IV. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE ATTILMPT AT A RECONSTRUCTION OF TLIE SMALL TION' ACCORDING TO THB PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION.
1. The Difficulties hi Applying the Princi ple of Nationality to the Reconstruction of Europe.— The principle of national self determination as applied to the reconstruc tion of Europe meant, in its most fundamen tal and general sense, die redrawing of the map of Europe, so that state lines wosild coincide with the etlmographic boundaries of the distinct national units which had been here tofore either thwarted in obtaining complete political unity or had been denied any political independence and existence whatever. This guiding tenet of nationality had, however, to be accepted by the Peace Conference with reser. Nations and had to be governed by good judg ment and common sense, or its enforceinent would have resulted merely in a return to some thing near complete political anarchy. As Mr. Zimmern has pointed out: "If the sentiment of nationaliti were admitted se sole and sufficient claim for a change of government French pineds would peas to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway. while the New York police would become servants of the new Home Rule govern ment in Ireland. The theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood min easily be reduced to an absurdity." Were there available space it would be most instructive to summarize what is known about the claims presented by the small nations at the Peace Conference. It is perfectly obvious that in many, if not most cases, the claims have em braced all the territory to which the most shad owy pretensions could be advanced, apparently in the hope that after extensive reductions in the original claims the territory assigned would be somewhat more than what each nation could hope to receive on the basis of the facts in the case. Such representative conflicting claims as those of Italy and jugo-Slavia to Dalmatia, Is tria, Fiume and Trieste; of Albania and Greece to Epirus; of Greece and Bulgaria to Mace donia and Thrace; of Greece and Italy to the Dodecanese Islands; of Rumania and Bulgaria to the Dobrudja; of Serbia and Bulgaria to western Macedonia; of Rumania and Serbia to the Banat; of Rumania and the Ruthenians of Galicia to Bdcowina; of Poland, Czecho-Slo vakia and the 'Ukraine to eastern Galicia; of Poland and the Ulcraine over their boundary line; of Poland to Lithuania; of Czecho-Slova kia and Poland to upper Silesia ; and of the Poles and Germans to Posen and West Prussia afford overwhelming proof that the principle ,of strict fairness and a conciliatory and com promising policy have not guided these states or potentiarstates in their negotiations at Paris.
They have apparently decided to stake the fu ture of their nations upon the success which might attend their *higgling in the boundary market of Paris.* While these extreme claims put forth by the small nations have created po litical and diplomatic problems of the first mag nitude, they are so obviously out of accord with a true application of the national principle in the contested regions that they may be passed over without further mention. Attention may be given to a brief survey of what has so far been achieved by the Peace Conference in redis tributing the territory inhabited by the peoples of the lesser states and in granting political in. dependence to the suppressed nations.
2. The Achievements of the Peace Con ference.—Any summary at the present time of the reconstruction of boundaries in central and eastern Europe must necessarily be unsatisfac tory on account of the absence of a final and definite settlement of the problem by the Peace Conference in many of the largest areas where some sort of a redistribution of territory was rendered inevitable by the war. In particular does this statement apply to regions formerly a part of Russia or Hungary, for the Allies have steadily. refused to enter into formal peace negotiations with the Soviet government of Russia or the late Soviet goveriunent of Hun gary. In addition to this cause for de.* in the settlement, there have been many others, es pecially the above-mentioned condicting claims of the small nations, and the secret agreements made among the Allied states during the prott rem of the war, which have been most diffirta of fulfilment in harmony with the principle of national self-determination. Finally, the neces sity of taking many plebiscites to determine ex act boundary demarcation, and the difficulties inherent in this process through racial and national complications have operated further to obstruct progress.