By such methods on 20 September a second advance in the same region proved successful. The troops worked their way forward across lines of defense that seemed beyond human ability to take. On 26 September another advance was made, and still another on 4 October. Then came a long series of struggles for limited ob jectives, all fought through in rain or mud. It was remarked when an unusual downpour came it was a certain sign that a British attack was scheduled for that particular moment. Thus through October the lines crept forward, and on 6 November the town of Passchendaele was gained with the ridge which dominated the surrounding positions. The weather had done 1 its worst, but pludc and coura e had triumphed. The third battle of Ypres, 31 uly to 6 Novem ber, had ended with the ritish on high ground and the Germans seven miles east of the ruined town.
Nevertheless the battle was a British failure. It was undertaken as the first stage of a large campaign. All that had been won in more than three months was on the plan for the first fort night. When it ended there was no opportumty to go on with the original plan. The 4th Army at Nieuport was not called into action, and the Germans sat securely for another winter in the coast towns of Belgium. But the failure was not due to bad fighting or defective leader ship; never did the British acquit themselves better. They took 24,065 prisoners and 74 guns and slew many; but their own losses were heavier than the losses of the Germans. Tw-o things were against them in this struggle: the weather, which should have been foreseen, as it was ordinarily bad in Flanders, and the re moval of German divisions from the Russian front. But the struggle was not all lost. It served to reduce the man power of the Germans and to push them back on the east from dangerous proximity to Ypres and Haze brouck. They were by that much—five precious miles — further away from the Channel than they would have been when in April 1918, they made their last great drive in that direction, and nearly reached the hills southwest of Ypres from which the glistening waters of the Channel can be seen on a clear day. In finding the balance of loss and gain the conclusion may be that the operations were worth all they cost in death and miserable living.
While the third battle of Ypres was being fought wilh so much difficulfror during the months of August to November General Petain conducted two brilliant minor engagetnents which had important local results and served to restore the drooping spirits of the French people, so badly shaken by the failure of the second battle of the Aisne. The first was at Verdun and the other was on t.he crest of the Heights of the Aisne, where the great battle was broken off before the Germans were driven from their footholds.
In the Verdun engagement the French were under the immediate conunand of General Guillemat and the Germans were under General von Gallwitz. The first had reason to believe his opponent was about to undertake some aggressive movement on the west bank of the Meuse, where the Germans held Hill 304 and Mort Homme, positions not affected by Nivelle's brilliant thrusts of October and December 1916. General Guillemat made his arrange
ments with great thoroughness. From 7-17 July he condncted several actions with limited objectives which gave him advantageous points for an attack along his line on both sides of the river. He opened the battle in the early dawn of 20 Aug. 1917, after three days of intense bombardment which played havoc with the German advanced trenches. All his objec tives were won, and in the fighting of the suc ceeding fortnight the Germans were pushed back on each side of the river until they stood, on 9 September, practically where they began the great battle on 21 Feb. 1916. In these engage ments the French took more than 10,000 pns oners and inflicted heavy losses in lcilled and wouncled.
General Petain then turned to the Heights of the Aisne, where the Germans still held out on the northern edge of the elevation west of the California Plateau. At this point the plateau was three miles wide and six long and the two lines faced each other across it. Gen eral Maistre was in immediate command of the French troops and made careful preparations for the attack. On 17 October he began a bom bardment of intense fury and six days later the infantry attacked at dawn, driving fonvard two and a quarter miles on a four-mile front and taking 8,000 prisoners. Within the next four days the French continued their advance until the whole plateau was in their hands and the northern slopes down to the meadows border ing the Ailette River. From the newly won heights they had a view of Laon six miles away.
The year 1917 was now coming to a close. So far a.s fighting in the west was concerned the Germans had lost the initiative, their only action in that character being the purely de fensive fighting of the spring retreat. It was followed by the battles of Arras and the second Aisne struggle, the third battle of Ypres, and the two blows of the French just described. In all of them the Allies were merely pounding on the German stonewall. It is true Nivelle's battle was inaugurated with the view of making a grand breach through which a decisive blow could be delivered. Haig's plans for Ypres also contem plated a grand offensive which would have a decisive influence on the course of the war. But both efforts resolved themselves into mere shock attacks under the pressure of dire neces sity. Haig at Arras and Petain at Verdun and on the Aisne Heights were merely fighting for limited objectives, taking toll of lives and territory as they could without im agining that they would do much to end the war in that particular effort. Of the same nature was the battle of Cambrai, 20 Nov. to 7 Dec. 1917, which General Haig precipitated as soon as he could break off the battle of Ypres.