German South-West Africa.— This great territory of about 322,000 square miles had a population of about 15,000 whites and some 100,000 natives, chiefly Hottentots, Bushmen and Bantus, when the war broke out. Its southern frontier bordered on Cape Colony and the goy einment of the Union of South Africa immedi ately undertook to defend its borders with its own troops. The declaration of war by Great Britain against Germany revived the smoldering disaffection among a remnant of the Boer ir reconcilables and culminated in the Beyers Re bellion (q.v.). About 10 Aug. 1914 the Germans abandoned their two principal stations on the coast, Luderitz Bay and Swalcopmund, and re tired to the inland capital, Windhoelc, 200 miles from the coast, carrying with them all military stores By the 'end of August they had made small incursions into British territory, skirmish ing with the farmers over the border. On 8 Sept. 1914 the premier of the Union, General Botha, announced in the Cape Parliament that the government had decided to carry the war into German territory. A majority in both Houses supported the proposal. Fighting on a small scale developed in . the southeastern an gle of the frontier; a German blocldiouse was captured at Raman's Drift on 15 September, and on the 18th an expedition arrived. by sea and raised the British flag over the town hall of Luderitz Bay. General Botha called for 12,000 troops. In an action fought at Sandfontein, in the desert between Raman's Drift and. Warm bad, on 26 September, a detachment of 200 British troops was compelled to surrender after their ammunition had given out The incident raised considerable suspicion owing to the ap pearance of treachery that surrounded it. Gen eral Botha found reason to suspect the loyalty of Lieut.-Col. S. G. Maritz, then in command of a Union forte in the northvrest. He hacl fought with the Boers in the South African War, 1W9 1902, and had later assisted the Germans against Morenga in the Herrero campaign. Botha sent Colonel Brits to relieve Maritz of his command. The latter replied with an ultimatum and a threat to invade the Union of South Africa (8 Oct. 1914). Maritz boasted that he had am ple gems, rifles, ammunition and money from the Germans and that he would overrun the whole of South Africa. In addition to his own rebel commands he had a force of Germans under him, and held the rank of a German general. He had also signed an agreement with Dr. Seitz, governor of German South-West Africa, guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a republic and ceding Walfish Bay ttad other portions of the Union to Germarw. A wide spread conspiracy revealed itself, implicating a number of Boer leaders with a considerable fol lowing. Martial law was imtaediately declared throughout the 'Union and the govermnent took energetic steps to suppress the rebellion. By the dose of the year Botha had taken 7,000 rebel prisoners; their leaders were killed, captured and scattered. On 25 Jan. and 3 Feb. 1915 the last rebel commandos surrendered and the cam paign against Gennan South-West Africa was vtgorously resumed under the comrnand of Gen eral Botha. A feature of the campaign was the attitude of the natives all tribes umting with an eager desire to help 'the Union troops against their former masters. They were not permitted to join in the fighting, but they were employed as scouts and transport drivers.
In January 1915 the British occupied Swa lcopmund, the terminus of the line to Windhoek and of that running to Grootfontein and Tsu mab. They also held Luderitz Bay, whenoe an other line rims to Windhoek by way of Keet manshoop and gained control of the Orange River to the south. General Botha's army con sisted of about 30,000 men, composed of South African Mounted Rifles, Transvaal Horse Ar tillery, Durban Light Infantry, Kaffrarian Rifles, Imperial Light Horse, Bechuanaland Rifles, Enslin's Horse, Diamond Field Horse, South African Railway Engineers, South Afri ca Motor Corps, Queenstown Rifles, Natal Po lice, Natal Carabiniers, Zululand Mounted Rifles, Pretoria Regiment and some of the Transvaal Scottish. More than half were
mounted; many wore no particular uniform, estecially the Boer commandos. The principal difficulty before them was that of transport The theatre of operations was a dreary, water less desert. All stores and much of the water had to be brought from Cape To-wn and con veyed into the mterior -by ox-carts, automobles or by a sea-route of 500 to 700 miles. Inland, even water had to be carried for man and beast, while the temperature was from 100° to 113° in the shade. Large gangs of natives were employed day and night shoveling the drifting sand from the railroad trac.ks.
Divicling his forces into two main armies, General Botha took command of the northern group and started 22 Feb. 1915 from Swakop mund along the railroad toward Windhoek. Lit tle progress was made during the first month, most of the time being spent in reconnoitring the strength and whereabouts of the enemy. The southern group, under General Smuts, op erated in three separate columns, one frotn Lu deritz Bay on the west, one from the Cape frontier on the south, and the other from Kim berley across the Bechuanaland frontier on the east. The plan of campaign was to conduct an enveloping movement against Windhoek along the two railroads. Owing to the desert nature of the ground the enemy could not hope to main tain a defensive if once dislodged from those lines. Sweeping the scattered German forces before them, the southern columns effected a junction at Keettnanshoop in April and began a united movement northward. Meanwhile Botha, in the north, had fought his way on to Windhoek and occupied the place, which sur rendered with 3,000 whites and 12,000 natives. The German forces, however, had retired northward to Otavi, the junction for Tsumab and Grootfontein. Botha reached Otavi by forced marches on 1 July 1915. Here the Ger mans made their last serious stand. Cut off from further retreat by a flying column under General Brits, the Germans surrendered uncon ditionally on 9 July 1915 with 204 officers, 3,293 of other ranks, 37 field guns and 22 machine guns. About 1,500 Germans were already in British hands. By 15 July the rest of the Ger mans had surrendered and the Union of South Africa undertook the adtninistration of the ter ritory.
German East Africa.— This, the greatest and richest of Germany's colonies, was about twice the size of the German Empire in Europe. It contained a population of 8,000,000, including about 5,500 whites. It was bounded on the north by British East Africa and the Victoria Nyanza; on the west by the Belgian Kongo and Lake Tanganyika; on the southwest again by British territory and Lake Nyasa ; on the south by Portuguese Mozambique and on the east by a coastline of 600 miles on the Indian Ocean. The principal seaports were Dar-es-Salam (the capital), Baganroyo, Saadani, Kilwa, Mikin dani, Tanga and Pangani. The two railroads — the strategic Usambara line, from Tanga to New Moshi (220 miles) and the Central, from the capital to Ujiji (780 miles), were comeleted in 1912 and 1914 respectively, and were intended to be connected with the Cape to Cairo route. A network of good roads spread through the whole territory. The military and police forte •consisted of about 3,000 natives and 300 Ger mans, well organized and equipped. At the out break of war a number of German reservists were brought from the east and landed at Dar es-Salam. With these and with recruits taken from residents and native tribes, the German fighting force in the colony was raised to some 3,000 whites and 5,000 natives. The British strength in the adjacent colonies was almost negligible. The King's African Rifles scattered in British East Africa and Uganda numbered barely 1,000; and in northeast Rhodesia and Nyasaland only small bodies of police and a few white volunteers were available. Particu larly vulnerable to hostile attack were the 584 miles of the Uganda Railway, in parts only 50 miles from the German frontier.