We have seen that those processes of fully explicit will that we term voluntary acts are always accompanied by a somewhat clear con sciousness of the end to be realized and of the relation of means to this end. Moreover, in a fully deliberative act of will, there is also a recognition of various competing possibilities and a conscious selection of one to the exclusion of the others. Instead of allowing an impulse. to pass at once into action in accordance with the immediate demands of some single want or uneasiness, in voluntary states consciousness takes control, looking before and after and comparing the consequences of different lines of action. In many cases its efficiency and control are shown by checking or inhibiting the imme diate impulse by the thought of some more val uable end with which it conflicts.
How are such volitions to be described psy chologically? What actually goes on when a decision is voluntarily made? If we leave out of account the various sensations of muscular strain that accompany volitions, we may say that the essence of the act consists in fixing one alternative and holding it fast before us by means of selective attention. This attention is not passively determined by the greater intensity or immediate attractiveness of one object, but is the result of the fullest activity of the subject, and is at once a psychological fact and a mov ing force in the external world. As Professor James remarks: 'We do not first have a sen sation or thought, and then have to add some thing to it to get a movement. Movement is the natural immediate effect of feeling, irre spective of what the quality of the feeling may be. It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional expression, it is so in voluntary life • The Freedom of the The vexed problem of the freedom of the will arises from the fact that there seems to be an antagonism between the demands of our intellect and those of our moral nature. On the one hand, there is the requirement that all phenomena of the inner life, like those of external nature, shall be capable of explanation according to the law of cause and effect. On the other hand, it is maintained that if morality is to have any meaning, the individual must be free and thus responsible for his acts. In favor of determin ism, it is argued that the mental life is com posed of a series of states or processes that are related to each other causally just as are events in the external world; this is the neces sary assumption of psychology and of all the sciences that attempt to explain the mental life 'Whenever determination by necessary laws ceases, there also the possibility if ;tit,: explanation.' Moreover, determinists point out that the individual is moved to act by certain motives and that these motives are the resultant of certain external influences as modified by his character. This character again is the product of previous acts, either of his own or of his ancestors; so that at any time the act performed is the necessary reaction of the individual in the given circumstances. Furthermore, it is maintained that there is an unbroken line be tween acts that arc performed from instinct or impulse, and where consequently there can be no claim made for freedom, and the most com plicated and deliberate acts of will. On the other side, those who contend for freedom argue that we have no right to consider the mind of man as simply a part of nature and subject like it to necessary laws of causation. They urge in support of their position that per sonality, the principle of intelligence itself, can not properly be represented as one factor on a level with others, but that it is the centre from which the very conception of law springs, and ,on another side is the determining ground of all motives and furnishes the standard by which they are evaluated. Appeal is also made to
the immediate conviction of freedom that is present in all genuine cases of willing. Further, it is said that it is only on the assumption of freedom that such terms as "responsibility,* "duty," "obligation" and "remorse" have any meaning. He who denies freedom, then, declares the experiences denoted by these words to be illusory.
It is impossible to give in the present article a detailed examination of these arguments. A few remarks may, however, be added regarding the general nature of the problem and the lines along which a reconciliation may be effected. In the first place, it is obvious that this con troversy is a special phase of the general prob lem of mechanism (q•v.) and teleology (q.v.). Is everything to be explained according to neces sary laws of cause and effect, or is it possible without doing violence to this principle to main tain a determination according to ends? If it is possible for the individual to set before him self the ends of his life, and to work for their realization, he is free in the only sense in which the word has any meaning. If, however, his acts are determined by some force that acts independently of him, he cannot be held re sponsible. Again, determinism is the only standpoint from which psychology as a natural science can proceed. For this science views the mental life as made up of a series of processes or mental phenomena. Its task, therefore, is to discos er how these various elements are linked together according to causal laws. From the very nature of its postulates it is impossible to admit that there is any break in the line of causes and effects; "state of mind" must be explained by showing that it stands in neces sary relations to some other phenomena belong ing to the same series. But this is to look at the mind from the outside, as composed of a number of phenomena, or mere occurrences in time. It is, however, possible to describe mind in a way that is truer to the direct experience of life, as a system of conscious functions or acts in which purposes are being realized and ends attained thromh the seli-dirt cted activity of the subject. As coon as this point of view is taken the causal and deterministic position is left behind, and the only possible assumption is that of self-determination or freedom. The conclusion we have reached then is that, so long as we regard mind from the standpoint of psy chology as a science, everything must he ex plained causally, and that there is no possibility of introducing here the conception of freedom But we have also seen that this standpoint is not final, but that experience can be more ade quately interpreted as a process in which a con scious subject realizes ends that he himself sets, and that this view necessarily regards mind as something more than a series of causally deter mined phenomena.
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