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Belief

beliefs, knowledge, rests, evidence and sufficient

BELIEF. In a general sense belief is the assent of the understanding to the truth of a proposition, but in a technical and theological sense has come to be used as a mental exercise somewhat depending upon the volition of the individual. The word is used to mean the ac ceptance of a proposition, statement or fact as true on the ground of evidence, authority or irresistible mental predisposition; the state of trust in and reliance on a person, thing or prin ciple; as also. for the fact believed, and some times specifically for the Apostles' Creed. Be lief is by some distinguished from knowledge, inasmuch as the latter rests on evidence, while belief rests on authority. Belief should, some say, not be used of facts occurring in one's own experience, or principles of which the opposite implies absurdity, such as the law of contradiction in deductive logic. These we Icnow, and, according to this view, the term should be limited to cases where a proposition is accepted without evidence, or where such evidence as is available implies only probability. On the other hand, certain psychologists are accustomed to regard as beliefs the fttndamental data on which reasoning rests; and to say that all knowledge rests ultimately on belief. Belief, they say, may admit of all degrees of confidence, from a slight suspicion to full as surance. There are many operations of mind in which it is an ingredient — consciousness, remembrance, perception. Kant defined opinion as a judgment which is insufficiently based, sub jectively as well as objectively; belief, as sub jectively sufficient but objectively inadequate; knowledge, as both subjectively and objectively sufficient. The strongest beliefs may, of course,

be false; beliefs in ghosts, astrological prog nostications, etc., are usually treated as supersti tions. Beliefs as such rest on grounds regarded as sufficient by thc person believing, who is pre pared to act on his belief ; but their grounds may have absolutely no validity for any other per son. Such beliefs are nevertheless very real. On the other hand there are many propositions accepted traditionally, and spoken of as beliefs, which are not real, vital abiding truths for those who nominally accept them; which have no influence on character or mental tone, and on which those who hold them would not be pre pared to act. Faith is a word used in very much the same sense as belief, but especially signifies the acceptance of and reliance on the truths of religion.

Bibliography.— Bain, (The Emotions and the Will' (London 1800) ; Balfour, 'The Foundations of Belief) ; Brentano, 'Psycholo gie) (Leipzig 1874) ; Carveth, (Conditions of Belief in Immature Minds) (in British Jourtusl of Psychology, Vol. VI, p. 304, 1914) ; Doras wamy, 'Knowledge, Belief and Will) (in 'Brahmavadin,) Vol. IX, p. 85, 1904) ; Hume, 'Inquiry' (Oxford 1894) ; James, (Psychology' (New York 1890) ; Ladd, (What Shall I Be lieve) (1915) ; Mill,