BARBARY POWERS, United States Treaties and Wars with the. The four Mo hammedan states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, though either independent or nominally tributary to Turkey, were for some three centuries, the 16th to the 19th, a common foe to Mediterranean commerce and travel. Almost their entire subsistence was on the produce of piracy: either the avails of captured stores, the ransoms for prisoners held in slavery or the blackmail paid by other powers for immunity. The large states paid them a regular annual tribute — though by joining forces they could have stopped the piracy at any time,— on the express ground that it gave them the monopoly of Mediterranean trade against the small ones which could not afford it; and England, which paid about $280,000 a year, deliberately put the price high to pre vent others from bidding up to it. Even these sums bought only temporary truce, as the pirate state lived on depredahons, and the tribute had to be supplemented with constant presents and concessions. A part of this tribute was always demanded in armed vessels, ammunition and naval stores, so that the civilized powers furnished the means for plundering themselves. The ransom of cap tives f rom them was a leading object of public and private charity, and collections were taken up in churches for this end. In 1786 there were 2,200 Christian captives in Algiers alone. When the United States began to send vessels to the Mediterranean no longer protected by the English flag, the pirates at once assailed them; and in July 1785, the Algerines captured two vessels and 21 men. Congress appro priated $80,000 in 1784 to buy immunity after the European model; but it seemed likely to cost nearer $1,000,000, and, reversing their usual parts, John Adams preferred to pay as a cheaper resort than fighting, while Jefferson considered fighting both cheaper, more honor able and the preparation for a better future. Morocco, for some reason much the most amenable, signed in 1787 a 50-years' peace with out tribute, though with the understanding of some presents to the Sultan, and kept it, save for a short time in 1803. The Dey of Algiers asked $59,496 for his captives, or over $2,800 each, though the last French captives ransomed had only cost $300, or with costs, $500; and the matter hung fire for several years, 11 of the 21 dying before the final ransom of 1795. In 1793, by the carelessness or bad faith of an English counsul, the Algerine corsairs gained entrance to the open sea beyond the Strait of Gibraltar, and captured 10 United States ves sels at a blow, the number of our captives in their hands in November being 115. Negotia tions were set on foot, and on 5 Sept. 1795 Congress paid Algiers $992,46325 for peace and the ransom of all our prisoners — this sum including a 36-gun frigate costing $99,727, and about $100,000 worth of stores and ammu nition. It also engaged to pay $21,600 a year thereafter in naval stores, $20,000 on presenta tion of a consul, biennial presents of $17,000, and other regular and incidental gifts. In 1798 it sent four armed vessels as arrears. A treaty was made with Tripoli in November 17%, on much the same terms save that there were no ransoms; and one with Tunis, in 1799, for $107,000. The cost of immunities and ran soms in 1802 had been over $2,000,000; and of course even this bought nothing permanent. The Pasha of Tripoli broke the treaty in three years and a half, demanding $225,000 with $25,000 annually, and on refusal declared war, 14 May 1801. A squadron under Commodore Dale was sent to the Mediterranean and blockaded Tripoli, also forcing Algiers and Tunis to think better of their threatened alliance with it and to renew their treaties.
Morris succeeded him, but was soon recalled. Preble, who took his place, 1803-04, forced Morocco, which had joined Tripoli, to with draw from the alliance and renew its treaties; carried on a vigorous blockade; and bom barded Tripoli five times. Barron succeeded Preble, but in the middle of 1805 turned over the command to Rodgers, who at once pre pared for a grand bombardment and assault. The scale was turned, however, by William Eaton (q.v.), who took up the cause of the Pasha's elder brother, Hamet Caramelli, driven from the throne some years before, or ganized at Alexandria a singular rabble of cosmopolites, and after a desperate six weeks' march across the desert, captured, with the aid of the navy, the seaport of Derne in Barca, several hundred miles east of Tripoli. The Pasha feared an insurrection as well as Rod gers' attack; and hastily signed on 3 June 1805, with Tobias Lear, United States consul general at Algiers, who had come to Tripoli on purpose, a treaty by which the United States paid $60,000 ransom for the prisoners, left Hamet's supporters to the Pasha's yen geance and Hamet himself to beg the United States for a pension, and allowed the Pasha four years to deliver up Hamet's wife and children. The need and honor of this abject surrender of our government belongs to his torical polemics. The embargo of 1807 pre vented further trouble for some years by an nihilating our commerce; but after its removal in 1810 the depredations were renewed, and in 1812 Algiers was ready for more gratifications. The Dey had received from us $378,363, but made out a case for $27,000 arrears, forced the United States consul to borrow it at usurious rates, and then, ordering him out of the coun try, declared war. The War of 1812, however, having denuded the Mediterranean of our trading-vessels, he captured only one brig and 11 persons; and after the war our naval force under Decatur was turned against Algiers. He found its entire fleet at sea; captured two and cut off the rest from port; entered the city 30 June 1815, 41 days after sailing; and forced the bey to sign within three hours, without gift or present, on pain of having his city destroyed and his fleet captured, a treaty abolishing all tribute or presents of any sort thereafter from the United States, delivering up all his cap tives and agreeing that henceforth prisoners of war should not be made slaves, and paying in demnity for the captured brig. Tunis and Tripoli having allowed English ships to seize American prizes in their harbors, Decatur pro ceeded to both places and forced their rulers to make similar treaties, pay indemnities and re lease all their Christian prisoners of whatever nations. This magnificent action of the United States induced the English government to take similar steps the next year, but Tunis and Tripoli did not abandon piracy till 1819, and Algiers was not finally reduced till 1829 by France. It was the United States which first lifted this incubus of
(as the entire system was compendiously called) piracy and slavery from the Christian world. Consult Schuyler, E.,