Although some losses were sustained by the Baltimore branch of the bank, the institution went along without encountering any particular political hostility until 1829, when President Jackson in his annual message to Congress raised the question of the constitutionality of the bank, claiming at the same time that "it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency,° He suggested that if a national bank was necessary one might be de vised founded upon the credit of the govern ment and its revenues, thus avoiding the ques tion of constitutionality.
At the beginning of the administration of General Jackson, says Mr. Parton, the Bank of the United States was a truly imposing institution. Its capital was $35,000,000. The public money deposited in its vaults averaged six or seven millions; its private deposits six millions more; its circulation twelve millions; its discounts more than forty millions a year; its annual profits more than three millions. Its capital was, therefore, about one-quarter, and its loans, circulation and deposits about one fif th of the whole amount held and issued by all the banks of the country. Besides the parent bank at Philadelphia, with its marble palace and 100 clerks, there were 25 branches in the towns and cities of the Union, eac.h of which had its president, cashier and board of directors. The employees of the bank were more than 500 in number, all men of standing and influence, all liberally salaried. In every State of the Union and in many foreign nations of the globe were stocicholders of the Bank of the United States. One-fifth of the stock was owned by foreigners. One-tenth of its stock was held by women, orphans and trustees of charity funds. Its bank notes were as good as gold in every part of the country. From Maine to Georgia, from Georgia to Astoria, a man could travel and pass these notes at every point without discount, and it is said that in London, Paris, Rome, Cairo, Calcutta, Saint Petersburg and other prominent cities, the notes of the Bank of the United States were within a frac tion more or a fraction less than their value at home, according to the current rate of ex change. They could actually be sold at a pre mium at the remotest commercial centres. It was not uncommon for the stock of the bank to be sold at a premium of 40 per cent. The directors of the bank were 25 in number, of whom five were appointed by the President of the United States. The bank and its branches received and disbursed the entire revenue of the nation.
The first real attack upon the second Bank of the United States originated in a political controversy. Jeremiah Mason had been elected president of the branch of the bank at Ports mouth, N. H. On his accession to this position he instituted some reforms in the management which rendered him unpopular. This gave to Levi Woodbury, a political antagonist, an op portunity to demand his removal. The charges
ag-ainst Mason and others of like nature affect ing the branches in Kentucicy and Louisiana were transmitted by Secrefary Ingham to Nicholas Biddle, president of the bank. The attacks upon Mason and the Portsmouth branch continued and grew more violent, and the political hostility of President Jackson was increasing. In his message for 1831 he again called the attention of Congress to the question of recharter. A bill with this object in view passed both Houses of Congress in the follow ing year, but was vetoed by President Jackson on 10 July.
Jackson's inconsistency in his message and in his veto are thus summed up. In 1829, when the charter had yet seven years to run, he calls attention to the necessity of prompt action as to the recharter in order to avoid precipitancy. In 1830 when the charter had yet six years to run, he advocates timely action. In 1831, there being five years more, he reiterates his previous advice; but, in his veto in 1832, when four years only remain to the bank, he says there is no need of haste.
But although the veto was exceedingly vul nerable from almost every standpoint, it served its purpose in arousing the popular feeling against the bank and in favor of Jackson. Ben ton, who in the Senate defended the veto against the attacks of Webster, Clay, Calhoun and Ewing, voiced the whole spirit of the party he represented when he said: "You may continue to be for a bank and for Jackson, but you cannot be for this bank and for Jackson. The bank is now the open, as it has long been the secret, enemy of Jackson. The war is now upon Jackson, and if he is defeated all the rest will fall an easy prey. What individual could stand in the States against the power of that bank, and that bank flushed with a victory over the conqueror of the conquerors of Bonaparte? The whole Gov ernment will fall into the hands of the moneyed power. An oligarchy would be immediately es tablished, and that oligarchy in a few genera tions would ripen into a monarchy.° The bill for the recharter could not secure the necessary two-thirds vote for the passage over the veto. Nor did the supporters of the bank fully realize, even then, the effect of the President s opposition. They thought the people would be disgusted at Jackson's un reasonable attitude. Nicholas Biddle wrote to Clay that he was delighted with the veto. The campaign of 1832 was fought on the bank issue. It was the hero of New Orleans against the "monster monopoly.° It was Jackson like a hero of romance fighting against "Old Nick's Money* and "Clay's Rags." The bank, having foolishly gone into politics, was defeated and Jackson again elected. The support of the people was at once claimed for all past and future warfare on the bank, and the result of the election sealed its doom. The attack prom ised on the stump began at once.