In.Syria the Turkish army, under Liman von Sanders, a German, held a line from the north of Joppa on the coast right across Syria, over the Jordan, and down its eastern bank to the Dead Sea. Some distance east of that line, near Maan, were the Arabs under the Shereef Feisul; they were to play a certain part in the coming offensive. The enemy's total str was estimated by General Allenby at sabres, 32,000 rifles and 400 guns; the garnson at Maan. and the posts on the Hedjaz Railway north of it consisted of some 6,000 rifles and 30 guns; his general reserve of only 3,000 rifles with 30 guns was scattered between Tiberias, Nazareth and Haifa; the total ration strength amounted to about 104,000. Allenby had at his disposal two cavalry divisions, two mounted divisions, seven infantry divisions, one Indian infantry brigades four unallotted battalions, and a French detachment equal to an infantry brig ade, malting a total in the fighting line, of some 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles and 540 guns —a superiority in numbers over the enemy, espe cially in mounted troops. The main attack, which opened on 19.Sept. 191f3, was preceded by a minor thrust up the road between Jericho to El Mugheir, where this highway meets a track from Shechem to the Jordan crossing at Jisr ed Damieh, which crossing enabled the enemy to transfer troops from the west to the east bank at pleasure and interrupt the communica tions of a force in the hills of Moab. All the enemy's commtmications to Damascus ran north ward convergin* some 25 miles upon El Afule and Beisan, which, with Deraa, were the vital points to be struck at Deraa was beyond Allenby's reach, but not beyond that of the mobile Arab army, which was in a position to dislocate all traffic. El Afule, in the plain of Esdraelon, and Beisan, in the Valley of Jezreel, were within reach of Allenby's cavalry if his infantry could break through the defensive systems and make a gap for the cavalry to rush through. It was essential that this gap should be created at the beginning of the operations in order that the cavalry might reach their destinations, 45 and 60 miles distant, before the enemy could malce his escape. Moreover, which ever route the cavalry followed, the hills of Samaria, or their extension toward Mount Carmel, had to be crossed before the plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel could be reached; and it was most important that the enemy should not be given time to man the passes. For this reason Allenby decided to make his main attack in the coastal plain rather than through the hills north of Jerusalem, where the ground afforded the enemy positions of great natural strength. A rapid and decisive advance was necessary, hence the route along the coast would enable the cavalry to pass through the hills of Samaria into the plain of Esdraelon at their narrowest point, thus ensur ing greater speed and less lilcelihood of being checked.
The Turks had constructed two defensive systems on a 10-mile front along the coastal plain at Jiljulieh, the ancient Gilgal. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3,000 yards deep, ran along a sandy ridge in a northwesterly direction from Bir Adas to the sea, and consisted of a series of works connected by continuous fire trenches. The second, or Et Tireh system, 3,000 yardi in the rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr Falik. The ground on the enemy's extreme right was marshy and could be crossed only in few places. The terrain between the Allied front line and the Turkish defenses was open and could be overlooked from the enemy's worIcs on the foot hills round Kefr Kasim. By reducing the strength of his forces in the Jordan Valley and withdrawing his reserves from the hills north of Jerusalem, General Allenby concentrated five divisions and the French detachment, with 383 guns, for the attack on these defenses. In addition, two cavalry and one Australian mounted divisions were available for this front Altogether the Allied strength on the front of attack represented 35,000 rifles against 8,000, and 383 guns against 130.
In order to prevent the Turks from discover ing the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley, a series of demonstrations were carried out in that region by Australian, New Zealand, Indian and English troops to induce the enemy to believe that an atttack was coming east of the Jordan, either in the direction of Madeba or Amman. A mobile column of the Arab army was meanwhile assembling at ICasr el Azrak, 50 miles east of Amman, accompanied by British artnored cars and a French mountain battery. The real objective of this column was the railway north, south and west of Deraa. It was hoped that the demonstrations just re ferred to would enable the Arab concentration to pass unobserved. The concentration on the front of attacic was carried out by night, and every precaution was talcen to prevent any in creased movement becoming apparent to die enemy. The many groves round Ramleh, Ludd
and Joppa were utilized to conceal troops during the daytime, though the chief factor in the secrecy maintained was the supremacy in the air which had been won by the Royal Air Force by continual wearing down of the enemy's aircraft throughout the summer. During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes had crossed the Allied lines; during the last week in August the number had decreased, to 18. Several were shot down within the next fevr days, with the resutt that only four machines ventured to cross the line during the period of concentration. While the concentration was nearincr completion the enemy's railway communications at Deraa were attaciced by the Royal Air Force and by the Arab army, which had moved into the Hanran. The line and station buildings were damaged on 16 and 17 September; on the 16th the Arabs, who had been joined by several local tribes and some Druses, destroyed a bridge and a section of the line; on the next day extensive demolitions were carried out north and west of Deraa, thus cutting off all through traffic to Palestine. On the morning of 18 Septem ber all was ready for the stroke. During the night one corps swung fonvard its right on the east of the Bireh-Nablus road and a division captured El Mugheir with stern hand-to-hand _ fighting. At 4:30 in the morning of 19 Sept 1918 the artillery in the coastal plain opened an ititense bombardment lasting 15 minutes, under cover of which the infantry left their positions of deployment. Two torpedo-boat destroyers assisted, shelling the coastal road to the north, clearing the way for the cavalry. The blow fell with such force that the Turici,sh line was completely broken in about four hours' fighting; the level plain helped to a rapid ad vance while the naval guns swept the roads. So swift and complete was the Turkish de moralization that the infantry was able, after marching five miles, to swing eastward at the railway junction and advanced base of Tul Keram, and capture it. In this direction dis organized bodies of the enemy were streaming in wild flight, pursued by the 60th division and the Australian Light Horse, with a composite regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis (Sepoys) attached. Turlcish troops, guns, motor lorries and transports of every description were struggling to escape along the road leading to Messudie and Nablus. The confusion was added to by the persistent attacks of the English and Australian flying corps, which wrought great havoc. The Bntish, mfantry covered 12 miles in half a day; through the broken line of the coast flying colunms of cavalry passed to com plete the rout and.round up the surprised enemy. The Desert Mounted Corps crossed the hills of Samaria, entered the plain of Esdraelon at El Lejjun, seized El Afule and sent a detachment to Nazareth, the site of the Yilderim Head quarters. Sufficient troops were left at El Afule to intercept the Turlcish retreat there, while the remainder of the corps rode down the Valley of Jezreel and seized. Beisan. An other corps rode along the line Hableh-Tul Keram, through the hills and converged on Santana and Attaro, sweeping the retreatiog Turks into the arms of the cavalry left at El Afule. This last-named place, south of Naza reth, contains the junction of the line from the port of Haifa connecting with the Jerusalem Railvray. 'Phe Australian Light Horse itad al ready cut the line at Anebka, west of Samaria The whole region was thus surrounded; on the second day (20 Septenrber) no fewer than 18,C00 prisoners, 120 guns, four aeroplanes and a large mass of war material and rolling stock fell to the victors. The scattered remnants of the Turkish army were endeavoring to cross the Jordan fords in the small section open to them, btrt were almost without roads to reach them. Those which fled north before the advanEkig in fantry were rapidly gathered in by the cavalry, who had established themselves in Nazareth and Beisan by 20 September. The northward roads from Jericho and Jerusalem meet .at Beisan, together with two others from the city of Samaria and from across the Jordan. The cavalry racing down the Samaria highwaY reached and occupied Jenin, and thus blociced for the fleeing Turks another group of roads spreading fanwise toward the north. Other detachments pursued such bodies of the enemy as were struggling in the direction of Damascus as far as Tiberias, Semakh, and Es Samrah on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. When the British cavalry reached Nazareth, the site of the enemy headquarters, fighting developed in tile streets and some 2,000 prisoners were taken.