days of fighting. This was due in part to the fact that the Russians out numbered the enemy two to one and that they were stiffened by the presence of a considerable number of British and Belgian armored cars.

There were also a good many French and British aeroplanes, though not enough to cope with the Germans. The Russian airmen also did excellent work themselves and were well supplemented by balloon observers. Moreover, there was an abundance of artillery of all calibres, trench mortars, machine guns and es pecially of ammunition. Never bad the Rus sian army been so well equipped. But instead of improving with action and success, the Rus sian soldiers grew daily less reliable. Divisions voted that they would not remain in the front line trenches more than 24 hours, and only so long on the condition that they would be strictly on the defensive and not ordered to attack When the Germans began to rally for a counter attack, Russian units deliberately disobeyed their officers and even retired from the line, thus opening dangerous gaps which weakened the morale of neighboring units. By 20 July the whole Russian front in Galicia was com pletely demoralized and in disorderly retreat. The Germans and Austrians did their best to complete the demoralization by attacks on the retreating rear—engagements which were mis represented in the Gertnan bulletins 3.s °hard won battles." The details of this dismal col lapse of the last Russian offensive need not be given. By August all that Brussilov had vron in 1916 was lost, almost without a blow. The Eastern Front was pushed back to the position which it held in the winter of 1915 16. Such were the early effects of Bolshevism upon the army. It was a very bitter situation for the officers, the Liberals and the true friends of the Allies in Russia. But they could do nothing. Patriots like Gourko and Kornilov who tried to stem the tide of demoralization and to back up their arguments with the threat that they would resign, were arrested and im prisoned as dangerous traitors to the new Rus sian republic.

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